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Making the Premises about Constitutional Meaning 
Express: The New Originalism and Its Critics 
André LeDuc*1 
ABSTRACT 
Perhaps the hottest front in the half-century-old debate over 
originalism turns on the introduction of semantics, pragmatics, and 
other techniques from the philosophy of language and linguistic the-
ory. While in some ways these arguments simply build on the now 
familiar distinction between interpretation and construction defended 
by the New Originalism, the newest of the New Originalists purport 
to break new ground in the debate. The originalists argue that they 
have rehabilitated originalism so as to avoid the criticisms that had 
been leveled against earlier versions, including those leveled against 
earlier versions of New Originalism. The newest critics argue that 
the sophisticated tools of linguistic philosophy, when properly ap-
plied in their hands, offer new and decisive challenges to originalism, 
including the newest of the New Originalisms. While the arguments 
on both sides of the debate have been welcomed as a new and excit-
ing intellectual development by the academy, this article demon-
strates why these efforts are yet another wrong turn to a dead end in 
the debate. 
This article thus performs a critical mission. It argues that the 
linguistic claims of the most recent wave of the New Originalism, like 
Solum and Soames, and those of their most recent philosophically 
sophisticated critics, like Marmor and Fallon, fail to advance the de-
bate over originalism. Each side places demands on philosophical ar-
gument that cannot be met. Philosophical argument cannot perform 
that role as a matter of our constitutional practice and as a matter of 
the nature of philosophical argument. The philosophical sophistica-
tion of the newest of the New Originalists and their critics is only  
 
 
*. I am grateful to Stewart Schoder and Laura Litten for thoughtful comments on an earlier 
draft, and to Dennis Patterson, Charlotte Crane, Jeff Greenblatt, and Kristin Hickman for 
comments on some closely related material. Errors that remain are the author’s own. 
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another Ptolemaic epicycle in a debate that should be abandoned, not 
pursued. 
I. INTRODUCTION: THE NEW FRONT IN THE DEBATE 
Perhaps the hottest front in the half-century-old debate over 
originalism hinges on the introduction of semantics, pragmatics, and 
other techniques from the philosophy of language and linguistic the-
ory to resolve the debate.2 While in some ways the new arguments 
introduced simply build on the now familiar distinction between in-
terpretation and construction defended by the New Originalism, the 
newest of the New Originalists purport to break new ground in the 
debate.3 The most recent originalist theorists argue that they have 
 
 2.  See, e.g., William Baude & Stephen E. Sachs, The Law of Interpretation, 130 
HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017); Richard Fallon, The Meaning of Meaning, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1235 (2015) [hereinafter Fallon, Meaning] (addressing the nature of constitutional mean-
ing to rebut linguistic philosophical arguments against the pluralist account of constitutional 
law that Fallon had previously defended); ANDREI MARMOR, THE LANGUAGE OF LAW 123 
(2014) [hereinafter MARMOR, LANGUAGE] (dismissing originalism as untenable as an account 
of constitutional meaning and interpretation); Scott Soames, Deferentialism: A Post-Originalist 
Theory of Legal Interpretation, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 597 (2013) [hereinafter Soames, Defer-
entialism] (defending a modified, limited form of originalism that privileges original meanings 
in certain cases but recognizing the need for non-linguistic methods when ambiguity and poly-
semy make the meaning of the constitutional law text too uncertain to admit of interpretation); 
Lawrence B. Solum, Communicative Content and Legal Content, 89 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 
479 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, Communicative Content] (arguing that there is an important 
distinction between the semantic, communicative content of a constitutional text and its au-
thoritative communicative content, endorsing the claim that the constitutional text is funda-
mentally a communication); Lawrence B. Solum, Semantic Originalism, Ill. Pub. Law & Legal 
Theory Res. Papers Ser. No. 07-24 [hereinafter Solum, Semantic Originalism] (offering a com-
prehensive statement of an originalism that articulates a complex account of the semantic 
meaning of the constitutional text and distinguishing between those constitutional provisions 
that are to be interpreted and those for which substantive constitutional construction is re-
quired); Cass R. Sunstein, There is Nothing That Interpretation Just Is, 30 CONST. COMMENT 
193 (2015) [hereinafter Sunstein, Nothing] (arguing that the choice among alternative interpre-
tive methods requires normative judgments); Mark Greenberg, Legislation as Communication? 
Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication, in PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS OF LANGUAGE IN THE LAW 217 (Andrei Marmor & Scott Soames eds., 2011) 
(arguing that the purpose and role of legislation is not simply a matter of communication, fo-
cusing upon what the legal texts are doing); 1 SCOTT SOAMES, Interpreting Legal Texts: What 
Is, and What Is Not, Special about Law, in PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS: NATURAL LANGUAGE: 
WHAT IT IS AND HOW WE USE IT 403 (2009) [hereinafter SOAMES, Legal Texts] (arguing that 
the particular features of legal texts are less important than the general features of language that 
have been inadequately understood in the legal literature exploring interpretation). 
 3.  See generally Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. 
POL’Y 599, 599–600 (2004) [hereinafter Whittington, New Originalism] (distinguishing mod-
ern forms of originalism from the reactionary, early originalism focused on discrediting the 
constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren Court). But see Mark Tushnet, Heller and the New 
Originalism, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 609 (2008) [hereinafter Tushnet, Heller] (arguing that there is 
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rehabilitated originalism so as to avoid the criticisms that had been 
leveled against earlier versions.4 The critics respond that the sophisti-
cated tools of linguistic philosophy offer new and decisive challenges 
to originalism. The arguments on both sides of the debate have been 
welcomed as a new and exciting intellectual development by the 
academy.5 This article demonstrates why these arguments are yet an-
other wrong turn to a dead end in the debate. 
In this article I perform a critical mission, arguing that the lin-
guistic claims of the most recent wave of New Originalists, like So-
lum and Soames, and those of their most recent philosophically so-
phisticated critics, like Marmor and Fallon, fail to advance the debate 
over originalism. Each side places demands on philosophical argu-
ment that cannot be met. Philosophical argument cannot perform 
that role as a matter of our constitutional practice and as a matter of 
the nature of philosophical argument. The philosophical sophistica-
tion of the newest of the New Originalists and their critics is only 
another scholastic twist in a debate that should be abandoned, not 
pursued. 
The efforts by the protagonists to enlist philosophical theory ad-
mittedly appear interesting and seemingly important, even to jaded 
observers of the interminable originalism debate. The protagonists 
argue that their new techniques will advance the debate. I have previ-
ously argued that the debate has been hampered by its protagonists’ 
failure to recognize the tacit premises in the debate.6 To the extent 
that the protagonists increasingly articulate their underlying linguis-
tic commitments, articulating and defending the linguistic commit-
ments might appear responsive to my concern that the tacit premises 
 
less new substance to the New Originalism than is often claimed). 
 4.  See, e.g., Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 172–73 (concluding that the 
philosophical arguments he has articulated confirm common sense understandings); Soames, 
Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 614–17 (asserting that his deferentialist theory is descriptively 
and prescriptively superior to non-deferentialist accounts). 
 5.  Thus, a major conference was convened at Fordham Law School to explore these 
developments. See generally Symposium, The New Originalism in Constitutional Law, 82 
FORDHAM L. REV. 371 (2013) (including contributions by Barnett, Whittington, Solum, 
Soames, Marmor, and Balkin).  
 6.  See André LeDuc, The Ontological Foundations of the Debate over Originalism, 7 
WASH. U. JURIS. REV. 263 (2015) [hereinafter LeDuc, Ontological Foundations] (articulating 
the tacit ontological and other philosophical commitments underlying the claims advanced in 
the originalism debate); André LeDuc, The Relationship of Constitutional Law to Philosophy: 
Five Lessons from the Originalism Debate, 12 GEO. J. L. & PUB. POL’Y 99 (2014) [hereinafter 
LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation] (arguing why the philosophical com-
mitments made by the protagonists are generally mistaken). 
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in the debate have gone unrecognized. That express articulation of 
the debate’s linguistic philosophical premises may appear to represent 
a step forward in the debate. It is helpful to distinguish the classical 
debate over originalism with its tacit linguistic commitments from 
the modern debate where the commitments are express and the role 
of the philosophical arguments central. 
But some originalists also claim that a more sophisticated philo-
sophical analysis of constitutional language will advance the original-
ist position.7 While they certainly have the right to call themselves 
the New New Originalists,8 they do not. I will simply lump them to-
gether with the other New Originalists. The critics make the corre-
sponding claim that their sophisticated linguistic methods will refute 
the originalist claims. These claims warrant our attention, if not on 
their own terms, then at least on their merits.9 I will argue that these 
claims are more confused and less productive than their proponents 
and most observers hope. 
Second, the claims tacitly challenge the deflationary account of 
the debate that I have defended.10 I characterize my account as defla-
tionary because I discount the theoretical or practical significance of 
the debate over originalism, arguing that it is a confused or, at best, 
misguided controversy.11 The sophisticated techniques and argu-
ments offer a seductive and exciting strategy to continue the debate. 
If I am right, this deflationary account must extend to these new 
 
 7.  See, e.g., Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2, at 481–82 (arguing that 
communicative content is prior to legal content, the legal binding force of a legal text, and that 
the contribution of communicative content to legal content is sensitive to context); Solum, Se-
mantic Originalism, supra note 2 (employing a sophisticated philosophical account of linguistic 
content to defend a version of originalism). See also Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2 (de-
fending a purported alternative to originalism that privileges the originally understood meaning 
of the constitutional text in certain cases). 
 8.  Leading examples are Larry Solum, Jack Balkin, perhaps Scott Soames (depending 
upon whether to classify his deferentialism as a variety of originalism). 
 9.  In order to engage the arguments in the debate derived from philosophical accounts 
of meaning, it is necessary to accept, at least provisionally, some of the tacit claims by the pro-
tagonists. For a fuller account of such a therapeutic approach, see André LeDuc, Originalism, 
Therapy, and the Promise of Our American Constitution (Sept. 19, 2016) (unpublished manu-
script) (on file with author) [hereinafter LeDuc, Therapy and Promise] (describing the patho-
logical features of the debate and the confused and otiose assumptions of the debate’s partici-
pants whose force must be acknowledged before they can be left behind). 
 10.  See André LeDuc, The Anti-Foundational Challenge to the Philosophical Premises 
of the Debate over Originalism, 119 PA. ST. L. REV. 131 (2014) [hereinafter LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge] (defending an anti-foundational account of our constitutional argu-
ment and decisional practice); LeDuc, Therapy and Promise, supra note 9. 
 11.  See generally LeDuc, Therapy and Promise, supra note 9, at 30–45 (describing the 
pathological features inherent in the debate over originalism). 
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gambits or it must be rejected. My earlier arguments apply easily to 
the new moves in the debate and the metaphilosophical argument I 
offered against the ontological premises of the debate is equally pow-
erful here.12 That argument is metaphilosophical because it relies on 
a philosophical account of the nature of philosophy and philosophical 
argument.13 I argue that philosophical argument cannot ground our 
constitutional practice or our constitutional argument and cannot 
provide a basis for the radical revision of those arguments and prac-
tice. 
I have previously explored some of the originalism debate’s key 
jurisprudential assumptions.14 The protagonists have also assumed 
accounts of meaning that explain what the semantic import of the 
constitutional text is and how it is communicated (and otherwise 
functions linguistically). In particular, the protagonists generally as-
sume that the constitutional text has a determinate semantic meaning 
that is controlling as a matter of constitutional law. Those commit-
ments to an account of semantic meaning are of signal importance to 
the respective positions taken in the debate. They are important be-
cause the underlying account of meaning makes the debate—as a 
controversy over the meaning of the Constitution—possible. The 
protagonists generally agree that there is an objective meaning of the 
Constitution to be determined by interpretation.15 But they disagree 
about what that meaning is and what the proper methods of interpre-
tation are. Increasingly, these commitments are articulated and de-
fended in philosophically sophisticated ways.16 Nevertheless, these 
positions cannot be sustained. I have not yet explored those commit-
 
 12.  See LeDuc, Therapy and Promise, supra note 9, at 45–55 (describing the ontologi-
cal foundations of the debate in the reification of the Constitution); LeDuc, Anti-Foundational 
Challenge, supra note 10, at 138–78 (describing the anti-foundational arguments of Philip 
Bobbitt and Dennis Patterson). 
 13.  See generally LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 6, at 
153–54 (arguing that the nature of our constitutional practice and the requirements imposed 
upon it are inconsistent with the methods and practices of philosophical argument). See also 
LeDuc, Therapy and Promise, supra note 9, at 45–55. 
 14.  LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 6; André LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positiv-
ism and Pragmatism in the Debate about Originalism, 42 OHIO N. U. L. REV. 613 (2016) 
[hereinafter LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism]. 
 15.  See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 31 (“there is a ‘fact of the matter’ 
about the meaning of a given utterance.”); MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 132 (“textu-
alism explicitly endorses an objective conception of the assertive content of an utterance.”). 
 16.  See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 31. See generally Soames, Defer-
entialism, supra note 2 (describing a novel post-originalist account of constitutional interpreta-
tion by a contemporary analytic philosopher of language); Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra 
note 2.  
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ments in the depth that they warrant. This article fills this important 
gap.17 
Historically, originalism has claimed to be a proudly com-
monsensical theory.18 It has eschewed the need for sophisticated 
philosophical or theoretical foundations or methods.19 Many of its 
critics have made corresponding claims.20 Recently, the protagonists 
in the debate have become more philosophically sophisticated in their 
 
 17.  This article is part of a trilogy exploring related premises about meaning, interpreta-
tion, reasoning and positivism in the current debate. See LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra 
note 14 (exploring the challenge of the legal pragmatists to originalism’s account of constitu-
tional interpretation and adjudication); André LeDuc, Competing Accounts of Interpretation 
and Constitutional Argument in the Debate over Originalism (May 27, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter LeDuc, Interpretation and Constitutional Argu-
ment] (exploring premises about interpretation and practical reasoning in the originalism de-
bate). 
 18.  See ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL 
SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 134 (1989) [hereinafter BORK, TEMPTING] (quoting with approba-
tion Joseph Story’s rejection of “metaphysical refinements” in constitutional interpretation). I 
argue elsewhere that such a purported commonsensical approach also masks important philo-
sophical premises that are, at best, problematic. See LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, su-
pra note 10 (defending a non-foundational account of our constitutional law) and LeDuc, On-
tological Foundations, supra note 6 (arguing that originalism and its critics rely on important 
ontological and linguistic philosophical premises). 
 19.  BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 134; ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 117 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) 
[hereinafter SCALIA, INTERPRETATION]. 
 20.  Among originalism’s critics, Sunstein’s pragmatism makes claim to a common sense 
foundation, as when he suggests that the test for all constitutional decisions ought simply to be 
whether we think the outcome would be desirable. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, RADICALS IN 
ROBES: WHY EXTREME RIGHT-WING COURTS ARE WRONG FOR AMERICA 72–73 (2005) 
[hereinafter SUNSTEIN, RADICALS] (arguing that we ought to interpret and apply the Constitu-
tion so as to achieve the best results). That approach fails to offer an adequate account of con-
stitutional argument—or the roles of doctrine and precedent. For Sunstein’s earlier work de-
veloping the theory of minimalism, which Sunstein also appears to believe is a matter of 
common sense, see CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE 
SUPREME COURT (1999) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE]; CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL 
REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 38–48 (1996) [hereinafter SUNSTEIN, LEGAL 
REASONING] (drawing on Rawls’s concept of incompletely theorized agreements to articulate 
the central minimalist concept of incompletely theorized decisions). 
Similarly, Richard Posner appears to claim a commonsense foundation when he suggests 
that we ought to assess whether a decision or interpretation would produce a utility-maximizing 
outcome. See generally Richard A. Posner, Bork and Beethoven, 42 STAN. L. REV. 1365 (1990) 
[hereinafter Posner, Bork] (comparing and contrasting originalism in constitutional theory with 
the original music movement with respect to classical music in the context of an instrumentalist 
critique of originalism). Such a consequentialist approach appears practical and consistent with 
pragmatic strategies. The original music movement did not have the same impact or influence 
as originalism has had; whether that difference calls into question Posner’s analogy is beyond 
my scope here. I am indebted to Koram Jablonko for calling my attention to this musical histo-
ry. 
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approach to meaning.21 Often the protagonists refer to what they are 
describing as semantic meaning, and sometimes this is what they 
mean.22 Often, however, they mean to describe linguistic meaning 
and to incorporate pragmatic import as well as semantic meaning in-
to their account.23 A charitable reading of the claims takes this broad-
er range of meaning into account, unless the context makes it incon-
trovertible that a narrower sense is intended. 
The protagonists argue that the increased sophistication in their 
approach has profound consequences for the debate. On the original-
ist side, for example, Solum argues that sophisticated accounts of 
meaning and the recognition that legal analysis requires linguistic 
techniques that begin with the communicative content of a text, and 
permits a public meaning originalism that answers earlier criticisms 
of originalism.24 Moreover, understanding the nature of the text as a 
communicative artifact also provides an argument for a sophisticated 
originalism.25 The communicative content of the constitutional text is 
derived from more than simply the text’s semantic meaning. Among 
the critics, Soames argues that the originalist commitment to seman-
tic meaning relies on a semantic meaning too austere to do the work 
that needs to be done.26 That flawed reliance renders the originalist 
theory mistaken. Indeed, both sides claim that increased sophistica-
tion with respect to linguistic meaning will win the debate. Both sides 
are wrong. Philosophical sophistication about meaning will not win 
the originalism debate. This article explains why. 
In the classical debate, both sides only tacitly assume or defend a 
 
 21.  See, e.g., Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2; Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra 
note 2; MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2. 
 22.  Even Larry Solum dubs his theory “semantic originalism,” but his argument makes 
his reliance on pragmatics express. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 31–38 
(introducing Grice’s theory). See also Lawrence B. Solum, Originalism and Constitutional 
Construction, 82 FORDHAM L. REV. 453 (2013) [hereinafter Solum, Constitutional Construc-
tion] (emphasizing the important role of constitutional construction for those constitutional 
provisions that do not admit of interpretation). 
 23.  See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 31–38. 
 24.  See generally Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2, at 480–82; Solum, Se-
mantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 31–38 (rebutting Dworkin’s criticism of originalism). 
 25.  Such a theory naturally recognizes the non-semantic sources of meaning for the 
constitutional text. See generally Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 31–33 (explor-
ing the contribution of pragmatics to linguistic content); Solum, Communicative Content, su-
pra note 2, at 480–82 (articulating a fundamental distinction between the semantic content of a 
text and its authoritative communicative content as a matter of law). 
 26.  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 599–600 (arguing that the semantic mean-
ing of a statement must be distinguished from what the statement asserts). 
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variety of conceptual foundations.27 In particular, originalism and 
most of its critics assume that constitutional decision begins with 
constitutional interpretation and that meaning is the object of the in-
terpretative project.28 But the concepts of interpretation and the na-
ture of constitutional meaning are controversial concepts.29 The pro-
tagonists in the debate generally have historically treated those 
foundations as a matter of common sense. When challenged, neither 
the classical originalists30 nor their critics31 have historically offered a 
robust or sophisticated defense of those tacit premises. There have 
also been important recent efforts to ground the originalist and criti-
cal positions firmly on sophisticated analyses of semantic meaning 
and pragmatic use.32 Those efforts are flawed, however, and do not 
 
 27.  For example, originalism and most of its critics assume the tacit premise that consti-
tutional decision begins with constitutional interpretation. As a result of that assumption, the 
performative element of the Constitution—the role of constitutional propositions in doing 
something—is largely overlooked and the complexity of constitutional language both as to 
meaning and use is underestimated. Among the critics of originalism, even Dworkin, who 
makes so much of his philosophical sophistication, assumes that constitutional decision is a mat-
ter of constitutional interpretation. See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in ANTONIN 
SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115, 117 (Amy 
Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, Interpretation] (defining interpretation very broadly 
for this purpose). In doing so, questions of constitutional decision are reduced largely to ques-
tions of interpretation. That leads to the natural error of inferring that we need an interpreta-
tion of a constitutional provision the application of which will determine the decision of the 
case in the court’s opinion. See infra Part III. 
 28.  See generally SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19 (titling his Tanner Lectures 
at Princeton A Matter of Interpretation, at once capturing the claim that constitutional decision 
is a matter of interpretation and the subtler claim that the opponents of originalism’s theory of 
interpretation hold erroneous opinions). 
 29.  See, e.g., Fallon, Meaning, supra note 2 (exploring the complexity of constitutional 
meaning in the context of an argument against originalism and emphasizing the limits of philo-
sophical argument in constitutional theory); Michael Moore, Interpreting Interpretation, in 
LAW AND INTERPRETATION: ESSAYS IN LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 1 (Andrei Marmor ed., 1995) 
[hereinafter Moore, Interpretation] (describing the increased emphasis on broad concepts of 
interpretation in constitutional theory but rejecting that focus as mistaken); Michael Moore, 
The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 871 
(1989) [hereinafter Moore, Interpretative Turn] (criticizing the interpretive turn from a natural 
law stance). 
 30.  The originalists, of course, often purport to offer a theory or account of constitu-
tional interpretation and decision without theoretical or philosophical commitments, and so 
may not remark the absence of such a defense. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, 
at 45; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 253–55. 
 31.  When originalists reject their critics’ claim that original understandings are suffi-
cient to interpret the Constitution, the pervasive commitments to positivism and the priority of 
interpretation shape the critics’ response. See, e.g., RONALD M. DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 
359–69 (1986) [hereinafter DWORKIN, EMPIRE] (employing an idiosyncratic concept of inter-
pretation to criticize originalist theory). 
 32.  See, e.g., Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2 (arguing for a limited form of 
originalism and for a broader concept of linguistic content that goes beyond the austere seman-
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do a much better job of grounding the debate than the tacit com-
monsensical foundations generally employed. I explore these two ju-
risprudential foundations of originalism and its critics, articulating 
the positions underlying originalism’s purportedly commonsense ap-
proach and the positions of its critics,33 as well as the purportedly 
more philosophically sophisticated approaches that have been 
brought into the debate.34 
Next, I tease out how these tacit premises inform the classical de-
bate. The fundamental difference between my account and that of-
fered by New Originalism is that my account does not accept the de-
bate’s premise that there are important differences between the 
originalists and their critics that can be resolved by argument in favor 
of one side or the other. If the debate is not treated as part of a 
healthy constitutional ideopolis,35 the role of the new arguments must 
also be characterized differently. On my account the new arguments 
are sterile, scholastic contributions to a confused and pathological 
debate. 
Originalism and most of its critics assume that constitutional un-
derstanding and decision must begin with determining the meaning 
of the relevant constitutional text.36 Some of originalism’s defend-
ers—including Larry Solum and Jack Balkin—claim that articulating 
the nature of the meaning of a constitutional text can provide a 
stronger originalist theory.37 Some of originalism’s critics like Ronald 
 
tic meaning of constitutional texts); Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2 (defending 
originalism but supplementing the privileged original understandings provided by constitution-
al interpretation with a more free-ranging constitutional construction for those constitutional 
texts that do not admit of interpretation); MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 107–29, 132–
55 (making sophisticated linguistic philosophical arguments against originalism). 
 33.  See infra, Parts II.A, II.B, and II.C.  
 34.  See infra Parts II.D and II.E. 
 35.  See generally LeDuc, Therapy and Promise, supra note 9 (arguing for a therapeutic 
strategy to move beyond the pathological debate without delivering victory to either side); An-
dré LeDuc, Beyond Babel: Achieving the Promise of Our American Constitution, 64 
CLEVELAND ST. L. REV. 185 (2016) [hereinafter LeDuc, Beyond Babel] (sketching elements of 
our constitutional practice in the Court and our constitutional theory in the academy in a post-
debate world); Jonathan Lear, An Interpretation of Transference, INT’L J. OF 
PSYCHOANALYSIS, reprinted in OPEN MINDED: WORKING OUT THE LOGIC OF THE SOUL 
56, 69–73 (1998) [hereinafter Lear, Transference] (describing an ideopolis as an idiosyncratic 
framework she constructs within the shared culture, an idiosyncratic polis). 
 36.  For a critical analysis of the triumph of interpretative theories see Moore, Interpre-
tative Turn, supra note 29. See also Moore, Interpretation, supra note 29. 
 37.  See Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2; Solum, Semantic Originalism, 
supra note 2; JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 103–04 (2011) [hereinafter BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM]. 
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Dworkin,38 Scott Soames,39 and Andrei Marmor40 think attention to 
theories of meaning ground powerful rebuttals to originalism.41 They 
accept the premise that constitutional adjudication begins with the 
meaning of the constitutional text.42 But they argue that the original-
ist account of meaning and of interpretation is flawed and inade-
quate.43 They argue that when we pay attention to sophisticated, 
philosophical accounts of meaning and interpretation we can rebut 
the claims originalism makes.44 
The new linguistic philosophical arguments are only cryptically 
invoked by Dworkin;45 he seems to think that such theories demon-
strate that there is not a meaning of the Constitution in the sense in-
voked by the originalists.46 The new linguistic philosophical argu-
ments get a fuller treatment by Marmor and Soames.47 Marmor is 
more critical of originalism. He argues that the nature of language 
and meaning preclude a purely formal account of meaning like that 
endorsed by originalism.48 Instead, interpreting constitutional and 
other texts requires substantive, normative political and ethical choic-
es as a precondition to interpretation and decision.49 Soames is less 
critical of originalism, arguing that the meanings it seeks are often 
available from the text but that the sources of meaning go beyond 
 
 38.  Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 27, at 117 n.6. 
 39.  See Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2. 
 40.  See generally ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY (rev. 2d 
ed. 2005) [hereinafter MARMOR, INTERPRETATION] (offering a philosophically sophisticated 
account of constitutional interpretation—and dismissing originalism as worthy of attention only 
for its puzzling widespread appeal). 
 41.  Others, like Posner, as a pragmatist, do not begin with interpretation. See generally 
LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 14, at Part II.A (arguing that the legal pragmatist 
skepticism about the priority and centrality of interpretation is well-placed). 
 42.  Fallon, Meaning, supra note 2, at 1237 (characterizing it as self-evident that inter-
pretation aims at meaning); Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 27, at 117–18, 117 (character-
izing such interpretation of the constitutional text as translation and asserting that we need 
“complex and subtle” philosophical argument to understand that process); DWORKIN, EMPIRE, 
supra note 31. 
 43.  Fallon, Meaning, supra note 2, at 1289–95; Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 27. 
 44.  Fallon, Meaning, supra note 2, at 1241 (asserting that legal scholars seeking to un-
derstand constitutional interpretation ignore the work done in the analytic philosophy of lan-
guage at their peril); Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 27. 
 45.  Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 27, at 117 n.6. 
 46.  See Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2. 
 47.  See MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2; Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2. 
 48.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 154–55 (arguing that Dworkin’s formal ar-
gument against Justice Scalia’s originalism fails). 
 49.  Id. 
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semantics.50 Soames’s theory is designed to fill the gaps when even 
those broader sources of meaning are not sufficient to render the lin-
guistic import of the constitutional text determinate.51 
This article first identifies and assesses certain tacit jurispruden-
tial premises that constitutional arguments are semantic arguments. 
This premise about the nature of constitutional law underlies the de-
bate over originalism.52 I have previously argued that both sides of 
the debate have made tacit commitments to claims about the nature 
of the meaning of constitutional provisions. More recently, the New 
Originalists and their critics have made their claims about the nature 
of the meaning of the constitutional text expressly.53 This article ana-
lyzes these more recent contributions to the debate and gives higher 
denomination currency to the claims I have made in the earlier arti-
cles.54 
 
 50.  See Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 600 (asserting that knowledge of the 
meaning of the English language is inadequate standing alone to understand the meaning of the 
Due Process Clause). 
 51.  Id. at 601 (explaining that determining the meaning of the Due Process Clause “re-
quires historical research.”). 
 52.  I have separately explored the ontological and philosophy of language premises that 
ground the debate. See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 6. I previously analyzed 
the epistemological and ontological foundations of originalism challenged by the anti-
foundationalist, anti-representationalist critics like Philip Bobbitt and Dennis Patterson in 
LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 10. See, e.g., PHILIP BOBBITT, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982) [hereinafter BOBBITT, 
FATE] (arguing that six modes of constitutional argument and our practice of constitutional 
decision comprise our constitutional law); DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996) 
[hereinafter PATTERSON, TRUTH] (extending Bobbitt’s anti-foundational account of constitu-
tional law to law generally and shifting the account of argument away from particular canonical 
modes of argument). I analyze the political philosophy underlying the claims made by original-
ism and its critics in André LeDuc, Political Philosophy and the Fruitless Quest for an Archi-
medean Stance in the Debate over Originalism, 85 UMKC L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (argu-
ing that unmediated political philosophical argument does not play a role in constitutional 
decisional argument and is unnecessary as a foundation to legitimate constitutional argument 
but that the structural and doctrinal modes of argument do have elements of political philo-
sophical argument). The philosophical foundations raise particular issues with respect to consti-
tutional law. See generally LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 6 
(arguing that the protagonists in the debate over originalism err with their approach to philo-
sophical argument either by missing their tacit philosophical commitments and the role those 
commitments play in grounding their constitutional claims or in attributing a fundamental, 
foundational role to philosophical argument). 
 53.  See, e.g., MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2; Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 
2; Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2; Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 27, at 117. 
 54.  See, e.g., LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 6; 
LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 6, at 279–85. I argued that certain unstated shared 
premises in the originalism debate comprised a tacit ontology and theories of language and 
truth and that those premises made the debate possible. That article did not explore in depth  
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I begin my analysis and argument by outlining the traditional 
claims and assumptions about constitutional meaning. Second, I ar-
ticulate an alternative account of the meaning of the constitutional 
text drawing on the concepts of performatives and other concepts of 
pragmatics and an inferentialist account of the conceptual content of 
those texts.55 That account emphasizes that the constitutional texts 
do things as well as say things. Because of that, the language of the 
Constitution cannot be understood simply as a collection of declara-
tive sentences. Third, I introduce and assess the arguments made by 
the New Originalists and their critics with sophisticated linguistic 
philosophy to defend their respective positions. The arguments made 
by the New Originalists overstate the role that linguistic philosophi-
cal argument can play. Their accounts continue to offer an incom-
plete description of the nature of our constitutional linguistic prac-
tice, because a more complete account marginalizes the entire debate 
over originalism. 
Fourth and finally, I draw out the implications of my argument 
with respect to these jurisprudential claims about constitutional 
meaning. Two principal arguments suggest that the introduction of 
these sophisticated arguments will not significantly advance the de-
bate. First, the philosophical claims that the meaning of the constitu-
tional text can be captured by the same techniques employed to un-
derstand the meaning of declarative or constative statements are 
controversial. Constitutional texts are performative; they do things as 
well as say things. Even if the meaning of such constitutional texts 
could be determined in the same manner as declarative statements, 
however, the resulting account of the constitutional text’s meaning 
yields an inadequate account of our constitutional language and prac-
tice. The New Originalists and their critics overlook key features that 
 
the concepts of meaning and the role that they play in the debate in the hands of the protago-
nists. 
 55.  The notion of performative utterances or text is that certain statements have a par-
ticularly important role in doing something, in addition to ordinary roles in saying or asserting 
something. Such utterances or texts are not so much true or false as felicitous or infelicitous, 
insofar as they accomplish the task that they are meant to perform. The concept derives from 
Oxford ordinary language philosophy. See generally PAUL GRICE, STUDIES IN THE WAY OF 
WORDS (1989) [hereinafter GRICE, STUDIES] (offering a catalog of normative rules of conver-
sational practice that highlight the place of conversational implicature, the non-semantic mean-
ing of utterances derived from their context in ongoing conversational exchanges); J. L. 
AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (1962) [hereinafter AUSTIN, WORDS] (intro-
ducing the concept of performative utterances, and the concept of the perlocutionary force of 
an utterance—the effect, whether belief or act, induced in the listener by the utterance). 
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inform our constitutional linguistic meaning and use. For example, 
the New Originalists do not have an adequate account of footnote 
four of United States v. Carolene Products Co.56 The recognition of 
the vulnerabilities inherent in the democratic process is not a seman-
tic or linguistic understanding. Second, the role accorded philosophi-
cal argument, often only tacitly, in these new strategies in the debate 
is mistaken as a matter of metaphilosophy. Philosophy and philo-
sophical argument cannot play the role as arbiter of constitutional 
claims or determinant of constitutional decision. That is because the 
only arguments that are authoritative in our constitutional decisional 
practice are those within the canonical modes of our constitutional 
decisional discourse; unmediated philosophical arguments do not sat-
isfy that requirement. Moreover, the therapeutic nature of philosoph-
ical argument precludes it from playing a constructive, foundational 
role in our constitutional theory. 
II. IMPLICIT AND EXPLICIT SEMANTIC PREMISES IN THE 
ORIGINALISM DEBATE 
Originalism is a semantic theory of constitutional law.57 It claims 
that constitutional questions are properly to be resolved by looking to 
the meaning of the constitutional words or texts;58 moreover, the rel-
evant meaning is the meaning at the time the provisions were origi-
nally incorporated in the Constitution.59 Originalists are not commit-
 
 56.  304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (articulating an account of the role of the Court in 
protecting “discrete and insular minorities”). 
 57.  See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 45–46 (describing semantic disa-
greements about the requirements of the Confrontation Clause and the Eighth Amendment 
prohibition on cruel and unusual punishments). In characterizing originalism as a semantic the-
ory, I am using a term introduced by Dworkin, but I am not endorsing the claim about theories 
of law he made. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 36–46. Dworkin conflated the claim 
that legal arguments are made by reference to semantic or linguistic meaning with the claim 
that such disputes are about such meanings. 
 58.  See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 36–46. Because of the account of meaning 
on which much of the debate rests, the distinction between the meaning of words and the 
meaning of the larger text is not important. Most of the protagonists in the debate believe that 
the meaning of the text is a matter of the meaning of the words therein. See District of Colum-
bia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 651 n.14 (2008). (Stevens, J., dissenting) (characterizing Justice 
Scalia’s approach to the meaning of the Second Amendment for the Court: “The Court’s atom-
istic, word-by-word approach to construing the Amendment calls to mind the parable of the six 
blind men and the elephant, famously set in verse by John Godfrey Saxe.”). 
 59.  I am here focusing upon originalism’s normative account of what proper constitu-
tional controversies should be. It acknowledges that our constitutional law has departed from 
such practices. Theories of constitutional interpretation like that defended, for example, by 
Akhil Amar, which argue that the meaning of key constitutional provisions (like the Bill of 
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ted to the proposition that disputes are about the meaning of the 
texts; they understand that what is at stake in constitutional disputes 
is far more than a matter of semantics.60 That is one of the reasons 
why originalism so comfortably resorts to dictionaries as authoritative 
sources of law.61 One important consequence of this premise is that 
originalism is an anti-consequentialist theory.62 The answer to a con-
stitutional question or the resolution of a constitutional dispute does 
not depend upon the consequences that follow from the result. A 
second, even more important consequence of the semantic nature of 
originalism is that it fundamentally disassociates the arguments for 
constitutional answers from the consequences of those answers. 
A semantic theory of adjudication asserts that appellate adjudica-
tion, after the facts of the case have been determined, is principally a 
semantic or linguistic activity.63 That is, a theory that asserts that the 
 
Rights) evolved and changed, with the result that the requirements of the Bill of Rights with 
respect to the States is different from the requirements that arose under the original meaning of 
those amendments as originally adopted, pose a subtle challenge to originalism, but are not 
necessarily inconsistent with an originalist theory. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998) [hereinafter AMAR, BILL OF RIGHTS] 
(emphasizing the evolution of the understanding of the Bill of Rights when it was incorporated 
by the Fourteenth Amendment in Reconstruction).  
 60.  That recognition is the foundation for the originalists’ confidence that the claims 
that they make for originalism are important. In the case of Randy Barnett, originalism is the 
method by which to recover The Lost Constitution. See generally RANDY E. BARNETT, 
RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF LIBERTY (2004) [hereinafter 
BARNETT, LOST] (defending a radical and unorthodox originalism not on traditional (if ques-
tionable) social contract arguments but on the basis of an argument that a libertarian natural 
law underlies the Constitution). 
 61.  See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE 
INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 415–24 (2012) [hereinafter SCALIA & GARNER, READING 
LAW] (discussing how to use dictionaries in judicial decision, acknowledging that it is not simp-
ly a matter of looking up the definitions of the words used); RALPH A. ROSSUM, ANTONIN 
SCALIA’S JURISPRUDENCE: TEXT AND TRADITION 209–12 (2006) (listing the decisions in 
which Justice Scalia had cited dictionaries for the meanings of terms of constitutional           
provisions). 
 62.  See generally LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 14, at Part II.A. 
 63.  See, e.g., Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 604 (“Legal content is deter-
mined in essentially the same way that the asserted or stipulated contents of ordinary texts 
are . . . .”); SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 37–38, 37 (characterizing his method 
of originalist interpretation as ignoring intent but giving the words of the Constitution “an ex-
pansive rather than narrow interpretation.”). 
Judgment need not be entirely semantic or even linguistic, of course; it may include, even 
in the arcane constitutional context, expressing ethical or other normative reactions, for exam-
ple. One might have moral outrage at the police pumping the stomach of the suspect in Rochin 
or empathy with the plight of the interned Japanese Americans in Korematsu, for example, and 
those reactions might be incorporated as proper elements to be taken into account by a judge 
according to a theory of constitutional decision. 
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activity of judging is an activity of determining the meaning of words 
or sentences.64 Once that meaning has been determined, the outcome 
of constitutional and other legal disagreements may be resolved. 
Originalism is a semantic theory at its core and sometimes exclusively 
so.65 Exclusive originalism looks only to the original meanings of 
constitutional provisions and asserts that constitutional disputes are 
to be resolved by reference to the original understandings or inten-
tions with respect to the meaning of the relevant constitutional provi-
sions.66 Non-exclusive originalism admits of other sources of law and, 
therefore, to the extent it admits of certain kinds of sources, may not 
be wholly semantic.67 
Thus, originalism has to account, first, for the meaning of the 
 
 64.  Such a baldly stated description is both trivially true and misleadingly reductive. 
Judges’ final decisions and principal orders are written; in general they interpret written law. 
(Of course, at the trial court level many judicial rulings are oral—although typically captured by 
a written trial record). As a matter of law they are ascertaining the semantic meaning of authori-
ties. So the description is surely true, at least as a partial description of adjudication. It is equally 
clear that such a reductive description of adjudication misses important non-semantic activity. 
The judge studying the demeanor of a witness to determine her credibility is not engaged in 
working directly with words, although the witness’s demeanor is relevant with respect to her 
verbal testimony. The judge weighing the moral depravity of a criminal or the heinousness of a 
crime in sentencing is also not engaged primarily in working with words. Neither of these qual-
ifications goes to the core of the claim made. 
 65.  See André LeDuc, Evolving Originalism: What Is Privileged?, § II.A (5) (Jan. 12, 
2013) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter LeDuc, What Is Privileged?] 
(classifying various forms of originalism based upon the nature of the historical elements that 
each privileges). Weak originalism privileges the original understandings or intentions but also 
recognizes non-originalist legal authorities—generally non-originalist precedent. Thus, weak 
originalism might initially appear to offer a role for a non-semantic account by looking to those 
precedents, not as a matter of the linguistic meaning of the relevant constitutional text but as 
authoritative statements of relevant constitutional law. In fact, the interpretation of those au-
thorities is best understood as an exception to such weak originalist theory. See SCALIA, 
INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 139–40.  
 66.  Of course, for the originalist, our history of constitutional adjudication is replete 
with examples of improper disputes and arguments that failed to look to the original under-
standing, and looked instead to exogenous moral theory or prudential concerns. See BORK, 
TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 95–100 (analyzing Griswold v. Connecticut as likely correctly 
decided but on the basis of an opinion articulating an erroneous rationale) and 151–53 (analyz-
ing the opinion in Shelley v. Kraemer striking down a racially discriminatory restriction on pri-
vate property as articulating an unprincipled theory). 
 67.  Thus, for example, to the extent that prudential considerations are taken into ac-
count, such a theory would not be reducible to semantics. Disputes would appear to turn on 
what is prudent, or whether prudential concerns should be decisive, not on what the meaning of 
certain prudential statements is. Such disputes are, on the originalist account, disputes about 
the world. Such weaker versions of originalism would not appear subject to challenge as seman-
tic theories only with respect to their account of the originalist authority. This non-exclusive 
originalism would appear to continue to argue that the proper approach to the interpretation of 
the constitutional text is generally semantic (or at least that the semantic analysis of the original 
understanding has a priority in that interpretive process). 
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constitutional text and then, second, for how those meanings figure 
in constitutional decision. More precisely: constitutional appellate 
adjudication is the decision of a constitutional case by determining 
which of competing arguments or proposed inferences with respect 
to the meanings of potentially applicable legal propositions or seman-
tic legal authorities (or both) is correct. 
In originalism, the nature of that decision process is not generally 
explored carefully because it is treated as a straightforward, formal 
process.68 For example, in deciding District of Columbia v. Heller,69 
the majority took the question to be whether the District of Colum-
bia handgun ordinance before the Court violated the Second 
Amendment’s protection of the right to carry and bear arms.70 An-
swering that question turned on a determination of the meaning of 
the Second Amendment. While the historical argument was extensive 
and controversial,71 Justice Scalia betrayed no doubts about what he 
was after or the role such meaning played in constitutional decision.72 
Once the original understanding of the text was established, however 
strong the historical arguments for alternative, narrower readings, 
that historical understanding ought to be applied in deciding con-
temporary constitutional case claims. I have explored the implicit 
conflict between originalism’s semantic theory and consequentialist 
accounts of judicial constitutional decision in a companion piece.73 
Here my focus is on the role of the semantic claims themselves in the 
debate. 
A. Semantic Originalism’s Claims about Meaning 
Originalism tacitly adopts a commonsense notion of the meaning 
of the language of the Second Amendment without much analysis. In 
Heller, Justice Scalia explored the meaning of the Second Amend-
ment text relying exclusively upon the rules of grammar, syntax, dic-
 
 68.  SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 46 (“The originalist, if he does not 
have all the answers, has many of them.”).  
 69.  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 70.  See id. at 573. 
 71.  Id. at 639–53 (Stevens, J., dissenting). See generally Sanford Levinson, The Embar-
rassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L.J. 637 (1989) [hereinafter Levinson, Second Amend-
ment] (arguing that the contemporary widespread academic hostility to the Second Amendment 
is unjustified). 
 72.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 576 (“We turn first to the meaning of the Second           
Amendment.”). 
 73.  See LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 14. 
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tionaries, and examples of common usage.74 Philosophical questions 
about the nature of meaning or interpretation did not waylay him, 
nor did any more prosaic questions about his account of constitution-
al meaning.75 Originalism is nevertheless committed to an account of 
the meaning of the constitutional text and the place of that meaning 
in constitutional adjudication.76 There are philosophical dimensions 
to those commitments and more purely jurisprudential dimensions 
related to the nature of constitutional law and adjudication. In partic-
ular, classical originalism and New Originalism both incorporate, 
tacitly or expressly, important stances with respect to the nature of 
the meaning of constitutional texts. These positions are the focus 
here. 
Originalism generally seeks to determine the meaning of consti-
tutional provisions. To do so, the typical method is to offer an inter-
pretation of those provisions.77 In so doing, it puts into service our 
ordinary and our not-so-ordinary notions of meaning. Generally, 
within the debate, particularly on the originalist side, while the mean-
ing of any particular constitutional provision may be acknowledged 
to be controversial, the nature of meaning is largely tacitly assumed 
to be familiar and straightforward. By contrast, in philosophy, the 
concept of meaning—even when confined to its linguistic sense—is 
not regarded as simple, straightforward, or uncontroversial.78 
 
 74.  554 U.S. at 573–628. 
 75.  Id. Thus, for example, Justice Scalia assumed without discussion that the first clause 
of the Second Amendment was simply prefatory and that, as a prefatory clause, had no inde-
pendent legal import. 554 U.S. at 576–78. 
 76.  See LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 6, at 279–85. 
 77.  See Fallon, Meaning, supra note 2, at 1237 (“Almost self-evidently, meaning is the 
object, or at least one of the objects, that statutory and constitutional interpretation seek to dis-
cover.” (footnote omitted)). Originalists typically reject the notion that such a task is assimilated 
to translation, although they may accord a significant role to construction. See Lawrence Les-
sig, Fidelity in Translation, 71 TEX. L. REV. 1165 (1993). For the rejection of notions of trans-
lation, see Steven G. Calabresi, The Tradition of the Written Constitution: A Comment on 
Professor Lessig’s Theory of Translation, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1435, 1436–37 (1997) (reject-
ing Lessig’s characterization of the process of understanding constitutional texts as a matter of 
translation because it cannot explain six important features of our constitutional practice and 
arguing that Lessig’s theory commits him to endorsing the Court’s decision in Dred Scott). For 
a leading originalist account of the role of construction, see KEITH WHITTINGTON, 
CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION: DIVIDED POWERS AND CONSTITUTIONAL MEANING 
(1999) [hereinafter WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTRUCTION] (supplementing an 
originalist account of constitutional interpretation with an account of constitutional construc-
tion to enable political choices to complete the indeterminate provisions of the Constitution). 
 78.  Originalists sometimes suggest otherwise. For example, in their emphasis upon dic-
tionary meanings and their repeated claim to distinguish facts from values, originalists make 
important but unstated commitments to a theory of meaning. The originalist commitments to 
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Even before we approach the text of the Constitution and the 
concept of the linguistic meaning of its text, we encounter meanings 
at many levels and in many contexts. We seek meaning in our lives, 
and some of us are fortunate to find it in our faiths, in our families, in 
our friends and communities, and in our work.79 Words have mean-
ings, signs have meanings, gestures have meanings, and works of art 
have meanings. Important arguments have been made that talk about 
meaning is fundamentally different than our talk about explanation, 
scientific and otherwise.80 Those arguments emphasize the narrative, 
normative, and contextualizing nature of accounts of meaning in dis-
tinction to scientific explanation that offers predictive accounts of ex-
periments and experience. Constitutional theories, of course, are also 
predictive as well as narrative in their account of constitutional doc-
trine and decision. 
Fortunately, given the manifest complexity of these disparate no-
tions of meaning, with respect to the debate over originalism and 
constitutional theory more generally, many of those senses of mean-
ing are not relevant; what matters for our purpose here is the mean-
ing and the use of the language of the Constitution.81 Accounting for 
linguistic meaning and use remains philosophically controversial.82 
 
an implicit account of meaning warrant examination. Even in the very precise field of modern 
analytic philosophy, Gil Harman has argued that accounts of meaning have conflated three sep-
arate notions of meaning, with attendant confusion. See Gilbert Harman, Three Levels of 
Meanings, in REASONING, MEANING AND MIND 155 (1999) (distinguishing the way that 
thoughts have meaning, communication has meaning, and shared social practices constitute 
frameworks within which acts and sayings have meaning). Indeed, modern analytic philosophy 
has been marked by careful attention to the linguistic dimension of philosophical problems and 
methods. See generally Richard Rorty, Introduction, in THE LINGUISTIC TURN: RECENT 
ESSAYS IN PHILOSOPHICAL METHOD 1–37 (Richard Rorty ed., 1967) (exploring the dramatic 
shift to the analysis of language in 20th century Anglophone philosophy but contextualizing that 
project within the traditional philosophical project); SCOTT SOAMES, THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE 32–49 (2012) [hereinafter SOAMES, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE] (exploring the 
complexities and failures in the fundamental efforts to explain meaning by reference to truth 
conditions). 
 79.  See generally VIKTOR FRANKL, MAN’S SEARCH FOR MEANING (1946) (analysis of 
the sources of existential meaning in the contemporary experience of human life). 
 80.  See Daniel Dennett, The Evolution of “Why?”, in READING BRANDOM: ON 
MAKING IT EXPLICIT 48 (Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer eds., 2010) (quoting Sellars). 
 81.  Jack Balkin has cataloged some of these varying senses of meaning as well. See 
BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 37, at 12–13 (cataloguing five types of meaning, 
only one of them linguistic). 
 82.  See generally SCOTT SOAMES, WHAT IS MEANING? (2010) [hereinafter SOAMES, 
MEANING] (arguing that our theories of meaning have not yet accounted for important features 
of quantification and that this failure casts doubt upon current theories and the role of proposi-
tions in particular); 2 SCOTT SOAMES, PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (2003) [hereinafter SOAMES, PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS]. For example, in the sec-
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How linguistic expressions have meaning, as well as the level of lan-
guage at which meaning arises—words, phrases, sentences, and lan-
guages—remains controversial and unsettled. Even within the analyt-
ic tradition truth conditions, verification conditions, uses, mental 
ideas, stimuli, referents, and causal chains have all been thought, 
among others, to be helpful in defining or supplementing meaning 
and accounts of meaning.83 
Philosophers draw a number of distinctions in speaking of lin-
guistic meaning, some of which have entered into the formulation of 
originalism and the debate with respect thereto.84 Yet as we think of 
drawing on that philosophical work, the continuing philosophical 
controversies over the nature of meaning must be acknowledged and 
taken into account.85 
In the debate over originalism, literal meaning and contextual 
meaning are frequently distinguished.86 The distinction is also drawn 
between the meaning intended and the meaning generally under-
stood.87 When we speak of meaning in this context, which do we in-
tend? Moreover, we often, but not always, also distinguish between 
the meaning of a word and its use.88 We must also distinguish the 
 
ond volume of this work, Soames discusses the introduction of the theory of rigid designators 
and the controversy that has surrounded it. He has explored some of these issues more fully in 
SCOTT SOAMES, BEYOND RIGIDITY: THE UNFINISHED SEMANTIC AGENDA OF “NAMING 
AND NECESSITY” (2002). 
 83.  See SOAMES, PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS, supra note 82; W. V. O. QUINE, WORD 
AND OBJECT (1960). 
 84.  Richard Fallon offers one of the more subtle and sophisticated approaches to the 
role of philosophical distinctions and claims in constitutional theory. See generally Fallon, 
Meaning, supra note 2. 
 85.  See generally SOAMES, MEANING, supra note 82, at 1 (exploring current philosophi-
cal questions with respect to meaning and endorsing the claim that “for each meaningful ex-
pression there are correct answers to the question ‘What does it mean?’”); Michael Dummett, 
What Is a Theory of Meaning?, in TRUTH AND MEANING: ESSAYS IN SEMANTICS 67 (Gareth 
Evans & John McDowell eds., 1976). 
 86.  See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 37–38 (contrasting his theory 
providing for a reasonable construction with strict construction). 
 87.  See id. at 38 (endorsing the publicly understood meaning as legally controlling). 
 88.  See RONALD M. DWORKIN, THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 5 (1977) [hereinafter 
DWORKIN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW] (“Lawyers find difficulty, however, in setting out in any 
general way what [propositions of law] mean, or, what amounts to the same thing, the condi-
tions under which they are true or false.”). See also ROBERT BRANDOM, ARTICULATING 
REASONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO INFERENTIALISM 69–72 (2000) [hereinafter BRANDOM, 
ARTICULATING REASONS] (defending an alternative to the dominant truth conditional theory 
of meaning based upon the inferences that support a proposition and the inferences that may be 
drawn from it, and criticizing theories of meaning as use or based upon truth conditions on the 
basis that certain words with seemingly identical denotations are freighted with different com-
mitments. The terms “nigger” and “negro” are two of the most obvious and offensive examples, 
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meaning of what is actually written or said from what is implied by 
what is actually written or said, and we must then ask whether any of 
these approaches to public understanding of meanings include only 
what is actually written or also includes what is implied. We will see 
that this is a question that has not generally been acknowledged by 
the classical originalists, but is central to the New Originalist project. 
Finally, when we include in a potential theory of original meaning 
the performative meaning of a constitutional provision in context the 
possibilities of what we mean become more numerous. 
At least three89 potential types of meanings may be distinguished 
in classifying originalisms: 
1. What the relevant terms of a constitutional provision literally 
mean;90 
2. What the relevant sentences of a constitutional provision 
mean, including both what they mean literally together with 
what they are understood to mean as a matter of presupposi-
tion, entailment, implication and related concepts;91 and 
3. What the particular performative sentences mean in context, 
taking into account what the sentences of the Constitution 
were understood—and meant—to do.92 
These three types of public meaning approach features of mean-
ing in particular ways. 93 The first begins with words and seeks to 
 
the former being so freighted with racist commitments that its use is no longer acceptable and 
it serves only as an inflammatory provocation when written or uttered today.). 
 89.  The literature is replete with other and more detailed classification schemes. See, 
e.g., Fallon, Meaning, supra note 2, at 1245–51 (distinguishing six types of meaning, including, 
in addition to those described above, real conceptual meaning, reasonable meaning, and inter-
preted meaning); Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 34–41 (distinguishing speaker’s 
meaning, sentence meaning, Framer’s meaning, and clause meaning). 
 90.  Most participants in the originalism debate refer to literal meaning. By that, they 
mean to capture the meaning of a word that would be found in a dictionary, for example, and to 
exclude understandings that arise from the context in which a word is used. I think the literal 
meaning referenced in the originalism debate largely corresponds to the concept of austere se-
mantic meaning employed in contemporary analytic philosophy of language. 
 91.  For a philosophical account of these concepts, see generally GRICE, STUDIES, supra 
note 55. 
 92.  See generally AUSTIN, WORDS, supra note 55 (describing and analyzing the concept 
of a performative utterance). When we speak here of what the Constitution was meant and un-
derstood to do, it is the non-linguistic acts and outcomes that are referenced. In the Constitu-
tion’s case, that is outcomes like the creation of a new Republic with an elected chief executive 
and a bicameral legislature. Note that this formulation encompasses purposive and non-
purposive theories; what the Constitution does is not necessarily a purposive concept. As a 
practical matter the purposive and non-purposive theories will usually be congruent because the 
Constitution will generally do what it was meant to do. 
 93.  Other types of meaning may also be identified, too. For example, what the drafters 
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construct the meaning of a provision from the semantic meaning of 
its words and rules of English syntax. We’ll refer to it as a semantic 
account of meaning.94 Dictionaries would appear to properly play an 
important role in such an approach. Rules of grammar would seem-
ingly also be important as we move from the meanings of words to 
construct the meanings of more extended linguistic sequences, alt-
hough grammar has generally taken a back seat to dictionaries for 
originalists in this process.95 When looking only to semantic mean-
ing, it is important to note just how austere it is, because it is so natu-
ral to take into account presuppositions and implications of state-
ments in our ordinary use of language.96 
The second approach looks to the meaning of the sentences as 
entireties and recognizes that dictionary and semantic meanings are 
not sufficient to capture the entire linguistic content of constitutional 
texts.97 Such an approach acknowledges, first, that the words of the 
Constitution are all incorporated into sentences, and, second, that 
those sentences appear in contexts that inform the entailments, im-
plications, and presuppositions of those sentences—all of which are 
relevant in determining the linguistic meaning of the sentences. 
We’ll refer to this as a linguistic account of meaning. 
Examples of such presuppositions and implications are common 
in ordinary usage.98 Soames gives the example of the utterance, “I 
have two.” Spoken in response to the question, “Do you have any 
 
were thinking (what they meant) when they chose the language in question, and what the 
speakers or drafters intended their audience to understand. 
 94.  This account is also often referred to as a theory of literal meaning. 
 95.  One exception has been the recent decisions with respect to the scope of the Second 
Amendment, where the syntactical analysis of that provision has been very important in its re-
cent interpretation and application. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 600–04 
(2008) (relying on the characterization of the first clause of the Second Amendment as “prefato-
ry” to deny it limiting or other substantive effect). The predominance of dictionaries over 
grammar is perhaps attributable to the relative simplicity of the syntax of the Constitution and 
to the implicit simplistic account of linguistic meaning underlying the originalism debate. 
 96.  See generally GRICE, STUDIES, supra note 55 (expressly articulating the informal 
rules of conversation that make conversation more efficient and allow utterances in the context 
of ongoing exchanges to carry far more meaning than mere semantics can explain). When 
Soames emphasizes the inadequacy of the austere semantic meaning of a text he is seeking to 
make the tacit assumptions we employ in our everyday language express. See SOAMES, Legal 
Texts, supra note 2. 
 97.  For an extended, classic discussion of such a holistic approach to sentence meaning, 
see QUINE, supra note 83. 
 98.  See generally SOAMES, Legal Texts, supra note 2 (arguing that legal language does 
not present a materially different case of language usage than do other types of texts but that 
semantic meaning is inadequate to account for the linguistic content of all such texts). 
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children?” it is understood to mean that I have exactly two children. 
Spoken in response to the question from a friend who has stopped by 
my home, “Do you have any beers in the refrigerator?” it would 
more likely be understood to mean that I have at least two beers in 
the refrigerator. In the context, the answer assures that my friend and 
I can each have (at least) one beer. The difference in context changes 
the linguistic (but not the semantic) meaning of the statement. 
More recently, Scott Soames has expressly addressed the nature 
of legal texts generally, in comparison to other texts. He argues that 
legal texts are not very different from other texts.99 But he criticizes 
the prevalent jurisprudential thinking about meaning because its fo-
cus is often confined exclusively to the semantic meaning of provi-
sions.100 An alternative approach to legal texts would be to consider 
what Soames refers to as the entire linguistic content of those texts—
and then to go on to incorporate historical legal content, too.101 The 
entire linguistic content of a text encompasses not only the semantic 
meaning of that text but also its pragmatics. According to Soames, 
this prevailing narrow focus creates illusory puzzles where provisions 
are semantically hard to interpret but not genuinely hard to interpret 
as a legal matter.102 
One implication of this claim, Soames argues, is that many of the 
classical arguments over interpretive challenges are overblown.103 As 
a result, his account of constitutional meaning neglects these im-
portant sources of guidance and potential controversy. Soames’s 
analysis tells us that if we take into account the full range of linguistic 
meaning then the apparent uncertainties of utterances are sharply re-
duced.104 Soames therefore concludes that the need for further inter-
pretative tools, like those advocated by Dworkin, is reduced.105 
The third type of meaning begins with all of the components of 
meaning identified by the linguistic account of meaning and places 
the sentences themselves in context, acknowledging that the provi-
 
 99.  Id. at 422–23. 
 100.  Id. at 403–04 (emphasizing that semantic meaning is more austere than is often rec-
ognized in jurisprudence and that other sources are necessary to account for the linguistic con-
tent of texts). 
 101.  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 600–02 (describing the historical under-
standing of the Due Process Clause). 
 102.  SOAMES, Legal Texts, supra note 2, at 422–23. 
 103.  Id. at 422–23. 
 104.  See SOAMES, Legal Texts, supra note 2, at 415–22. 
 105.  Id. at 422–23. 
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sions of the Constitution not only say things, but do things as well. 
The Constitution was to create a single central government with far 
greater powers than had been provided under the Articles of Confed-
eration. It was to create a bicameral legislature balancing the interests 
of the larger and smaller states with a complex representational for-
mula to balance the interests of the slave and free states. It also 
sought to redefine the entire relationship between the States and the 
federal government, and between the people and their government. 
This third approach asks what the provision of the Constitution was 
to do.106 We’ll refer to this as a performative account of meaning. 
This approach builds on certain work that has been done in contem-
porary analytic philosophy of language.107 
For example, as Grice points out, utterances of the type “There is 
a garage around the corner,” when spoken in response to another’s 
statement “My car is almost out of gas,” conveys the meaning not on-
ly that there is a garage around the corner but that such garage sells 
gasoline and that the other speaker may be able to fill up his gas tank 
there.108 Indeed, that is the meaning that was intended. Think of 
“Fire!” shouted in a crowded theatre. The semantic content of this 
utterance is not unambiguous. It may mean “there is combustion oc-
curring here and now.” Or it may mean, when directed to a squad of 
soldiers with raised rifles facing a blindfolded and bound prisoner, 
“discharge your weapons on this command.” Neither in the crowded 
theatre nor at the execution grounds outside a prison are the outcome 
expectations, indeed, the intended or planned outcome, ambiguous. 
In the theatre, patrons understand immediately that they face a very 
serious physical threat, and should immediately proceed to the exits 
and leave the theatre. They understand that because of the context; 
without the context of a firing squad receiving orders from a com-
manding officer, there is no potential pragmatic ambiguity. The im-
plication of the utterance “Fire!” in the context of a crowded thea-
tre—and the associated linguistic content, in Soames’s terms—is that 
there is a dangerous fire in the theatre. A further practical implication 
of that is that the other patrons are in danger and should exit the the-
 
 106.  Although this is conventionally termed the outcome that the provision was intended, 
expected, or understood to have, it is more accurate to capture the functionality of the provision 
by focusing upon the intentions, expectations, and understandings as to what the provision 
would do. The provision acts as a cause itself, or as a reason for agents to cause things to hap-
pen in the world and for the community to think certain things about those results. 
 107.  See, e.g., AUSTIN, WORDS, supra note 55; GRICE, STUDIES, supra note 55. 
 108.  GRICE, STUDIES, supra note 55, at 32. 
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atre in an expeditious but orderly manner. In the face of such an ut-
terance, we expect the theatre to be evacuated pell-mell, with some 
risk of injuries to such patrons from trampling. At the execution 
grounds the understanding of the meaning and import of the com-
mand is equally clear, and we expect the squad to discharge their ri-
fles on the command, with some implicit potential mitigation of each 
member’s responsibility for the death of the executed prisoner. 
In the constitutional context, the pragmatics of the text is more 
complex and less straightforward than the pragmatics of simpler texts 
often analyzed. That is because the kinds of information about the 
speaker, the audience, and the context are missing or washed out for 
constitutional texts.109 
Semantic originalists focus solely upon the semantic intentions 
and expectations of the relevant actors.110 Semantic here refers to the 
meanings of the linguistic expressions, words, phrases, and sentenc-
es.111 That is, semantic originalists focus upon the linguistic meanings 
associated with the utterances or texts, as distinguished from the per-
formative role such texts or utterances may have, or the expectations 
that the speakers and listeners may have with respect to what such 
texts and utterances would achieve. What did the speakers, drafts-
men, ratifiers, and their audiences intend and expect solely as a se-
mantic matter with respect to their constitutional utterances? 
A semantic intention is an intention formed with respect to the 
meaning of words or sentences; more precisely, it is an intention of a 
speaker with respect to how a listener—or a writer with respect to a 
 
 109.  See Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2, at 496–97. That contextual in-
formation is washed out with the loss of historical information with the passage of time or, with 
respect to the nature of the text’s audience, with the arrival of new audiences with the passage 
of time. 
 110.  Dworkin first articulated this concept most clearly in the debate. See Dworkin, In-
terpretation, supra note 27, at 116–18; see also SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 
141. More recently Larry Solum has offered a complex and comprehensive articulation and de-
fense of semantic originalism. See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 40–54 (explor-
ing the questions relating to collective intentions and the identification of the relevant commu-
nity in the context of a defense of an original public understanding originalism). 
 111.  Reference to the semantic expectations, intentions, and understandings is intended 
to draw a contrast with what was being done in the adoption of the Constitution or in its 
amendment as a matter of politics or power. Thus, most clearly, the Thirteenth Amendment 
was adopted to outlaw slavery and to expressly provide for the freedom of the formerly enslaved 
people of the slave states. In adopting the Thirteenth Amendment the Congress and the ratify-
ing states intended, expected, and understood certain consequences would follow with respect 
to the formerly enslaved persons and their purported owners. The Congress and ratifying states 
also had semantic intentions, expectations, and understanding as to what the Thirteenth 
Amendment said and should be understood to mean. 
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reader—will understand the meaning of an utterance or a text.112 A 
semantic intention may be contrasted with a host of other inten-
tions—to marry someone by saying “I do,” or to rob someone by say-
ing “Your money or your life,” for example.113 In the constitutional 
arena, a semantic intention may be contrasted with the political in-
tention of constituting a new Federal republican government of lim-
ited powers, or the legal intention of outlawing slavery within the 
United States. 
The differences between the two approaches become apparent if 
we consider the interpretation of the Second Amendment.114 The 
first approach would begin with the meaning of the words “Arms”, 
“keep”, “bear”, “people”, “infringed”, etc. It would then consider the 
rules of syntax, including the place of introductory clauses like that of 
the Amendment. This was essentially the approach taken by Justice 
Scalia writing for the Court in Heller.115 The second approach would 
look to the meaning of the entire sentence of the Amendment, with-
out seeking to construct it solely from the meaning of its parts and 
the rules of syntax. Thus, the second approach would seek to recon-
struct how the linguistic community originally understood the provi-
sions. Here, the relevant understanding is not limited to semantic 
understanding or even the more expansive notion of the understand-
ing of the linguistic content. The relevant understanding includes 
what the constitutional provision was doing.116 Relevant evidence 
would include what people contemporaneously did and what they 
said as they summarized the provision, provided arguments in its fa-
vor, and drew inferences from it. Justice Scalia also adopted this ap-
proach when he considered analogous state constitutional protections 
for arms.117 Dictionaries and their meanings, out of context, would be 
 
 112.  This shorthand account glosses over many obvious and not-so-obvious imperfec-
tions. 
 113.  It is important to note how little the meaning of such performatives connects with 
the meanings of the words that make them up. That discontinuity is troubling if one is con-
structing a Tractarian theory of language; it is not troubling if we think about language as simp-
ly one more tool that humans use to get things done. 
 114.  “A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of 
the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.” U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 115.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 116.  It is valuable to compare this concept of the understanding of the provision with 
more common focus on the original expectations with respect to the application of a provision. 
The understanding of what a provision was to do is not simply a matter of understanding how it 
was to be applied. An understanding of what a provision was to do could also operate in abstract 
terms. 
 117.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 599–603. 
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accorded less weight.118 
In his fullest and most authoritative statement of his originalist 
interpretive principles, Justice Scalia asserts that “context is every-
thing” in constitutional interpretation.119 Justice Scalia would appear 
to be seeking to privilege meanings beyond the literal “dictionary” 
meanings of words. A plausible construction of Justice Scalia’s posi-
tion would be that he is employing the context of a provision to privi-
lege not only what is said but also what may be taken from any fur-
ther implication. Context thus enables both his broad interpretation 
of the First and Fourth Amendments and his reading of the Eighth 
Amendment to permit capital punishment. The latter reading, clear-
ly, cannot be based upon anything expressly written in the Constitu-
tion, only upon inference, implication, or implicature from what is 
said, and perhaps, even, what is unsaid.120 
With respect to the First Amendment, when Justice Scalia in-
vokes the concept of a synecdoche to interpret the text, he is claiming 
 
 118.  The third approach looks not just to the semantics but also to the pragmatics of the 
provision. Pragmatics looks to the use of a provision, and takes into full account the operative 
context of action in which the statement is made. See generally ROBERT BRANDOM, MAKING 
IT EXPLICIT: REASONING, REPRESENTING AND DISCURSIVE COMMITMENT (1994) [hereinaf-
ter BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT]; BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 88. 
When the robber accosts me with a dangerous weapon in the darkened street and says “Your 
money or your life!” he is not simply stating an alternative. He is demanding my money from 
me and threatening to kill or wound me should I fail to comply with his demand. He also com-
mits a felony. In the context of a series of proposed amendments to the Constitution, state-
ments like that of the Second Amendment may well have had public understandings very differ-
ent from the literal meaning of their terms. 
 119.  SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 37. He denies that he is a strict or lit-
eral constructionist. In so doing, he is disavowing principles like Thayer’s requirement of clear 
statement. He is also disavowing any requirement that ambiguities in interpretation be con-
strued against a broader reading of a constitutional provision. Id. at 38. See also SCALIA & 
GARNER, READING LAW, supra note 61, at 56–58 (stating the supremacy of text principle as 
applied to the words of the text in context). 
 120.  By suggesting that the linguistic content of the Constitution incorporates what is 
unsaid I do not mean to endorse concepts of the Unwritten or Invisible Constitutions. See, e.g., 
AKHIL REED, AMERICA’S UNWRITTEN CONSTITUTION: THE PRECEDENTS AND PRINCIPLES 
WE LIVE BY (2012) [hereinafter AMAR, UNWRITTEN]; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, THE INVISIBLE 
CONSTITUTION (2008). Instead, I mean to assert only the claim, as a matter of semantics, that 
what is unsaid is sometimes as important as what is stated expressly. See, e.g., GRICE, STUDIES, 
supra note 55, at 33 (giving the example of an academic letter of recommendation that expressly 
states only that the candidate regularly attends class and has a command of the English lan-
guage). In the constitutional context, the prohibition in the Fifth Amendment on takings for 
public use without just compensation is generally understood to prohibit takings for private use. 
See generally RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF 
EMINENT DOMAIN (1985) [hereinafter EPSTEIN, TAKINGS] (classic libertarian interpretation of 
the taking power to reflect natural law property theory and the philosophical theory of the au-
thority of the state). 
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an implication from the text.121 The literal protection of the press is 
extended by implication to protect broadcast radio, broadcast televi-
sion (whether high definition, black and white, or color), private cor-
respondence, and other media. This interpretation cannot be sup-
ported by the dictionary or literal meanings of the terms or by the 
meaning of the sentence of the First Amendment out of context. 
“Speech” and “the press” do not literally mean or include “broadcast 
television.” The application of the First Amendment to prevent cen-
sorship of private letters may be even more problematic insofar as 
such a medium existed at the time of the adoption of the Bill of 
Rights. 
Justice Scalia is implicitly arguing that the protection of the free-
dom of speech and the freedom of the press creates an implicature of 
some sort, as Paul Grice defines the term, that a broader array of 
communicative freedoms also is protected.122 The implicit argument 
is that the original understanding of the protection of the First 
Amendment for speech and the press would encompass private corre-
spondence or public signs, and that modern broadcast technology 
plays a role in the dissemination of ideas, arguments, and opinions 
analogous to that played in the Eighteenth century by the press. 
Thus, the express protections of the First Amendment for speech and 
for the press should be extended to broadcast radio and television by 
implication. It is certainly the case that the law of the First Amend-
ment has construed the text broadly to encompass the variety of 
means of expression that Justice Scalia now captures with his invoca-
tion of the text as a synecdoche. 
The source or grounds for the implication that Justice Scalia, 
Judge Bork, and others have drawn from the express language of the 
 
 121.  See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 38. 
 122.  Paul Grice does not expressly identify the mechanism of synecdoche as one of the 
common means of implicature and it is not any more obvious that he implies such an inclusion. 
I do not think that there is anything in Grice’s theory that would suggest that Justice Scalia’s 
move—and, of course, here he is firmly in the First Amendment mainstream—is improper. See 
GRICE, STUDIES, supra note 55, at 22–40. The variety of recognized complex strategies in lan-
guage use continues to expand. See SOAMES, Legal Texts, supra note 2; 1 DAVID K. LEWIS, 
Scorekeeping in a Language Game, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 233, 240 (1983) [hereinafter 
Lewis, Scorekeeping] (arguing that if conversation is a game then the rules for keeping score 
reflect a principle of accommodation that operates to incorporate otherwise seemingly “wrong” 
moves that is unlike many other kinds of game). The ability of “moves” in the constitutional law 
game to change the course of the game is captured, in part, by Dworkin’s metaphor of the chain 
novel. See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 228–38. While the writing of subsequent in-
stallments of Dworkin’s chain novel is not governed by rules as formalized as those that govern 
games, his account emphasizes the informal rules that apply and constrain the project. 
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First Amendment can be found in a variety of potential authorities.123 
Justice Scalia, however, would likely turn to an implicit political theo-
ry that highlights the role of free expression; that political theory is 
grounded in Anglo-American political tradition. As such, it is part of 
the context that can be invoked to support the constitutional implica-
tions that fill in the canvas of the First Amendment’s protection of a 
system of freedom of expression. Justice Scalia does not need (or 
want) natural law; the implicature that he endorses can be made 
based on a functional analysis of the media in the Eighteenth and 
Twenty-First Centuries, and by the political theory that endorses the 
democratic public’s right to engage in the intellectual and political 
debate of the issues of the day. What are the differences, and the sim-
ilarities, between Justice Scalia’s synecdoche, which is a permissible 
means of originalist interpretation, and Justice Douglas’s penumbra 
in Griswold v. Connecticut?124 
At the outset it should be acknowledged that the foundations of 
the right to privacy identified and protected in Griswold could not 
have been created by characterizing the references to those rights as a 
synecdoche for a litany of similar rights. Similarly, interpreting the 
express reference to the press in the First Amendment as creating a 
penumbra that extended to other media would have resulted in a dif-
ferent First Amendment jurisprudence. On the other hand, one 
might argue that the willingness to extend the protections of the First 
Amendment to a broad spectrum of media reflects a penumbral anal-
ysis of the protection of speech and the press. That argument would 
also explain why there is little attention to whether such protection is 
a matter of protecting speech or the press—or what the difference 
between such protections might be. 
Smith v. United States125 has emerged as a critical example for 
the articulation and analysis of the linguistic philosophical claims of 
the New Originalism. In that case a defendant was accused of having 
conspired to violate a federal criminal statute that prohibited using a 
firearm in the commission of a felony. The defendant had proposed 
 
 123.  See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down limits on po-
litical contributions by corporations to produce a movie on the basis of the First Amendment). 
See also SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 38 (characterizing the term “press” in the 
First Amendment as like a synecdoche, without ever acknowledging the question why reading 
the term like a synecdoche is consistent with the semantic claims of originalism—or why the 
reading treats the term like a synecdoche rather than as a synecdoche).  
 124.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 125.  Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993). 
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to deliver a firearm in payment for the purchase of illegal drugs.126 
The Court looked to the literal semantic meaning of the statute and 
found the language of the statute satisfied.127 Justice Scalia dissented, 
on the basis that the phrase “uses a firearm” in the statute required 
interpretation in its context, and that that context demonstrates that 
only more paradigmatic deployments of a firearm were within the 
ambit of the statute.128 Justice Scalia acknowledged that his reading of 
the statute treats the statutory language as including a tacit or sup-
pressed phrase “as a weapon” to modify the predicate of use. He ar-
gued that implying that limitation was appropriate because constitu-
tional interpretation must look to the “ordinary meanings” of words 
and phrases.129 
Justice Scalia has himself cited Smith as an example of his ap-
proach to originalism.130 The case highlights the question of how 
originalism will depart from the austere semantic meaning of the 
constitutional text. Justice Scalia has made the sweeping claim that 
context is “everything” in constitutional textual interpretation.131 He 
does not mean this claim literally, and cannot mean this claim literal-
ly, because if it were true, semantic meanings would be unimportant 
and meaning would be reduced to that found in the world of Humpty 
Dumpty.132 Instead, he must mean that after identifying the original 
semantic meaning of the provision context may be looked to in de-
termining whether the semantic meaning is controlling. 
Justice Scalia never expressly articulates his theory of when the 
ordinary semantic meaning can be disregarded or overridden by con-
text. He begins by noting that the term “use” is elastic, with a variety 
of meanings.133 But he does not conclude that all the meanings that 
fall within its semantic range are included and given legal effect. In-
stead, he simply describes what he believes is the most common and 
dominant sense of the verb “to use” and then asserts that it is that 
 
 126.  Id. at 225–27. 
 127.  Id. at 240–41. 
 128.  Id. at 242–43 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 129.  Id. at 242. 
 130.  See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 23–24. 
 131.  Id. at 37. 
 132.  LEWIS CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOKING-GLASS Ch. 6 (1898) (1872) (Humpty 
Dumpty’s assertion that the meaning of a word may be anything that the speaker chooses it to 
be). 
 133.  Smith, 508 U.S. at 241–42. 
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sense that is employed in the relevant statute.134 Justice Scalia offers 
additional arguments based upon the structure of the statute, but 
these seem strangely inconclusive.135 
Andrei Marmor urges that the disagreement in Smith should be 
understood as a failure to recognize the polysemy of the word 
“use.”136 Polysemy is the semantic property of having distinct, but 
closely related, meanings.137 Marmor contrasts polysemy with the 
more commonly encountered semantic property of ambiguity in 
which a word or expression has multiple, separate meanings. On 
Marmor’s account, Justice Scalia was right in choosing the more 
common, dominant meaning in his interpretation of the statute be-
cause, in the absence of any other indicators, “use” is used with re-
spect to guns to mean used as a gun.138 Thus, Marmor believes that 
there is likely an empirical linguistic practice that supports Justice 
Scalia’s intuition and argument. In most instances, he suggests, mul-
tiple meanings are distinct and disjoint, not parallel and similar, and 
as a result the dominant meaning must generally be the meaning tak-
en for words in their constitutional usage.139 Moreover, Marmor be-
lieves that such semantic analysis is sufficient to make Justice Scalia’s 
conclusion that the statute ought not to apply correct. 
Marmor does not appear to consider the question whether such 
arcane and nuanced semantic analysis ought to be dispositive of the 
legal question presented in Smith. He seems to believe that answer-
ing the semantic question is sufficient to decide the case. There are, 
of course, reasons to doubt that argument and conclusion. Marmor’s 
tacit premise that constitutional decision begins with an interpreta-
tion of the semantic and pragmatic meaning of the relevant constitu-
tional or legal text is untenable.140 Constitutional decision likely does 
not begin with linguistic meaning or interpretation, but with judg-
ment and consideration of the relevant constitutional or other legal 
arguments that bear on decision.141 The modes of argument that 
 
 134.  Id. at 242–43. 
 135.  Id. at 243. Thus, for example, Justice Scalia cites the sentencing guidelines which 
provide that “other use” of a firearm means use that is more than merely “brandishing, display-
ing, or possessing” of a firearm. 
 136.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 123. 
 137.  Id. at 121–22. 
 138.  Id. at 123–24. 
 139.  However, Marmor thinks the case presented in Smith is likely atypical. Id. at 124. 
 140.  See generally LeDuc, Interpretation and Constitutional Argument, supra note 17. 
 141.  See generally RICHARD A. POSNER, REFLECTIONS ON JUDGING 120–30, 178–236 
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come into play in Smith are more varied and complex than Marmor’s 
account permits. 
The more precise formulation of the adjudication process above 
excludes the non-semantic fact-finding role of trial courts and 
strengthens the claim as to the semantic nature of adjudication. Se-
mantic theories seek to capture and emphasize the critical verbal di-
mension of law. Written laws have permitted and, perhaps, perversely 
encouraged, verbal dispute.142 Portia’s argument, after all, turned up-
on the semantic meaning of Antonio’s bond.143 It disregarded context 
and the unspoken understanding of the parties. More generally, when 
the written text is elevated to be a definitive statement of law, it in-
vites the community to privilege that statement in lieu of the under-
standing and arguments that inferentially support that statement but 
may not support the case at hand. 
Semantic dispute lies at the interpretative core of many cases, 
constitutional and otherwise, whether there are other elements to 
those cases as well.144 Semantic theories assert more than that consti-
tutional disputes should be resolved on the basis of semantic argu-
ments. As a semantic account of constitutional interpretation and 
controversy, originalism fundamentally severs the connection be-
tween legitimate constitutional argument and consideration of the 
consequences of constitutional readings and decisions. Constitutional 
argument is to proceed only by debating the semantic meanings of 
the constitutional provisions (and other authoritative sources of con-
stitutional law, like precedent). It is an entirely deontological ac-
count; consequences do not figure into the express argumentative 
 
(2013) [hereinafter POSNER, JUDGING]; Charles Fried, On Judgment, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. 
REV. 1025 (2011) [hereinafter Fried, Judgment] (arguing for the importance of the exercise of 
judgment in adjudication). 
 142.  Authoritative statements of law, while making the application of such rules simpler 
and potentially more uniform, thus may also invite disputes about the semantic and other im-
plications of such statements. 
 143.  WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE MERCHANT OF VENICE, ACT 4, SC. 1 (arguing that 
Antonio’s bond entitles Shylock to a pound of flesh but none of his blood naturally a part 
thereof). A similar example appears in a lighter context in THE PIRATES OF PENZANCE (age of 
a man born on February 29th does not conform to usual norms, thus saving the hero from a life 
of piracy). W. S. GILBERT & ARTHUR SULLIVAN, THE PIRATES OF PENZANCE (1879). 
 144.  For example, Maryland v. Craig, 497 U.S. 836 (1990), turned on the meaning of the 
right of criminal defendants under the Sixth Amendment to be confronted by the witnesses 
against them; District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), turned on the meaning of 
the Second Amendment; Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), presented the question of 
the meaning of the Eighth Amendment protection against cruel and unusual punishment, at 
least to Justice Powell in his concurring opinion; and Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 
(1969), turned on the meaning of the term “speech” in the First Amendment. 
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discourse in constitutional decision. Originalism’s critics have been 
critical of, and have often rejected, this disassociation.145 
Originalism generally defends that disassociation only indirectly. 
It does not defend the anti-consequentialist stance of originalism as 
desirable or good in itself but as a consequence of the need to confine 
constitutional argument to the original meaning of the constitutional 
text.146 That restriction is needed to cabin judicial discretion and the 
exercise of judges’ subjective preferences.147 
B. Challenging Classical Originalism’s Semantic Account 
In reducing constitutional disputes to matters of language and 
meaning, originalism does not deny the importance or stakes of the 
disputes.148 When the question of whether the continued segregation 
of the Topeka schools was presented to the Court in Brown, the 
stakes for our country, white and black citizens alike, were profound. 
Originalists assert that this debate before the Court (as distinguished 
from parallel prudential or political debates before the Topeka Board 
of Education, or moral debates before God or among ourselves as 
moral agents) was necessarily properly cast in constitutional legal 
terms.149 For the originalist, those legal, constitutional terms were 
whether the requirements of the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment—its meaning—were satisfied by purportedly 
“separate but equal” racially segregated public school systems.150 
Both the New Originalists and the anti-originalists challenge the 
classical originalists’ semantic account. Three arguments challenge 
the implicit semantic account of originalism. Dworkin challenges 
originalism as a semantic account of constitutional controversy. He 
 
 145.  See generally Posner, Bork, supra note 20, at 1380 (“The originalist faces back-
wards, but steals frequent sideways glances at consequences.”); DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 
31, at 31–37 (characterizing legal positivism as a semantic account of law that fails to take its 
normative dimension into account adequately). 
 146.  See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 45–46, 144–46. 
 147.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 69–100 (criticizing the innovative, free-
wheeling constitutional jurisprudence of the Warren Court). 
 148.  See, e.g., SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 149 (predicting that there 
will be important substantive constitutional implications of an ascendant originalism). 
 149.  Bobbitt captures this element forcefully when he notes that arguments from kinship 
or based upon the self-interest of a judge would not be made in court, or if made, treated as 
anything other than a profound misstep—or contempt. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 52,  
at 6. 
 150.  See generally Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding separate but equal 
racially segregated facilities under the Equal Protection Clause). 
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begins by challenging originalism’s semantic account of constitution-
al meaning. Dworkin has captured the importance of context with his 
example of a boss speaking to an employee about how to evaluate the 
candidates for a position when one of those candidates is the boss’s 
child.151 Dworkin appears to introduce the example to show the dif-
ference between the semantic meaning of an utterance and its ex-
pected application.152 But he does not stop to explore or even to 
acknowledge the pragmatics of the utterance and that source of po-
tential linguistic content.153 Instead, he focuses immediately on the 
difference between what the speaker intends his listener to do and 
what the semantic meaning of the utterance is. 
The directive to choose the best candidate may be misunderstood 
by the employee to require nepotism; but as a matter of the literal or 
austere semantic meaning of the boss’s directive, the utterance says 
no such thing.154 Indeed, the express statement neither entails the 
truth of such a statement nor implies it.155 At most, the statement 
suggests to the employee the choice of the son. Dworkin thinks this 
example shows that the austere meaning of the language is what 
should be followed and that it is the employee’s duty to hire the best 
candidate, even if she knows that her judgment is different from that 
of her boss.156 Some support for Dworkin’s argument may come from 
the very limited pragmatic import carried in this asymmetrical con-
text where the employee’s boss speaks from a position of power. Yet, 
one suspects that in many such situations, an employee understands 
that it is the boss’s son who should be hired unless manifestly unqual-
ified. 
 
 151.  See RONALD M. DWORKIN, JUSTICE IN ROBES 124 (2006) [hereinafter DWORKIN, 
ROBES]. See also Ronald Dworkin, The Arduous Duty of Fidelity: Originalism, Scalia, Tribe, 
and Nerve, 65 FORDHAM. L. REV. 1249, 1255 (1997) [hereinafter Dworkin, Arduous] (articu-
lating Dworkin’s earlier treatment of these issues in the immediate aftermath of Justice Scalia’s 
Tanner Lectures at Princeton). 
 152.  DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 151, at 124. In Austin’s terms, Dworkin may appear 
to be focused on the difference between the illocutionary act and the perlocutionary act—what 
the listener took away from the utterance, but this does not quite capture it. In Dworkin’s hy-
pothetical, what is intended to be done is not captured by the semantics of the utterance.  
 153.  Id. 
 154.  Id. 
 155.  Entailment is a logical concept when one or more propositions or statements logi-
cally insure the truth or falsity of another proposition or statement. Implication is a broader 
concept. The statement “My daughter is asleep.” implies that I am committed to the claim that 
I have a daughter, although it does not entail that my claim is correct or that the statement “I 
have a daughter.” is true. 
 156.  See DWORKIN, ROBES, supra note 151, at 124. Dworkin’s account of this exchange 
is one of his more opaque treatments of what are so often compelling hypotheticals.  
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Dworkin never explains or defends his claim that it is the austere 
semantic meaning, rather than any richer linguistic meaning that 
ought to be applied and followed by the courts when we shift to the 
constitutional context. In the constitutional context, of course, it may 
be that Dworkin thinks that the fuller linguistic meaning is too un-
certain, or too susceptible to misinterpretation or manipulation. It 
may also be that Dworkin believes that the account of the legitimacy 
of law as a matter of political philosophy requires that it be limited to 
its semantic meaning, but he never articulates such claims. They are 
certainly not obviously true. The political legitimacy of the intended 
or expected force of law properly enacted by a democratic majority 
would also appear a strong candidate for qualification as a legitimate 
law. Moreover, in the context of Dworkin’s law as integrity theory, 
which relies on abstract philosophical theory, such an argument from 
methodological simplicity or certainty appears out of place. 
Dworkin’s account of the conversation in which this utterance is 
made rules out certain contextual elements (like a wink) that would 
bear heavily on the meaning (broadly understood) of what is said. We 
may nevertheless suspect that Dworkin’s austere account of the ex-
ample leaves many elements of the context unexplored. How quali-
fied is the son? How qualified does the boss think his son is? Those 
elements of context, among others, go directly to what the boss 
should be understood to mean. Thus, for example, if the employee 
knows that the boss thinks his son is extremely qualified and thinks 
the employee shares that assessment, it could likely be that the boss 
ought to be understood to be encouraging the employee to choose 
his son. In other contexts, that meaning could be absent, as in the 
case in which the boss is known to have no confidence in his son. 
Dworkin denies that any semantic theory of law can give an ade-
quate account of legal disputes, including constitutional disputes.157 
Dworkin insists that our theory must account for constitutional disa-
greements as substantive, not merely semantic.158 That is, Dworkin 
denies that any theory that reduces legal disputes and arguments to 
disputes and arguments over meanings can give an adequate account 
of law.159 Dworkin asserts that constitutional disputes are ultimately 
 
 157.  DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 36–46. 
 158.  Id. at 40–43. 
 159.  See RONALD M. DWORKIN, The Model of Rules: I [hereinafter DWORKIN, Rules 
I], in TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 14, 43–45 (1977) [hereinafter DWORKIN, TAKING]; 
DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 36–46. Dworkin also denies that any positivist account, 
of which originalism is one, can give an adequate account of law. See DWORKIN, Rules: I, at 45. 
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disputes about moral philosophy and values.160 Instead of reducing 
constitutional and other legal questions to questions of philosophy, 
constitutional disputes should be recognized as implicating non-
semantic disagreements. Correspondingly, the arguments properly 
made in our constitutional practice go beyond semantic arguments—
although semantic arguments are permissible arguments, too. 
Dworkin tests our intuitions with a case that presents the question 
whether a child who has killed his grandfather may take under his 
will under the rules of inheritance or whether allowing a murderer to 
profit from his crime should be denied under the common law.161 
Dworkin argues such a dispute does not appear to be confined to a 
question of meaning.162 Although Dworkin’s argument is controver-
sial163 and Dworkin has not expressly deployed it against original-
ism,164 I want to explore here whether such an argument would apply 
against originalism, and, if so, whether it would be persuasive. 
According to public meaning or semantic expectations original-
ism, disputes about constitutional questions are to be resolved by de-
termining what the Founders and Ratifiers understood the meaning 
of one or more relevant constitutional provisions to be.165 The New 
Originalists temper this claim by restricting it to disputes with re-
spect to those provisions that admit of interpretation. With a deter-
mination of that meaning, and an understanding and conceptualiza-
tion of the facts presented by the case at hand, the constitutional 
 
I discuss the implications from the positivist character of the dominant originalism in LeDuc, 
Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 14. 
 160.  See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 379–89 (describing how Justice Hercules 
would have approached Brown). 
 161.  See Riggs v. Palmer, 115 N.Y. 506 (1889) (creating a rule under common law that a 
potential heir who murders his testator cannot take under the will of his victim). 
 162.  See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 36–46. 
 163.  See, e.g., MARMOR, INTERPRETATION, supra note 40, at 5 n.6 (acknowledging that 
Dworkin’s semantic sting argument has been mislabeled); H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW 244–48 (2d ed.1997) (rejecting Dworkin’s claim that he has offered a semantic theory of 
law and legal disputes). A more radical challenge that applies both to the originalists and to 
Dworkin denies that law is principally an interpretive activity. See, e.g., Dennis Patterson, In-
terpretation in Law, 42 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 685 (2005) [hereinafter Patterson, Interpretation] 
(arguing against the priority of interpretation in understanding or applying law on philosophi-
cal grounds); Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Recon-
struction of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
 164.  See, e.g., Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 27, at 115–27; RONALD DWORKIN, 
The Forum of Principle, in A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 33–71 (1985) [hereinafter DWORKIN, 
Forum]. 
 165.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 262; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 19, at 38. 
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decision properly follows.166 Dworkin denies that account. According 
to Dworkin, the parties do not dispute the meaning of the Constitu-
tion, nor does an appeal to the original understandings, intentions, 
and expectations with respect to the relevant provision answer the 
question posed in the dispute.167 Many disputes are about rights and 
things, not about words.168 A semantic account of the dispute is, 
therefore, inadequate because the constitutional dispute does not re-
duce to a dispute about meanings. 
Originalists might reply that Dworkin’s argument is a little off 
the mark; they do not argue that the dispute is about meanings but 
that the arguments that may be advanced in such disputes must be 
about meanings. Thus, Dworkin’s criticism has conflated what the 
constitutional argument is about with how the constitutional argu-
ment is made. On this response, originalism’s semanticism is about 
how constitutional arguments are made, not what they are about. 
Originalism merely asserts that the judicial decision must be made on 
the basis of arguments about historical semantic understandings of 
meaning. Originalism also needs an account of why constitutional 
cases are about one thing while constitutional arguments are about 
another. On its face, that is a puzzling relationship. Originalism has 
not generally offered such an argument expressly. 
But a powerful argument is available to originalists. That argu-
ment has been hinted at in the originalist emphasis of formality in 
constitutional reasoning and on the rule of law.169 Any formal ac-
count of law and any account of the Constitution that contextualizes 
our constitutional law within the rule of law must acknowledge that 
there is a potential for the relevant legal arguments to depart from 
the arguments about what is at stake in the dispute. Procedural ar-
guments make this disconnect most clearly; arguments about stand-
ing, about jurisdiction, and about statutes of limitation, for example, 
do not engage the substance of the underlying legal dispute. All 
originalism needs to do to explain why semantic arguments control 
the determination of substantive constitutional arguments is to assim-
 
 166.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 262; SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra 
note 19, at 38. 
 167.  See DWORKIN, Forum, supra note 164. 
 168.  See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 40–43. 
 169.  See generally LeDuc, Interpretation and Constitutional Argument, supra note 17; 
Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CHI. L. REV. 1175 (1989) (emphasiz-
ing that the fairness of the equal application of rules as well as justice is an important element of 
the concept of the rule of law). 
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ilate the semantic and linguistic arguments to this formal model. 
They can defend such an assimilation on the basis that our constitu-
tional law is a fundamental element in the rule of law and, as such, 
must remain formal in significant respects with respect to its argu-
ment and doctrine. 
The second, most radical criticism attacks originalism’s implicit 
reliance on the premise that appellate constitutional adjudication is 
simply a matter of semantic interpretation. It may be helpful to con-
sider the richness of the ways in which language is used. Utterances 
such as “Your money or our life!”, uttered in an appropriate context, 
have a meaning that is very different from ordinary statements of 
propositions. That is, while we speak customarily of the meaning of 
these performatives, perhaps that is a type of meaning sufficiently dis-
tinct from the meaning of such other statements that it confuses 
more than it illuminates. The performative nature of the constitu-
tional imperatives might appear to leave a semantic analysis of consti-
tutional provisions open to the same objection. Wittgensteinian phi-
losophers of language would likely reply by reminding us that both 
kinds of utterances are doing certain things, and to the extent that we 
use meaning to refer to that dimension of communication that carries 
a linguistic message, the two kinds of utterances certainly appear to 
share a common feature ordinarily called their meaning. Moreover, 
while utterances like “Fire!” or “Your money or your life!” have their 
own particular usages, many other utterances have meanings that de-
part from the literal meanings of the words that comprise them. If 
context is indeed everything, that’s the meaning that we need to focus 
on, even if it arises contextually by implication or by the performative 
role of the text rather than solely from the semantic or linguistic 
meaning of the words in the text. The claim that the performative na-
ture of the Constitution gives it meaning apart from mere semantic 
analysis has generally received little attention from the originalists, or 
their critics.170 
Second, even if it is sensible to speak of meanings with respect to 
these imperative performative utterances, the provisions of the Con-
stitution present no similar usages independent of the performative 
 
 170.  Exceptions would include Larry Solum and Jack Balkin, whose originalism is hardly 
entirely traditional. See generally Andrew Koppelman, Why Jack Balkin Is Disgusting, 27 
CONST. COMMENT. 177 (2010); Steven G. Calabresi & Lina Fine, Two Cheers for Professor 
Balkin’s Originalism, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 663 (2009) (praising Balkin’s living originalism and 
contrasting it with classical originalism before concluding that it requires refinement). 
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role of the provisions. That is, the Constitution should be viewed on-
ly as a performative, and analyzed on that basis. Even if that strong 
claim is rejected, however, it should be conceded that the Constitu-
tion is not merely a series of statements of propositions. The very 
constitutive role of the Constitution formulating the political and le-
gal framework for the Republic commits it to a performative role. 
Because the Constitution outlines the rules under which the federal 
government operates, it must play a performative role, doing as well 
as saying. Our analysis of the meaning of the Constitution’s provi-
sions would appear to need to acknowledge that role and account for 
it in our interpretation. Moreover, the constitutional law—if not the 
Constitution itself—includes locutions seemingly disassociated from 
the terms thereof; “substantive due process” would appear to be the 
most obvious.171 In sum, whether the intuitive concept that contextu-
al meaning may often not be derivative from (in ordinary semantic 
ways) the meaning of the words comprising provisions will carry the 
theoretical weight placed on it will be explored below. 
This line of argument takes us back to focus on the constitutional 
text. The Constitution is, after all, a particular kind of text.172 It not 
only says certain things but also does certain things. For example, it 
commands Congress not to enact certain laws, and commands the 
states not to treat their own citizens in certain ways, and requires 
those states affirmatively to treat their citizens in other ways (at least 
since the Reconstruction Amendments).173 It also commands the 
President.174 The meaning that the Constitution has as a result of 
these performative roles is fundamentally different than the import 
 
 171.  The doctrine of the dormant Commerce Clause, the concept of “separate but equal” 
and the concept of desegregating schools with “all deliberate speed” would appear to be others. 
I think that the ability in constitutional discourse to use constitutional expressions very loosely, 
indeed, almost metaphorically, helps to explain why John Hart Ely’s otherwise devastating con-
tempt for the concept of “substantive due process” fails to tell. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY 
AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 18 (1980) [hereinafter ELY, DEMOCRACY]. 
It is not just that there is too much precedent that would need be overturned if the concept 
were abandoned; the concept resonates with our contemporary constitutional intuitions. Bob-
bitt’s account of constitutional discourse explains why this is so—arguments from doctrinal 
precedent are an accepted mode of constitutional argument, and substantive due process, what-
ever its flaws, is part of that accepted precedent. 
 172.  See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 37 (characterizing the Constitu-
tion as “an unusual text” but without explaining how it is unusual). 
 173.  Thus, for example, U.S. CONST. amend. XV (proscribing racial discrimination by 
the States with respect to voting rights). 
 174.  See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1 (prescribing the precise text of the President’s oath of 
office). 
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and role that Tribe’s treatise on constitutional law has, for example, 
as a treatise. 
The difference arises from the role of Tribe’s treatise principally 
as a saying, not a doing. The role such a treatise plays is in saying 
what the constitutional law is, not in a legally binding way, but ex-
pressively, explaining how it arose, as a matter of reason and of histo-
ry. The role of that treatise as a doing is much smaller, although it 
exists. The treatise helps establish Tribe as a towering twentieth-
century constitutional scholar; it satisfies certain contractual terms 
between Tribe and his publisher, etc. One act that Tribe’s treatise 
does not accomplish is to authoritatively state what the law is, as Su-
preme Court constitutional opinions do. 
It is precisely that authoritative role in saying what the law is that 
makes constitutional law opinions and decisions more than mere in-
terpretations, and the task of deciding the case and announcing the 
decision more than one of mere interpretation. We can capture the 
performative significance of a Supreme Court majority opinion by 
considering a commonplace response to criticism. If criticized with 
respect to a Court opinion that she had written, a Supreme Court 
justice might say, truly if not truthfully,175 “Well, it’s only my opin-
ion,” as if to deflect the criticism with an implicit relativist response. 
Such a response would miss the critical performative dimension of 
such a writing and the consequences such a writing has, not merely 
for the particular litigants, but for our republic and its law.176 
It might be argued that this hypothetical simply relies on a con-
flation of two senses of opinion, one general and one narrowly legal. 
The hypothetical Justice’s response simply trades on this ambiguity 
and is not otherwise of interest as a theoretical matter. The example 
does rely on the multiple meanings of opinion, but it does so high-
light the different performative value of an opinion from the Court 
and opinions otherwise expressed about the Constitution. 
Third, I argue against a semantic account of constitutional law 
 
 175.  See BERNARD WILLIAMS, TRUTH AND TRUTHFULNESS 102 (2002) (recounting 
the example of St. Athanasius’s statement to the pursuing Roman soldiers who had failed to 
recognize him as to the whereabouts of Athanasius which was literally true, but wholly          
misleading). 
 176.  For a contemporary discussion of the binding effect of Supreme Court opinions and 
decisions see STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK 1–2 (2010) [hereinafter 
BREYER, DEMOCRACY] (arguing that the force of Supreme Court decisions relies upon a foun-
dation of public trust and that the Court’s mission of preserving that trust shapes its interpre-
tive and decisional practice). 
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and disputes. A better account substitutes—or at least adds—a focus 
on pragmatics for, and to, a focus on, semantics. Pragmatics focuses 
on the meaning of the Constitution in context, in action. It empha-
sizes the role of the Constitution as both a saying and as a doing.177 
When the priority of the Constitution as a doing—rather than a say-
ing—is recognized, any effort to restrict constitutional analysis to 
semantics quickly collapses. That is because the meaning or import of 
performative statements or utterances turns on their context in criti-
cal and often determinative ways.178 
The constitutional provision that the Vice President serves as the 
President of the Senate is an example showing that the force of the 
Constitution is generated by its performative role, not merely its se-
mantic meaning.179 The performative text thus has a meaning or im-
port that is different from its semantic meaning and different from 
the corresponding declarative text. Other examples can be easily 
called up. For example, the First Amendment expressly protects only 
the freedom of the press. As a semantic matter, that protection would 
not encompass sound trucks, broadcast radio, or television. As a per-
formative matter, by contrast, the courts have not hesitated to read 
the provision to encompass such technologies. The recognition of the 
performative nature of the constitutional text is more helpful than, 
for example, simply asserting that the term “press” is to be read as a 
“sort of” synecdoche in the First Amendment.180 I explore these ar-
guments below. 
C. Performatives, Inference, and an Alternative Account of the 
Conceptual Content of Constitutional Law 
An alternative account of the constitutional text asserts both that 
its meaning and import is not limited to its semantic or linguistic 
meaning and that the semantic content of the constitutional text aris-
es from the role of propositions of constitutional law in inference. 
The force of the constitutional text arises not only from the content 
of the text but also from the inferences that may be properly drawn 
from it. That account emphasizes two elements of constitutional law 
 
 177.  See, e.g., Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2, at 486–89 (rejecting the 
term pragmatics in favor of the term “contextual enrichment” in writing for an American legal 
audience because of the potential confusion with legal pragmatism). 
 178.  See id. and authorities cited therein. 
 179.  See id. 
 180.  See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 38. 
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that have generally not been recognized nor adequately taken into 
account. Both elements emphasized in this account have a pragmatist 
tenor; each emphasizes the Constitution’s role and place in our social 
and individual lives. The increasing recognition of sources of mean-
ing for legal and constitutional provisions now comes from a wide 
range of philosophers of language.181 There is an increasing recogni-
tion that the austerity of semantic meaning is an incomplete account 
of the salient features of constitutional language.182 In the account de-
fended here, not only is the pragmatics of constitutional language 
emphasized but, more importantly, I will argue that the constitution-
al text is a performative.183 The Constitution in its entirety and in its 
discrete provisions is a doing. The salient feature of a performative 
utterance or a text is its role to do something by saying something.184 
Examples of performatives abound: wedding vows exchanged in a 
wedding ceremony and bets made by gamblers in entering into a wa-
ger are among those most celebrated.185 
The second element of constitutional law is its propositional or 
conceptual content. The propositional or conceptual content of pro-
visions of the Constitution or of opinions interpreting or applying 
the Constitution are those propositions asserted or denied by such 
texts and the consequences of the inferences such propositions sup-
port, as well as the other propositions that support such propositions 
of constitutional law.186 This is neither an uncontroversial account 
nor is it outside the mainstream of contemporary philosophical    
theory.187 
 
 181.  See, e.g., Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2; SOAMES, Legal Texts, su-
pra note 2. But see Greenberg, supra note 2 (articulating a widely held theory that the semantic 
content of law generates its legal content but arguing that such a theory is mistaken). 
 182.  See SOAMES, Legal Texts, supra note 2; Solum, Communicative Content, supra 
note 2. 
 183.  See generally AUSTIN, WORDS, supra note 55 (developing a theory of performative 
language (initially in the context of speech acts)). 
 184.  Id. at 6, 12 (“[B]y saying or in saying something we are doing something.”). 
 185.  Id. at 5 (wedding vows). 
 186.  In describing the conceptual content of the Constitution in terms of the inferences 
that the constitutional text permits, I am drawing on the work of Robert Brandom. See general-
ly ROBERT B. BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 88, at 165–66 (introducing the 
inferentialist account of meaning based upon the inferential function of the conceptual content 
of propositions); BRANDOM, MAKING IT EXPLICIT, supra note 118. 
 187.  See generally Danielle Macbeth, Inference, Meaning, and Truth in Brandom, 
Sellars, and Frege, in READING BRANDOM: ON MAKING IT EXPLICIT 197 (Bernhard Weiss & 
Jeremy Wanderer eds., 2010); Michael Dummett, Should Semantics Be Deflated, in READING 
BRANDOM: ON MAKING IT EXPLICIT 197 (Bernhard Weiss & Jeremy Wanderer eds., 2010). 
LEDUC.MACRO.FINAL_3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017  6:51 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
152 
A few examples can demonstrate the inferential role of proposi-
tions of constitutional law. Turning first to the role of provisions in 
drawing inferences, the Fifth Amendment provides that private prop-
erty may not be taken for public use without just compensation.188 
Casting that provision in the form of the affirmative proposition, 
“private property may be taken by the federal government for public 
use on payment of just compensation” can allow that proposition to 
be employed in inferences to the conclusions that private property 
may not be taken for private use and that private property may not be 
taken for public use without the payment of just compensation. Al-
ternative inferences are also possible.189 With the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, additional important inferences may be 
constructed with respect to the eminent domain power of the states. 
Constitutional provisions also stand as conclusions from infer-
ences drawn from other provisions of constitutional law. The role as 
consequences of inferences admittedly may appear a little puzzling 
since the text of the Constitution provides a sufficient basis for such 
propositions and their role as consequences of inferences may appear 
inconsequential. Those inferences enable us to choose among com-
peting, grammatically possible readings of ambiguous provisions or 
sets of provisions. Consider the two provisions of the Constitution 
that provide the general rule that the Vice President shall preside 
over the Senate190 and the exception to that rule that the Chief Justice 
shall preside when the Senate sits to try the President for impeach-
ment.191 No comparable express exception provides that the Vice 
President shall not preside over her own impeachment trial. While 
the potential for the Vice President to exercise such a role may ap-
pear manifestly implausible, there has been significant academic at-
tention to the question of how to reach that conclusion in light of the 
text.192 
 
 188.  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 189.  The text of the Fifth Amendment could also be deployed in inferences that private 
property may be taken for private use and, indeed, that private property may be taken for pri-
vate use without payment of just compensation. Those inferences are not made in our constitu-
tional law of taking and have apparently never been seriously entertained. What counts as pub-
lic use, of course, has not been uncontroversial. See, e.g., Kelo v. City of New London, 545 
U.S. 469 (2005) (upholding the state condemnation power for urban redevelopment in the ab-
sence of urban blight or other nuisance); see also EPSTEIN, TAKINGS, supra note 120, at 161-81 
(exploring what he terms the “invisible” public use clause). 
 190.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 4.  
 191.  Id. cl. 6. 
 192.  See, e.g., Joel K. Goldstein, Can the Vice President Preside at His Own Impeach-
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Focusing on the inferences to the statements of constitutional law 
that may be understood from the constitutional text helps solve this 
conundrum. The Constitution may be understood to incorporate a 
number of principles. These principles are embedded in the Consti-
tution, if at all, in an inferential sense. More precisely, the conceptual 
content of the constitutional provisions, coupled with our practice of 
practical inference, generates the principles as consequences of the 
express constitutional propositions. Those principles are not express-
ly stated or a matter of the semantic or linguistic meaning of the con-
stitutional text. 
One important example of such an implied principle is the sepa-
ration of powers.193 One of the most fundamental particulars of the 
doctrine of separation of powers is that no man, including the sover-
eign, should be a judge in his own case.194 If we endorse that princi-
ple, then from it we can construct an inference to a proposition that 
extends the express principle that the Vice President shall not preside 
over the trial of the impeachment of the president, a fortiori to the 
proposition that the Vice President shall not preside at the trial of 
her own impeachment. 
A little background on pragmatics and the theory of performa-
tives may clarify the importance of the performative role of the Con-
stitution. The initial focus of the analysis of performatives was on ut-
terances,195 but texts can also be performatives.196 Translating the 
theory of performatives to written texts is not simple, however, as the 
context of a text, the author, and the audience are more complicated 
than the corresponding notions for utterances. A written exchange of 
promises may make a contract, for example.197 Austin identifies a 
number of conditions that are necessary for a text or utterance to op-
 
ment Trial? A Critique of Bare Textualism, 44 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 849, 850–51 (2000) (exploring 
the question whether the vice president, as the presiding officer of the Senate, may preside over 
her own trial). See also AMAR, UNWRITTEN, supra note 120, at 6–16. Few appear to be per-
suaded that the provision for the Chief Justice to preside over the impeachment trial of the 
President creates an implication that the Vice President may preside over her own trial, despite 
the semantic meaning of the constitutional text. 
 193.  See generally CHARLES FRIED, SAYING WHAT THE LAW IS: THE CONSTITUTION 
IN THE SUPREME COURT 53–68 (2004) [hereinafter FRIED, SAYING] (emphasizing the autono-
my of our constitutional doctrine within the social and political practices of the Republic).  
 194.  See generally Goldstein, supra note 192. 
 195.  BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 88, at 4–7. 
 196.  AUSTIN, WORDS, supra note 55, at 5 (giving the example of a bequest made in a 
will). Indeed, in the case of purported contracts subject to the statute of frauds only written 
texts can be successful performatives. 
 197.  Id. at 150–51. 
LEDUC.MACRO.FINAL_3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017  6:51 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
154 
erate as a performative.198 
Austin distinguishes five types of performatives.199 Only two types 
appear in the Constitution: the exercitive and commissive. An exerci-
tive takes an action or exercises a power that is vested in the speak-
er.200 The right or power attributed to the speaker may be vested in 
her formally or informally, but Austin remarks the prevalence of ex-
ercitives in the legal context, where there is significant formality in 
the vesting.201 As Austin notes, an exercitive “is a decision that some-
thing is to be so.”202 In the Constitution, the creation of the Con-
gress, the creation of the Presidency, and the creation of the Supreme 
Court as constitutive elements of the sovereign federal government 
are all obvious examples of exercitives. The creation of rights, as un-
der the First and Second Amendments, and the limitation of the 
power of the Federal or state governments, as under the First, Sec-
ond, and Fourteenth Amendments, are also important examples of 
exercitives. The constitutional provision that the President may be 
impeached and tried for high crimes and misdemeanors is another 
example. A commissive is made by a speaker or writer with the power 
to commit herself to a particular course of action.203 In the Constitu-
tion, the provision that the President shall exercise due care that the 
laws are enforced is an example of a commissive As such, it is a little 
puzzling because it is made on behalf of the President but it is not 
made by the President.204 
Performatives are significant because they behave differently 
from ordinary declarative utterances or textual statements—what 
Austin terms constatives.205 Most constitutional interpretation, and 
certainly most of the protagonists in the classical debate over 
 
 198.  Id. at 14. 
 199.  Id. 
 200.  Id. at 154. 
 201.  Id. Such formality serves certain well-recognized functions, including those of en-
suring certainty and simplifying proof. See generally BARNETT, LOST, supra note 60, at 106–09 
(describing the functions of a writing, in private contract and in public constitutional law).  
 202.  AUSTIN, WORDS, supra note 55, at 154. 
 203.  Id. at 156–57. 
 204.  The cited provision nevertheless qualifies as a commissive. When the president or 
members of Congress swear the required oath to uphold the Constitution, it would appear that 
they also affirm such undertakings as part of their respective constitutional duties. This affirma-
tion may be thought of as an incorporation by reference (in a legal perspective) or as implied by 
their oath (on an inferentialist account). In either case, the commissive expressed in the consti-
tutional text is affirmed by the individuals who, individually or as a member of the collective 
body, commit to the performance.  
 205.  Id. at 3. 
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originalism, have tacitly treated the constitutional text and the texts 
of authoritative constitutional opinions as constatives.206 That as-
sumption has misled many of the participants in the originalism de-
bate. For example, if we read, apply, and interpret the constitutional 
text only as constatives or declaratory, we ignore the dimension of 
what the text does as well as what it was understood, expected, and 
intended to do. That changes the way we read, apply, and interpret 
the text. For example, consider truth conditions. Rightly or wrongly, 
we generally think that statements of fact are true or false.207 Do 
propositions of constitutional law have truth conditions? To the ex-
tent that such texts constitute performatives and Austin is right, then 
the statements or propositions that comprise such texts do not have 
non-trivial truth conditions.208 
Austin focused first on the apparent absence of truth conditions 
for performatives and observed that performatives are instead meas-
ured by a different, novel metric.209 Austin terms his account of the 
ways in which performatives fail the doctrine of the infelicities.210 
Those failures arise because the utterances don’t fit with, or conform 
to, the social practices or contexts in which they are embedded. In 
the case of a wedding vow, a participant might already be married, 
might be under the legal age of consent, or might think she was only 
acting in a play.211 In such cases the wedding vows would be ineffec-
tive—the couple would remain unmarried—but the vows would not 
 
 206.  Most do not even acknowledge the concept of performatives. While Dworkin makes 
a passing reference to Grice’s work, he does not make clear what he is referring to, or how that 
work figures into Dworkin’s critique of originalism. See Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 
27, at 117, n.6. An important exception, of course, is Larry Solum, who employs Grice’s analy-
sis in his account of originalism. See Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2 (expressly 
relying on Grice’s theory for an account of the importance of intention and context in constitu-
tional interpretation). 
 207.  See generally, e.g., David Lewis, General Semantics, in SEMANTICS OF NATURAL 
LANGUAGE 169 (Donald Davidson & Gilbert Harman eds., 1972) (asserting the relationship of 
meaning and truth conditions).  
 208.  AUSTIN, WORDS, supra note 55, at 154. For an extended discussion of the question 
of the existence of truth conditions for propositions of constitutional law, see LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge, supra note 10; LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 6. 
 209.  AUSTIN, WORDS, supra note 55, at 13–14. 
 210.  Id. at 14. It is important to note certain failures that are excluded from Austin’s ac-
count. In the case of the performatives uttered in a marriage ceremony, Austin does not include 
the failure of and unhappy marriage or an infelicitous match. That is important because the 
failures that Austin captures are confined to failures to do the act that the performative is de-
signed and (ordinarily) intended to accomplish. Whether that act has good or happy conse-
quences falls outside the ambit of Austin’s theory. That limitation makes sense because he is 
concerned with language, not with action theory. 
 211.  See id. at 16. 
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be false. Many of the complexities of Austin’s account are irrelevant 
here; for example, because of the success of the Constitution,212 Aus-
tin’s account of how performatives fail213 would appear unimportant 
in constitutional theory. 
But Austin’s core insight is that certain utterances (and texts) do 
not reduce to declarative statements and the linguistic usage impli-
cated in such utterances is very different from a Cartesian predication 
or an empiricist report of sense data. Because constitutional texts fall 
within that category of performatives, Austin’s theory is important 
and very relevant to the analysis and understanding of those texts. 
Austin’s denial of truth values to performatives has not been uncon-
troversial, of course, and some have sought to rehabilitate the truth 
values of performatives by arguing that performatives are true by 
their utterance.214 For my purposes here, I will simply adopt an ap-
proach to performatives like that outlined by Austin. 
Constitutional texts (including judicial decisions) are often (per-
haps, in the case of constitutional provisions themselves, always) per-
formatives,215 and it is important to understand the performative di-
mension of the constitutional text. I want to focus on four elements. 
First, are constitutional texts performatives? Second, who is the au-
thor with respect to such texts? Third, who is the audience? Fourth, 
what are the objections to such a performative characterization? 
Whether constitutional texts or other legal texts are performa-
tives is not a new question.216 That inquiry has been part of the analy-
 
 212.  The success of the Constitution, in this context, is a matter of its having been under-
stood and effective in constituting a new sovereign federal government with certain generally 
understood features. This characterization is not a normative assessment of the justice of the 
government created or its provision for the rights of its citizens. 
 213.  See LEO TOLSTOY, ANNA KARENINA 1 (Richard Pevear & Larissa Volokhonsky 
trans., 2013) (1877) (“All happy families are alike; each unhappy family is unhappy in its own 
way.”). 
 214.  See Lewis, Scorekeeping, supra note 122, at 247–48. 
 215.  In claiming that constitutional texts are generally performatives, I am not claiming 
that such texts are speech acts (which had admittedly been the focus of the analysis of performa-
tives). Nor am I claiming that such texts are to be analyzed with a model of speech. Thus, the 
argument here is, I believe, and is intended to be, agnostic on the claims that Jed Rubenfeld has 
made about the inadequacy of the model of speech. See generally Jed Rubenfeld, Reading the 
Constitution as Spoken, 104 YALE L.J. 1119 (1995) [hereinafter Rubenfeld, Reading the Con-
stitution] (arguing that the atemporality of the Constitution’s legal authority precludes simple, 
speech metaphors for constitutional interpretation). 
 216.  See Geoffrey P. Miller, Pragmatics and the Maxims of Interpretation, 1990 WIS. L. 
REV. 1179 (1990) (arguing that maxims of interpretation are simply specific examples of Grice’s 
more general account of the rules of conversational implicature); DWORKIN, Forum, supra note 
164, at 400 n.13 (questioning whether legislative votes are speech acts). 
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sis of legislation as a particular form of communication.217 If we start 
with the fundamental questions—whether the Constitution is intend-
ed to do something, on the one hand, and whether it does, in fact, do 
something, on the other—the answers seem apparent. The Constitu-
tion is intended to, and does, do something.218 It is the what of that 
intended performance that is more complex.219 
Constitutional performatives do different things and, indeed, dif-
ferent kinds of things, than many simpler utterances and texts. As 
noted above, the types of performatives employed in the Constitution 
that fit into Austin’s categories are exercitives and, possibly, commis-
sives.220 But these two types of performatives would not appear to ex-
haust the kinds of things that the Constitution does. It may be helpful 
to provide at least a partial catalog of what the Constitution does. It 
creates a sovereign state, the United States of America. It constitutes 
the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of that state, and cre-
ates a bicameral legislature, and provides certain rules as to the indi-
viduals that are eligible to serve. It grants limited powers to that sov-
ereign state. It limits the powers of the otherwise sovereign States 
that are subsumed within that state. It provides a rule for the ratifica-
tion of the instrument that created the new sovereign state and for 
the amendment of such instrument. The performative analysis of 
these diverse and complex provisions is not simple. 
First, the provisions of the Constitution that instruct or constrain 
the States would appear to be performatives of a type not easily cap-
tured by the categories described by Austin.221 The provisions of the 
Constitution instruct the otherwise sovereign States as to their obli-
gations or restrict their powers on behalf of the superior federal sov-
ereign. For example, when Article I, Section 10 provides “No State 
 
 217.  See, e.g., Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2, at 486–89 (endorsing a 
Gricean pragmatics to account for constitutional meaning); Greenberg, supra note 2. 
 218.  See Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL’Y 817, 821 (2015) [hereinafter Sachs, Legal Change] (“What’s important about the 
Constitution of 1788 isn’t what it said, but what it did . . . .”). 
 219.  Thus, whether we attempt to assimilate the adoption of the constitutional text or the 
decision of a constitutional case and issuance of an associated opinion to orthodox communica-
tion theory, the performative act appears central. See Greenberg, supra note 2. 
 220.  Such provisions exercise powers on the part of the sovereign to limit the powers of 
the otherwise sovereign States (exercitives) and commit the national government to certain ac-
tions, as in the prohibition in Article I, Section 9 of any legislation restricting the slave trade 
before 1808 (as commissives). 
 221.  See AUSTIN, WORDS, supra note 55, at 150–63 (distinguishing five general classes 
of performatives). 
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shall enter into any Treaty [or] Alliance,”222 that provision prohibits 
the States from exercising powers that would otherwise be theirs as 
sovereigns. That is a performative act.223 The provision, by its terms, 
imposes a limit on the otherwise available powers of the States. This 
is done by the constitutional provision and requires no further saying 
or doing to be effective.224 With Article I, Section 10, the States’ 
powers to enter into treaties have been eliminated. What sort of per-
formative is such a provision? It does not appear to fit easily into any 
of Austin’s categories.225 When the First Amendment provides that 
the “Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of . . . the 
press,” that, too, is a performative provision, prescribing a limit on 
the power of the Federal government.226 
When Article I, Sections 2 and 3 provide for the creation of the 
House of Representatives and the Senate, respectively, and provides 
for the powers thereof, those provisions are constitutive and, as such, 
are also performative texts.227 That provision would appear to be an 
exercitive because it employs a sovereign power to create or consti-
tute the two houses of Congress. All of the provisions of the Consti-
tution,228 other than the Preamble,229 are likely performatives because 
the Constitution and each of its provisions are doing something. 
Opinions in constitutional cases are more complex than the sim-
 
 222.  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
 223.  In particular, in Austin’s terminology it is an exercitive. AUSTIN, WORDS, supra 
note 55, at 154–56. 
 224.  Were a state to enter illegally into such a treaty or alliance, action to enforce the 
prohibition would need be required, of course; the constitutional provision does not magically 
operate in the space of causes to prevent a state from entering into such a treaty or alliance. 
 225.  It is most like an exercitive, if it fits into any of the categories enumerated by Austin, 
but none of the many exercitives identified by Austin prohibit actions by another. But Austin 
does expressly define an exercitive as including performatives for which the “consequences may 
be that others are. . .‘not allowed’ to do certain acts.” AUSTIN, WORDS, supra note 55, at 154. 
While I think this definitional note is accurate, I do not think it is very important. The failure 
of these provisions to qualify within Austin’s taxonomy is a function of the complexity of the 
political institutions of the Republic. These provisions are, in a sense, second-order performa-
tives within an existing political legal context. 
 226.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 227.  U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3. 
 228.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008), held that the preamble of the 
Second Amendment was without legal force and therefore would not qualify as a performative 
in the relevant sense here. 
 229.  The preamble may not appear to be a performative because it seems simply to recite 
or state the basis upon which the Constitution was made. On the other hand, it may be per-
formative, under the political theory of the Founding. On such an account, grounded on social 
contract theory, the preamble recites the exchange of consideration that supports the contrac-
tual rights and obligations created or memorialized in the balance of the document. 
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ple kinds of utterances that Austin analyzes. The holding of the case, 
and the reasoning of the case, are performatives. That is, the authori-
tative, precedential core of a case is performative. But unlike the text 
of the Constitution, there may be non-performative elements in con-
stitutional cases. Opinions may state historical or sociological facts 
that are relevant to the case,230 or they may state facts relating to the 
procedural history of the case itself.231 For our purposes, I can focus 
upon the performative elements of the constitutional text. 
Dissenting or concurring opinions appear to present a problem 
under this analysis because they do not authoritatively state the law. 
Are they also performatives and, if so, what is it that they do? On 
their face, dissenting opinions may appear to do nothing, creating the 
apparent paradox that the authoritative kernel of controlling opinions 
are performatives while other opinions are composed of constatives. 
While concurring and dissenting opinions lack the performative force 
of controlling opinions, they have a weaker, modal performative sta-
tus. Such opinions are in the nature of counterfactual hypotheticals: 
they purport to provide what the authors would have held if they had 
held the power to decide. Thus, in a counterfactual form, such opin-
ions indicate what the law might have been. As signals or signposts 
with respect to the direction of the law such opinions also carry sig-
nificant performative force. Despite the apparent paradox, that sub-
stantial difference between the controlling opinion and all other 
opinions under a performative analysis simply reflects the common 
law lawyers’ understanding of the nature of precedent.232 The con-
trolling opinion states the law and, in so doing, makes the precedent. 
That congruence between the performative text and the legal prece-
dent that states the controlling law is powerful evidence of the per-
formative role of constitutional (or other legal) opinions. 
The second step in the analysis requires that we determine to 
whom we attribute the constitutional text. If we begin with the Con-
stitution originally adopted by the Constitutional Convention and 
ratified by the votes in the States, to whom ought the constitutional 
 
 230.  See, e.g., District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 684–87 (2008) (Breyer, J., 
dissenting). 
 231.  Id. at 573–77. 
 232.  See generally Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 
YALE L.J. 161 (1930); Max Radin, Case Law and Stare Decisis: Concerning Prajudizienrecht in 
Amerika, 33 COLUM. L. REV. 199, 200–02; (1933) (classical statement of some of the obvious 
puzzles inherent in the doctrines of stare decisis and precedent); Frederick Schauer, Precedent, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 571 (1987). 
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text to be attributed to for purposes of a performative analysis under 
Austin’s theory?233 Are there impediments to such an attribution and 
associated analysis? Some have questioned the very existence of col-
lective understandings.234 Originalism requires that we be able to 
identify the relevant actors or community whose intentions, expecta-
tions, or understandings are to count in determining the original im-
port of the constitutional text.235 To employ Austin’s concepts, we 
need to identify the utterer or author to whom the speech or text is 
attributed. That question of attribution also arises with respect to ju-
dicial decisions applying and interpreting the Constitution. Who is 
the author in those cases for purposes of an analysis of the texts as 
performatives? Do we adopt the fiction that the Court is merely 
channeling the authors of the relevant constitutional text? Or do we 
treat the Court as an author? 
It is not clear that this question is of more than theoretical inter-
est, because it is unclear that different choices of author would make 
a material difference in the performative analysis. Whoever is treated 
as the author, the pragmatics of the context and the intent of the au-
thor appear substantially congruent. They would be substantially 
congruent because all of the actors who stand as potential authors in 
the performative analysis were engaged in a common social enter-
prise; they had a coordination strategy with respect to the constitu-
tional texts adopted. 
In the case of the Constitution as originally adopted, the candi-
dates for authorial status would appear to include particular members 
of the constitutional community (with respect to particular provi-
sions, for example): the members of the Convention voting to pro-
pose the Constitution, the entire Convention, the members of the re-
spective State ratifying conventions (perhaps excluding those from 
North Carolina and Rhode Island),236 the voters who elected the del-
 
 233.  This restates as a question a criticism that Dworkin leveled against originalism. See 
DWORKIN, Forum, supra note 164, at 43–45. 
 234.  Id. at 400 n.13.  
 235.  See, e.g., id. at 43–45 (offering classical statement of concerns with respect to group 
intentions or expectations); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for Original Understanding, 
60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). 
 236.  The delegates and voters from those two states ought perhaps to be excluded be-
cause the Confederation Congress adopted a resolution providing that the Constitution would 
become effective when ratified by eleven of the thirteen states, and North Carolina and Rhode 
Island were the last two states to ratify. In addition, the voters and delegates from the final four 
states ratifying should perhaps also be excluded because the Constitution specified that it would 
be effective when adopted by nine State ratifying conventions, and those states ratified after the 
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egates to the State ratifying conventions, and the People. These are 
the same persons whose intentions and expectations are taken into 
account under original intentions and original expectations original-
ism.237 For purposes of the discussion here, we may assume that the 
same kinds of answers available with respect to identifying the rele-
vant actors for originalism are generally available for purposes of a 
performative analysis.238 Moreover, it is unclear that there are good 
reasons to believe that the different candidates to be treated as author 
would have had materially different intentions and expectations rele-
vant to a performative analysis. 
Third, in addition to identifying the author with respect to con-
stitutional law texts, we must also identify the audience if we are to 
construct a performative account.239 Is the audience limited to the 
initial, or original, audience or can we endeavor to construct an ac-
count of an audience that stretches out into time? This question is, of 
course, at the heart of the dispute between originalism and its critics 
with respect to the originalists’ temporal account of the meaning of 
constitutional provisions.240 The originalists look only to the original 
speech act and the original authors and audience.241 One strategy that 
 
requisite majority of states had already adopted the Constitution. See U.S. CONST. art. VII. See 
generally PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 
1787–88 (2010). 
 237.  See generally DWORKIN, Forum, supra note 164, at 43–44. They are also most of 
the classes of persons considered relevant under the New Originalism looking to the original 
understanding of the constitutional provisions (missing are certain broader linguistic          
communities). 
 238.  The question that is unanswered by originalism is whether the court may be treated 
as the author; that is not a possibility for originalism. In certain respects, when the Court pro-
vides a specification of an open-ended constitutional provision, for example, it is hard not to 
treat the Court as the author, at least as to the specification. See, e.g., National Labor Relations 
Board v. Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550, 2550 (2014) (providing an express rule as to how many days 
the Senate must be in recess before the Recess Appointments Clause becomes potentially appli-
cable).  
 239.  In ordinary utterances, this is not a problem, because acoustics defines who is within 
earshot, and the context generally indicates who is intended to hear. But drama is rife with in-
stances of asides and utterances directed to hidden listeners, or couched in terms that only some 
of those present can be anticipated to understand in the manner intended. 
 240.  See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 140; Laurence Tribe, Comment, 
in ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 65, 
84 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997) [hereinafter Tribe, Interpretation] (“[M]uch of the Constitution 
simply cannot be understood as a law enacted by a particular body of persons on a specific date 
but must instead be comprehended as law promulgated in the name of a ‘people’ who span gen-
erations.”). See also BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 144 (identifying the relevant class as 
the ratifiers of the Constitution). 
 241.  See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 140. For an exploration of some of 
the puzzles of temporality raised by the competing theories of constitutional interpretation, see 
LEDUC.MACRO.FINAL_3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017  6:51 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
162 
the originalists may offer for their position is to challenge the notion 
that atemporal speech acts are a plausible, or perhaps even a mean-
ingful, concept. The originalists may argue speech acts, including 
textual acts, are social artifacts that are always embedded in a histori-
cal moment. The notion that we can pluck such texts out of that con-
text while retaining a coherent notion of the text’s meaning may be 
confused and mistaken.242 Yet it would appear that we have a range of 
texts, often in the religious context, that are understood to prescribe 
natural or religious law, among their other roles, and, to the extent 
that those texts do so, are understood by the relevant observant reli-
gious community to speak to and for eternity.243 In the case of the key 
sources in the Judeo-Christian tradition, these texts are familiar to 
many originalists and, indeed, important models for interpretation.244 
But for many secular contemporary citizens the model of divine reli-
gious texts is problematic. The timeless authority of such texts de-
rives, after all, from their divine status or source. Nevertheless, if we 
stand the question on its head, why must texts or utterances speak on-
ly to a particular temporal context? Mathematical propositions, for 
example, appear to have a timelessness that even an agnostic contem-
porary can acknowledge. So it is not clear that the notion of speaking 
to the ages is a flawed or impossible performative project—just     
ambitious. 
But originalists are generally not prepared to imagine such an 
atemporal or temporally extended audience in the interpretation of 
the constitutional text because of their pursuit of a meaning based 
upon a temporally defined original understanding or expectation.245 
In attributing this position to originalists, new and old, I am simply 
restating the originalists’ claim that it is the original understanding of 
 
Rubenfeld, Reading the Constitution, supra note 215. 
 242.  On this objection attempting to state an atemporal unchanging meaning or applica-
tion for texts or utterances is as misguided as trying to state an unchanging meaning for indica-
tive or other indexical terms. Such a strategy misunderstands the nature of such terms, which 
derive their meaning from their context.  
 243.  See, e.g., THE KORAN; THE BIBLE. 
 244.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 164 (describing the status and interpreta-
tion of the Ten Commandments which were understood to be a divine law binding upon God’s 
chosen people); but see Sanford Levinson, On Interpretation: The Adultery Clause of the Ten 
Commandments, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 719 (1985) (playfully exploring the complex and difficult 
interpretative questions that would immediately arise in contemporary society on a codification 
of the Ten Commandments). 
 245.  See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 140 (acknowledging Tribe’s claim 
that constitutional provisions are trans-temporal but asserting that the meaning remains invari-
ant over time). 
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the text or the original intentions or expectations, as the case may be. 
Frank Easterbrook, an originalist himself, has denied that originalism 
is committed to the understanding at that historical moment, howev-
er.246 He attempts to deflect the claim by asserting that New 
Originalists look to the meanings of the text, and, as textualists, do 
not stand within a historical moment.247 The text is invariant over 
time. Yet it is the historical meaning that controls.248 
Fourth, and finally, there are three objections to this performa-
tive account. First, originalists (or their critics) might argue that this 
performative account of the meaning of the constitutional text is un-
necessary. They might argue that the concept of context—which is 
already central to their account—does the same work that the con-
cept of performatives does without the complexity or philosophical 
baggage.249 The appeal to context certainly does do some of the same 
work that the concept of performatives does in explaining the mean-
ing of constitutional texts. But it does so in an entirely opaque way: 
context is a black box or deus ex machina that miraculously effects a 
change to the semantic meanings of a text without any explanation of 
why. When Justice Scalia asserts that in constitutional law “context is 
everything,”250 what does that mean, and how does that help us to 
identify the semantic content or import of the constitutional text? He 
does not explain. One approach is to consider what context is em-
ployed to do in other interpretations. 
In the end, I do not think that an explanation for the role of con-
text for Justice Scalia can be articulated. Context, for Justice Scalia, 
functions as a non-semantic source of constitutional linguistic con-
tent that cannot be reconciled with the fundamental express claims of 
 
 246.  See Frank Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 
1119, 1119–20 (1998) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Dead Hand] (arguing that the source of the 
commitment to the original understandings is the originalist philosophical or theoretical ac-
count of political legitimacy that makes the original understanding of the text the goal of the 
interpretive theory that follows from that political theory). 
 247.  Id. at 1119–23 
 248.  Id. 
 249.  Austin’s theory of performatives and Grice’s theory of implicature remain live topics 
in the contemporary philosophy of language, with many issues still without agreement, along 
with the relationship and relative importance of semantics and pragmatics. See, e.g., WAYNE A. 
DAVIS, IMPLICATURE: INTENTION, CONVENTION, AND PRINCIPLE IN THE FAILURE OF 
GRICEAN THEORY (2007) (criticizing the particular claims and aspirations of the Gricean pro-
ject but acknowledging the importance of Grice’s contribution to the understanding of mean-
ing). See generally Charles Travis, Pragmatics, in A COMPANION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
LANGUAGE 87, 87 (Bob Hale & Crispin Wright eds., 1st paperback ed. 1999). 
 250.  SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 37. 
LEDUC.MACRO.FINAL_3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017  6:51 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
164 
originalism. Or, to put it more charitably, the relevant context of the 
constitutional text arises out of its performative character. What the 
text is to be understood to mean is in part a matter of what it does. 
That use of linguistic pragmatics would be foreclosed to Justice Scal-
ia’s semantic understanding originalism except to the extent that it is 
introduced through a notion of context. The concept of a performa-
tive statement and the assimilation of the performative constitutional 
text to more common, widely recognized performative utterances and 
texts explains why the meaning of the constitutional text is not simply 
a matter of semantics. We need the concept of performatives because 
the originalists’ appeal to context explains so little. 
The second objection to this performative account of the consti-
tutional text argues that it conflates the potentially performative con-
stitutional text with non-performative statements about those provi-
sions.251 On this objection, arguments about the Constitution and 
interpretations of the constitutional text are not performatives, and 
do have truth conditions. Thus, whether the Eighth Amendment 
prohibits capital punishment is true or false, and a statement or deci-
sion that the Eighth Amendment bars capital punishment is true or 
false and has truth conditions. This is an intuitively engaging objec-
tion, not least because it salvages our intuition that such statements 
about the Constitution are true or false, as well as the notion that the 
Constitution has, itself, an important performative dimension or 
character. 
I want to reject this criticism and to claim that statements about 
the Constitution in the context of authoritative reasoning about, or 
holdings of, constitutional law are also most importantly performa-
tive statements. Such statements are to be contrasted with non-
authoritative statements by constitutional theorists or constitutional 
historians. Such latter statements are true or false, at least for those 
who endorse the importance of accounting for truth. It is easiest to 
see the performative nature of judicial statements about the Constitu-
tion in the case of holdings by the Court. When the Supreme Court 
holds that, for example, the Eighth Amendment prohibition on cruel 
and unusual punishment prohibits capital punishment of the mentally 
impaired,252 that statement is fundamentally a performative. It pro-
 
 251.  A more radical version of the objection would challenge Austin’s claim that per-
formatives do not have truth conditions. See Lewis, Scorekeeping, supra note 122, at 247–48; 
MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 61. I cannot explore that objection here. 
 252.  Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002). 
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hibits the execution by the State of one or more mentally impaired 
human beings.253 When the Court’s holding does that, it is neither 
non-trivially true nor false. It may be consistent or inconsistent with 
other constitutional law, it may be foolish or wise, it may be easy or 
difficult to reconcile with historical understandings or with the text of 
the Eighth Amendment, but it is not true or false.254 It is so because 
the Supreme Court so holds. On this reply, it is the critics who have 
conflated authoritative performative statements of constitutional law 
with non-performative statements about the Constitution.255 
The third apparent objection to an account of the constitutional 
text that emphasizes its performative role is that such an account ap-
pears to deprecate the conceptual or propositional content of the 
constitutional text. At Chief Justice Roberts’s confirmation hearings 
he famously (perhaps infamously) characterized the role of a judge, 
including a judge facing constitutional questions, to that of an umpire 
in the game of baseball, impartially calling balls and strikes.256 That 
metaphor is apt insofar as it captures the performative role of judicial 
decisions in what might be termed, also a little misleadingly, as the 
game of constitutional law. That metaphor is misleading, however, 
insofar as it misses or ignores the conceptual dimension of judicial 
decision.257 The conceptual content of judicial decisions in our prac-
tice of American constitutional law is very different from the very 
limited conceptual content of umpires’ calls in the game of baseball. 
 
 253.  Id.  
 254.  I take this to be the somewhat subtle point Charles Fried makes. See Fried, Judg-
ment, supra note 141, at 1026 (exploring the import of a contemporary Unites States legislative 
resolution characterizing the massacres of Armenians in the waning days of the Ottoman Em-
pire early in the Twentieth Century as genocide). 
 255.  It is more complicated than this because non-authoritative statements about the 
Constitution’s provisions are often made in a performative context, too, as in the case of dis-
sents or arguments presented directly or indirectly to the Court. Such statements, while not 
authoritative, also have an important performative dimension. They do so, while also potential-
ly being true or false and having truth conditions. Thus, for example, there is a historical an-
swer or answers to the questions whether the relevant actors in the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment intended or understood that Amendment to prohibit or to permit segregated 
schools. But that historical account does not determine how any constitutional case must be 
decided. 
 256.  See Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. To Be Chief Justice of the United States: 
Hearing Before the Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 66 (2007) (statement of John G. 
Roberts, Jr.). For a brief discussion of this testimony and the controversy it generated, see 
MARK TUSHNET, IN THE BALANCE: LAW AND POLITICS ON THE ROBERTS COURT 70–72 
(2013) (describing the firestorm of controversy that the metaphor rightly created in the acade-
my). It is a metaphor that the Chief Justice has continued to employ. 
 257.  On the spectrum of texts and utterances, rulings by umpires in sports have a very 
limited conceptual content. 
LEDUC.MACRO.FINAL_3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017  6:51 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
166 
Calls in baseball support few inferences. The inferences that they do 
support are generally strongly constrained by the rules of the game. 
“Strike three!’ entails “You’re out!” and may entail that the team at 
bat has been retired for the inning. 
But while simple performatives may have less conceptual content 
than many other statements, it is not inherent in the concept of a 
performative that it be without conceptual content.258 The tension 
between the performative and inferential dimensions arises because 
of the contrast between truth conditions for ordinary statements 
(which are often thought to have truth conditions)259 and performa-
tives, which are thought to be felicitous or infelicitous, for example, 
but often not true or false.260 The semantic theory of originalism be-
gins with a premise that the semantic meaning of the Constitution 
conveys a substantial conceptual content.261 We see this, for example, 
when Robert Bork writes that the Constitution furnishes the major 
premise for syllogistic constitutional inference.262 The conceptual 
content of the constitutional provision permits it to stand as the ma-
jor premise in such a syllogism.263 
The conceptual content of such constitutional propositions does 
not play a performative role in constitutional argument in Austin’s 
sense. The utterances of propositions that together state a proof of a 
mathematical theorem are not performatives, even though they per-
 
 258.  Many performatives are also freighted with substantial conceptual content. For ex-
ample, in the celebrated example of the bridegroom saying “I do” in a classical Christian mar-
riage ceremony, that performative utterance is freighted with conceptual content that commits 
the groom, at least ordinarily, to certain expressive claims with respect to the bride and to cer-
tain affirmative and negative obligations that he has assumed. Ordinarily, the groom would 
have committed to such conceptual claims, and would assent to a wide range of implications 
from the simple act of uttering “I do.” There may be exceptions to these general rules, as in the 
case of the groom who marries the bride for her money, or to obtain a so-called green card as a 
matter of United States immigration law, for example, but such cases are exceptions, not coun-
terexamples to the truth of the general conceptual implications of the utterance. 
 259.  R.M. Dworkin, Introduction to THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 5 (R.M. Dworkin ed., 
1977). 
 260.  AUSTIN, WORDS, supra note 55, at 6, 13–14. 
 261.  The conceptual content is the substantive, propositional content of constitutional 
law. When we state constitutional doctrine, we are summarizing the propositional content of 
that law. 
 262.  BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 262. 
 263.  See generally BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 88, at 165–66 (ar-
guing that propositional content is the property of figuring as a premise and as a conclusion in 
inferences employed in our discursive practice of asking for, and giving, reasons); BRANDOM, 
MAKING IT EXPLICIT, supra note 118. More generally, the conceptual content of the Constitu-
tion permits constitutional arguments from that text and practical inferences about how to re-
solve questions of constitutional decision. 
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form the act of proving the theorem.264 The performative acts that 
Austin focuses upon are embedded more concretely in social behavior 
and practice. Yet the conceptual content of constitutional texts and, 
in the rare case of constitutional decisions read from the bench, ut-
terances are substantial and important. Indeed, most lawyers ap-
proach a constitutional question with a focus upon that doctrinal con-
tent. That is much of what legal education teaches as well as much of 
what lawyers work with in their ordinary legal practice.265 That con-
ceptual, propositional content—hornbook law—is important and 
cannot be ignored in an account of our constitutional law. 
Moreover, subject to any deflationary account of truth that may 
be adopted, such statements about such conceptual content have 
truth values. For example, when we assert the following, “the Second 
Amendment protects an individual’s right to own a hand gun, with-
out regard to service in the National Guard or any other militia,” we 
make an assertion that has a truth value. Since the decisions in Heller 
and McDonald, that assertion is true; before those decisions, the 
truth value of the statement would have been unknown and contro-
versial. This recognition of such truth values is hardly surprising. But 
what makes the claim important and interesting here is the tension 
that it creates with the performative analysis that I have earlier out-
lined. If such statements have truth values, then how are such truth 
values reconciled with the performative analysis? 
The reconciliation requires that we distinguish authoritative 
statements of constitutional law from statements about constitutional 
law. The two can look very similar in form, but depending upon the 
author and the context, their force and function are entirely different. 
A statement of the law by the Court makes itself true, just as the en-
 
 264.  The reason such propositions are predominantly constatives, rather than performa-
tive, is because such conceptual content is largely independent of non-linguistic behavior and 
practices. Proofs of mathematical theorems are largely atemporal and independent of context. 
Yet even mathematical knowledge has a social dimension that is not immediately apparent. See 
generally PHILIP KITCHER, THE NATURE OF MATHEMATICAL KNOWLEDGE (1984) (arguing 
against the accepted a priori characterization of mathematical knowledge in favor of an account 
that looks at the growth of mathematical knowledge and the discursive practices of mathemati-
cians to create what Kitcher styles an empirical account). 
 265.  Characterizing such practice as ordinary captures not only the quotidian nature of 
such practice but also the notion of a normal practice in the Kuhnian sense. See generally 
THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (3rd ed. 1996) (defend-
ing a now classical account of the incommensurability of alternative scientific theories and argu-
ing that the process of replacing one scientific theory with a different theory is not simply a 
matter of following experimental evidence). Recognizing Kuhn’s insight here and its import for 
understanding legal argument need not commit the reader or me to the entire Kuhnian project. 
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actment of a statute creates the law (subject to effective dates and po-
tential constitutional infirmities). A statement about the law has a 
truth value that is determined by facts of the matter beyond it or, on 
a more pragmatist account, by how we treat such statements them-
selves and their inferential implications. It is the performative dimen-
sion of the Court’s pronouncements about the law that make such 
statements the law. The Court’s pronouncements also have the con-
ceptual content I have described. The Court’s opinions engage in 
practical reasoning and inference. Those inferences and their concep-
tual content have the unusual truth value feature that arises from 
their performative role. Saying makes them so. 
It may, therefore, appear to the protagonists in the debate that 
my criticism of the originalism debate for its failure to recognize the 
performative role in the constitutional texts is too harsh. In the de-
bate, at least off the Court, the statements made about constitutional 
law and decision lack the performative dimension I have described. 
While that is so, my criticism has focused on the failure of the pro-
tagonists generally to recognize the performative role of the authori-
tative constitutional texts, not a performative role for their own 
texts.266 
A second dimension of the constitutional text that goes beyond its 
semantic meaning, as traditionally understood, articulates the infer-
ential role and implicature associated with constitutional texts. As the 
debate has articulated an account of the meaning of constitutional 
texts the protagonists in the debate have generally overlooked the in-
ferential role of statements of constitutional law in our constitutional 
discourse. When we endorse particular claims about the Constitu-
 
 266.  It is important to recognize the parallel between the performative analysis outlined 
above and Mark Greenberg’s challenge to the communication theory of law. See Greenberg, 
supra note 2, at 217–20. My analysis is consistent with Greenberg’s criticism, because both em-
phasize the performative dimension of legal texts in making law. Id. at 256 (focusing expressly 
on statutes). The Constitution is not simply a communication, just as the affirmation of the 
marriage vows is not simply a matter of communication. Reciting marriage vows in an other-
wise felicitous ceremony not only communicates a bride or groom’s intent to marry, it legally 
effects the marriage. While one could characterize the utterance as a communication that one is 
marrying, that seems somewhat misguided for at least a couple of reasons. First, so characteriz-
ing the utterance as a communication does not appear to add anything. Second, the utterance of 
the felicitous marriage vow by the groom would not appear equivalent to the statement “I am 
marrying the bride now” at the appropriate time in the ceremony, even though characterizing 
the two as communications would appear to render them equivalent. But my account of the 
meaning of the Constitution also recognizes the inferential, conceptual content of our constitu-
tional law. In rejecting an account of our constitutional law exclusively as a matter of communi-
cation, we should not lose sight of that important conceptual content. 
LEDUC.MACRO.FINAL_3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017  6:51 PM 
111] Making the Premises of Constitutional Meaning Express 
169 
tion, we are entitled to certain inferences from those claims. We are 
also committed to certain other claims that implicate these initial 
claims. This is the conceptual content of the law made by judicial de-
cisions generally without parallel in umpires’ calls in sports. 
Brandom has constructed an account of language that accounts 
for meaning not simply as use, but by reference to the inferential 
commitments we make and the inferential consequences we become 
entitled to in our discursive practice.267 That account seems generally 
plausible for our constitutional decisional discourse. Authoritative 
statements of constitutional law have the conceptual content and car-
ry the inferential commitments and entitlements that Brandom de-
scribes. As a result, when the Court states the law, the conceptual re-
lationship of that statement with other elements of the law may be 
articulated logically. This is the limited sense in which Dworkin’s 
theory of the consistency of our constitutional law is correct. That 
conceptual consistency need not extend to our moral and political 
philosophy, however. 
The second element in this account of the conceptual content of 
the constitutional text, implicature, is elucidated by Paul Grice in his 
account of the non-semantic sources of linguistic meaning.268 Several 
constitutional theorists have recognized the potential importance of 
Grice’s work for their respective projects.269 There has been some 
recognition of the role of implicature, the ability of context to give 
utterances or texts additional meaning. But the general approach has 
been highly cautious.270 Grice emphasizes the pragmatics of linguistic 
meaning, how the context in which ordinary statements are made in-
forms the meanings potentially conveyed by semantically identical 
statements.271 
 
 267.  BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 88, at 45–77. 
 268.  See GRICE, STUDIES, supra note 55. In lumping Austin and Grice together, I am 
doing at best only very rough justice to philosophical theories that are different and perhaps 
inconsistent in important ways. See id. at 1–21 (criticizing Austin and Searle). But the inconsist-
encies do not appear material to the use I want to make of the insights each offers. See also So-
lum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2. 
 269.  See, e.g., Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2; Dworkin, Interpretation, 
supra note 27 at 117 n.6 (merely citing Grice’s name). 
 270.  See MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 34 (“In ordinary conversations, prag-
matic enrichment is the norm, not the exception; in statutory law, it is the exception.”). I think 
constitutional law is like statutory law for this purpose.  
 271.  See GRICE, STUDIES, supra note 55, at 24–27 (introducing the concept of implica-
ture to capture the myriad ways in which conversational context permits efficient communica-
tion with utterances conveying far more meaning than semantics alone can account for). See 
also DAVIS, supra note 249 (quarreling with the particular description Grice offers while en-
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An example of widely accepted implicature in the constitutional 
text may help clarify the claim. The First Amendment prohibits 
Congress from making any law “abridging the freedom of the . . . 
press.”272 The Court has had no difficulty reading that protection to 
extend to broadcast television and to the Internet. Explaining that ex-
tension has proved more difficult, however. As a matter of syntax and 
semantics, the reading would appear wrong. Justice Scalia has sug-
gested that the courts have read the term press as a “sort of synecdo-
che.”273 More recently, the even more arcane concept of a hendiadys 
has been pressed into similar service.274 A much more direct approach 
is to recognize the pragmatics of implicature. Grice’s work is im-
portant because it captures the way context can be analyzed to high-
light our rule-like conventions or practices that enrich the semantic 
meanings of utterances and texts. 
Yet it must also be acknowledged that Grice’s pragmatics do not 
translate verbatim into legal and constitutional contexts. In the con-
text of disclosure statements under the federal securities laws, for ex-
ample, a special Bauhausian maxim of caution applies: less is almost 
always more, subject only to the threshold requirement that the dis-
closure omitted does not make the disclosure made misleading and a 
bias in favor of identifying all the material risks that a business or in-
vestment may face. The particular pragmatics of the constitutional 
context have never had an adequate Gricean analysis and catalog. In 
response to those who might argue that pragmatic enhancement is 
unusual in the constitutional context, the best argument may be to 
simply note the manifold, important texts in which it apparently     
figures. 
Any adequate account of the authoritative constitutional texts 
must therefore also account for the conceptual content of both the 
constitutional text and the authoritative judicial decisions applying 
and interpreting the Constitution.275 The conceptual content of such 
 
dorsing the soundness of the project). 
 272.  U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
 273.  SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 38. 
 274.  Samuel L. Bray, “Necessary and Proper” and “Cruel and Unusual”: Hendiadys in 
the Constitution, 102 VA. L. REV. 687 (2016) (introducing the concept of hendiadys—phrases 
with meanings distinct from the mere syntactical synthesis of the semantic meanings of their 
component terms—to determine the meaning of certain important provisions of the Constitu-
tion). Bray’s article is another Ptolemaic epicycle in the debate. 
 275.  The strategy here has parallels to Larry Solum’s strategy to distinguish communica-
tive content and legal content. Solum properly emphasizes the richness of constitutional mean-
ing that is all too often lost in constitutional theory. See Solum, Communicative Content, supra 
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constitutional texts is distinguishable from the performative content 
of those same texts.276 The conceptual content of constitutional pro-
visions is the propositional content that allows such texts to provide 
acceptable, licensed grounds from which to infer conclusions of con-
stitutional law. For example, such content permits constitutional texts 
to figure in constitutional reasoning and the decision of constitution-
al cases. The conceptual content of the constitutional provisions is 
substantial.277 That content has generated our constitutional juris-
prudence from a relatively modest seminal text.278 
It is important to articulate how the propositional or conceptual 
content of the constitutional texts has generated the larger, more ful-
 
note 2. But there are important differences. Characterizing the distinction as between commu-
nicative content and legal content, at least in the constitutional context, may be misleading. 
The classic example of substantive due process is a good counterexample for Solum’s account. 
As a matter of communicative content, the phrase would appear incoherent, as Ely has argued. 
See ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 171 (comparing the phrase “substantive due process” to the 
phrase “red green pastelness”). If Ely were right, the phrase has no communicative content, yet 
effectively communicates an array of legal norms. Solum’s theory cannot, or cannot easily, ac-
count for this radical discontinuity. On the other hand, because his proposed interpretative 
method begins with communicative content, it is unclear how he would account for the concept 
of substantive due process. See Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2, at 494–502. Per-
haps the best strategy would be to characterize the words as constituting a technical term of 
constitutional art—or perhaps even as a hendiadys. Yet none of the elements of such a term 
would appear to have technical meanings, and the term itself would appear meaningless, as Ely 
argues. It is an interesting question whether this analysis may help redeem the Court’s decision 
in Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393 (2007) with respect to the cryptic text “Bong hits 4 Jesus” 
but I cannot explore that question here. 
 276.  It is distinguishable because the performative dimension does not have the concep-
tual or discursive content. For lawyers, the example of representations in commercial contracts 
stands as a good example. Representations are often included, not to assert or record the truth 
of the propositions they state, but to allocate the risk of falsehood between the parties. Thus, in 
negotiating contracts, the frequent primitive gambit that a party does not know the truth of the 
representation stated is easily dismissed by an explanation of the role played by the performa-
tive representation in the contract. Whether representations are knowable or whether any of 
the parties knows or even believes such representations made is not relevant for such purpose. 
See generally CHARLES M. FOX, WORKING WITH CONTRACTS: WHAT LAW SCHOOL 
DOESN’T TEACH YOU § 2:2:3 (2002) (highlighting that contractual representations are a means 
of allocating risk between or among the parties and not, as many young lawyers mistakenly 
think initially, a matter of asserting the truth of propositions). The role of representations in 
contracts is a simplified model that is instructive for a more general non-representational ac-
count of language. 
 277.  See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2d ed. 
1988) (offering an extensive discussion and analysis of only selected parts of American constitu-
tional doctrine). 
 278.  How that doctrinal content has been generated and, indeed, its very legitimacy is 
not free from doubt, of course. See generally FRIED, SAYING, supra note 193, at 3–10 (describ-
ing the place of precedent in articulating the conceptual content of constitutional law); Charles 
Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1140 (1994) [hereinafter Fried, Constitu-
tional Doctrine]. 
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ly elaborated constitutional doctrine. That process can be seen most 
clearly when the Court confronts a constitutional dispute that is a 
matter of first impression and without direct precedent,279 as in Hel-
ler,280 for example. It is clearer in the context of those hard cases be-
cause the Court must construct an argument that extends further 
from the available authorities to reach the instant case. 
Heller considered the question of whether a strict and compre-
hensive regulatory regime enacted by the District of Columbia vio-
lated the Second Amendment prohibition against Congress limiting 
citizens’ right to bear arms. The Court held that it did.281 In a pur-
portedly semantic analysis, the Court, in an opinion by Justice Scalia, 
explored the original understanding of the Second Amendment, in-
cluding in its analysis the dictionary definitions of key terms of the 
Amendment.282 In articulating that individual right the Court an-
swered many questions,283 but left many other questions unan-
swered.284 The Court expressly addressed the syntactic implications 
of the Second Amendment text, holding that the first clause of the 
Amendment was prefatory, not restrictive.285 The Court did not ex-
plore the pragmatics of the adoption of the Second Amendment.286 
To do so would have required an examination of what the adoption 
of the Second Amendment was intended and expected to do; that in-
quiry would have been inconsistent with Justice Scalia’s public mean-
ing originalism. The resulting decision striking down the District of 
Columbia law was a significant development in our Second Amend-
ment constitutional jurisprudence. 
The methods the Court employed to derive its conclusions were 
 
 279.  My formulation in the text may seem unduly circumspect and perhaps even redun-
dant, but the nature of precedent and the extent to which a precedent is controlling or even 
particularly relevant is often a matter of judgment. 
 280.  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 281.  Id. at 635. 
 282.  Id. at 578–604. 
 283.  For example, the Court interpreted the first clause of the Amendment as prefatory, 
and without limiting effect. See id. at 594–600. And the Court rejected the dissent’s argument 
that the right protected under the Second Amendment generally had to be balanced against 
state interests in regulating firearms. Id. at 634–36. 
 284.  The question whether the Fourteenth Amendment incorporated the right protected 
under the Second Amendment was not before the Court in Heller. The Court therefore did not 
need to consider what limitations might be imposed upon such right, but the Court expressly 
acknowledged that some limits (like restrictions on firearms being carried in court houses) 
might be permissible. See id. at 625–28.  
 285.  Id. at 571. 
 286.  Id. 
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not simple. Those methods ranged far beyond simple syllogisms 
whose premises state the propositional content of the constitutional 
text.287 Grammatical and syntactical rules, invoked tacitly as a matter 
of apparent common knowledge, form part of the argument.288 In 
other cases the argument appears to proceed with analogical reason-
ing.289 Yet the starting point for that derivation of the constitutional 
doctrine and constitutional decision, as in Griswold290and Roe,291 was 
the constitutional text.292 As constitutional doctrine develops, courts 
may increasingly decide cases by reference to the precedents that ar-
ticulate the relevant constitutional law more directly. This doctrinal 
development permits decision without constructing arguments from 
direct applications or interpretations of constitutional provisions—
which may need to be more complicated and complex.293 
This sketch of the performative and inferential dimensions of 
constitutional texts is only schematic. Many elements would need to 
be more fully articulated and the potential objections addressed be-
fore we could claim to have made a dispositive case for such an ap-
proach. For example, the nature of performatives and the use of the 
theory of performative texts to analyze the law generally and the 
Constitution in particular are not uncontroversial.294 The argument 
 
 287.  See Part II.B, supra. 
 288.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 599 (“[T]he Second Amendment’s prefatory clause announces 
the purpose for which the right was codified.”). 
 289.  See generally SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING, supra note 20, at 62–83 (exploring 
the diverse ways that analogical reasoning and similar techniques figure in legal reasoning). 
 290.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 291.  Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 292.  See generally Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, supra note 278 (emphasizing constitu-
tional text as the beginning but not the exclusive source of our rich constitutional doctrine). 
The judicial reasoning of Roe, in particular, has been controversial. See, e.g., John Hart Ely, 
The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920 (1973) [hereinaf-
ter Ely, Wages] (foreshadowing the argument Ely would later make in Democracy and Dis-
trust, arguing that the legal academy’s intemperate criticism of the Warren Court’s constitu-
tional jurisprudence stripped the academy of credibility when confronted by a genuinely 
questionable decision).  
 293.  For example, when the Court recently considered the scope of States’ power to con-
demn private property under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments, its analysis focused almost 
entirely upon its precedent, not the text of the Constitution. See Kelo v. City of New London, 
545 U.S. 469 (2005). As constitutional doctrine develops and becomes more complex, constitu-
tional decision relies more heavily upon the statement of such doctrine in the case law. See 
FRIED, SAYING, supra note 193. 
 294.  See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 2 (challenging the model of legislation as commu-
nication); DAVIS, supra note 249 (challenging the specifics of the Gricean project); DWORKIN, 
Forum, supra note 164, at 400 n.13 (questioning in passing whether legislative votes are speech 
acts).  
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sketched here warrants further development. 
There is a great deal of intuitive appeal to the sketch outlined 
here. The constitutional texts do appear to be doing something. They 
also appear freighted with substantial conceptual and propositional 
content. It is hard to imagine an adequate account of the constitu-
tional texts and their place in constitutional adjudication and law that 
does not account for both elements. 
If we do account for both the performative element and the infer-
ential roles of the constitutional texts, however, we are able to ac-
count for doctrines, like substantive due process, and to explain why 
Sunstein’s example of the interaction between normative commit-
ments and speaker’s intention in choosing a friend’s birthday present 
is not an apt analogy for the project of constitutional adjudication.295 
In the case of substantive due process, the semantic puzzle it cre-
ates296 must be understood to be ancillary to the performative role 
that the doctrine plays. The doctrine is the means by which the doc-
trinal gap in post-Reconstruction Amendment substantive protec-
tions created by the crabbed interpretation of the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause jurisprudence has been filled.297 It has been cobbled 
together to create substantive protections that might easily have been 
sourced in the Privileges or Immunities Clause, absent the direction 
that the Court’s jurisprudence took. In that process, the Court rode 
roughshod over the finer semantic meanings of the constitutive ele-
ments of the doctrine. But it is, as a performative matter, far from the 
oxymoron Ely claimed. 
In the case of Sunstein’s puzzle about why we do not approach 
the application of the Constitution in the same way that we likely dis-
regard our own normative preferences in choosing a birthday gift for 
a friend who likes the music of Barbra Streisand, the solution lies in 
understanding the performative role of the constitutional text in con-
stitutional decision. In Sunstein’s example, he posits that a gift giver 
would seek to purchase the kind of music that his friend would most 
 
 295.  See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 20, at 57. 
 296.  See ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 171, at 18 (characterizing the term “substantive 
due process as an oxymoron and comparing it to the phrase “red green pastelness”). 
 297.  The interpretation of the Privileges or Immunities Clause has been controversial 
since the Slaughter-House Case was decided. See generally KURT T. LASH, THE 
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES OF AMERICAN 
CITIZENS (2014) (defending a complex historical argument for an intermediate position on the 
scope of the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment); AMAR, BILL OF 
RIGHTS, supra note 59; ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 171, at 22–32.  
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enjoy listening to; the goal in choosing the gift is controlled by the 
subjective preferences and choices of the donee.298 Sunstein asks why 
a similar approach ought not to be taken in constitutional interpreta-
tion and decision in reading the Constitution and the resolution of 
constitutional controversies by following the intentions and prefer-
ences of the Founders (and the later relevant actors) in adopting and 
amending the Constitution. While Sunstein rejects such an approach 
in favor of following, on a limited, minimal basis, the normative 
judgments that our society would make today,299 he never adequately 
explains why such an approach is right. His tacit instrumentalism ex-
plains his choice, but it would hardly convince an originalist who 
hews to the competing deontological approach. 
One critical reason for the different stance toward the friend’s re-
quest for music she would like and the text of the Constitution lies in 
the very different performative roles the two texts play. In the case of 
the friend’s request, the utterance or, if conveyed in writing, the text 
is to provide guidance in selecting a present. There is rarely a com-
pelling reason, in the context for the gift giver to seek to substitute 
his preferences or to select a better gift on the basis of what he thinks 
would be better for the donee. We can alter the hypothetical to bring 
into play just such constraints if we assume that the friend is com-
promised as an autonomous rational agent or has asked for something 
that is manifestly dangerous or harmful. In such case, Sunstein would 
be surely prepared to nudge the hypothetical friend with a gift differ-
ent from that which the friend might have preferred.300 
In the case of reading and applying the Constitution to resolve 
constitutional controversies, we have to consider what the performa-
tive role the Constitution was intended, expected, and understood to 
play, and what role it does, in fact, play today. That is obviously a 
complicated question because the constitutional text plays a variety of 
performative roles and those roles have evolved over time. At the 
least, there can be no easy assimilation of the constitutional text to 
the description of what the gift giver’s friend has asked for. Unlike 
that example, there is little in the pragmatics of the constitutional text 
 
 298.  See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 20, at 57–59.  
 299.  Id. at 61–78.  
 300.  See generally RICHARD H. THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING 
DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND HAPPINESS (2008) (defending a paternalistic ap-
proach setting, decisional defaults and employing other techniques to harness decisional inertia 
to increase human welfare at some cost in autonomy). 
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that would make the normative judgments of the interpreting and 
conforming citizens unimportant. Justice Scalia emphasizes that the 
purpose of a Constitution is to protect individuals and minorities 
from the will of the majority and that Constitutions reflect a concern 
that rights and the good may erode over time.301 That is likely quite 
true, but it is not a complete description of the performative role of 
the Constitution. The Constitution, in the aspirational and general 
language it employs, signals that it is performing a more open-ended 
role than merely providing legal rules.302 The originalists deny this 
characterization, of course,303 but that denial appears hollow and un-
persuasive in light of the formulations of the constitutional text. 
The performative roles that the Constitution plays, as Balkin has 
astutely remarked,304 are several. Here, I want to focus only on the 
performative legal roles. The Constitution constitutes a federal gov-
ernment, limits the sovereignty of the several states, provides the 
rules for the amendment of itself, guarantees the rights of citizens 
and persons, and limits the rights of others—most notably slaves until 
the Reconstruction Amendments and women, with respect to the 
franchise, until the adoption of the Nineteenth Amendment. But it is 
also important to note the different ways that the Constitution per-
forms those varying missions, because there are also importantly dif-
ferent performative techniques deployed in the text of the Constitu-
tion. Thus, for example, when the Constitution imposes a minimum 
age for the holding of key Federal offices,305 that performative states a 
prescriptive rule with respect to whom the Republic may empower by 
elevating to the enumerated offices as well as with respect to who is 
eligible to seek such offices. That rule is simple and clear; academic 
efforts to suggest otherwise are unpersuasive.306 The language of a 
variety of other provisions appears different.307 
 
 301.  SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 40–41 (raising the possibility that over 
time that society may not so much mature as rot). 
 302.  See generally BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 37; Tribe, Interpretation, 
supra note 240, at 68–72. 
 303.  SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 134–36.  
 304.  BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 37, at 59–64. 
 305.  E.g., 30 years for a senator and 35 years for the president. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3; 
id. at art. II, § 1. 
 306.  See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMS OF JURISPRUDENCE 265–67 
(1990) [hereinafter POSNER, PROBLEMS].  
 307.  See Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 240, at 67–72 (distinguishing among different 
language in various provisions of the Constitution but denying that such provisions can be neat-
ly sorted into two categories and insisting on the complexities inherent in approaching such 
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Originalism responds to the manifest differences in the language 
employed in different provisions of the Constitution in a couple of 
related ways. One is indirect: the introduction of the concept of con-
struction, discussed above. The second is Balkin’s concept of frame-
work originalism.308 Each of those moves is intended to protect the 
privileged role of arguments from original understanding or meaning 
while acknowledging that such arguments are not available to answer 
all of our questions. They are, in a sense, an alternative to Bork’s ink-
blot approach to the Ninth Amendment.309 But what evidence do the 
New Originalists present for such a distinction? Their general ap-
proach is to make an argument from the nature of the constitutional 
language.310 But in so doing, the New Originalists assume that the 
distinction they want to draw is manifest in the text of the different 
provisions themselves. Tribe has powerfully refuted that claim.311 
Originalists may respond by asking what evidence we have or 
what arguments we may make for the multiple performative roles as-
cribed to the constitutional text. The originalists generally limit their 
account of the constitutional text to its semantic or linguistic mean-
ing.312 The multilevel performative analysis sketched above is incon-
sistent with that semantic account because it goes beyond linguistic 
meaning to the performative role of the constitutional text. One ar-
gument for ascribing multiple roles to the constitutional text pro-
ceeds from the premise that, taken as a whole, the Constitution did 
something and was originally understood, intended, and expected to 
do something: to constitute a new supreme, sovereign national gov-
ernment of limited powers and to establish certain individual rights. 
The originalists generally do not dispute that global characteriza-
tion.313 But if the whole played a performative role, why should we 
 
variation in constitutional interpretation). 
 308.  BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 37, at 3, 21–23 (contrasting framework 
originalism with skyscraper originalism on the basis of the difference in their respective ap-
proaches to constitutional construction). 
 309.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 183–85 (suggesting that the historical un-
certainty as to the original understanding of the Ninth Amendment leaves that Amendment 
without legal force today). 
 310.  See KEITH WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL 
MEANING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 7 (1999) (characterizing the constitu-
tional texts that require construction as having “no discoverable meaning”); Randy E. Barnett, 
An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611 (1999). 
 311.  See Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 240, at 67–72.  
 312.  SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 144 (agreeing substantively with such 
a characterization but insisting on a different terminology). 
 313.  See, e.g., id. at 40 (describing the mission of the Constitution to protect individual 
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doubt that each provision ought to be read to contribute to that per-
formance? The originalists, of course, never articulate or address 
these questions on these terms because they do not acknowledge that 
the performative nature of the Constitution entails that its language 
cannot be read or understood simply as a series of declarative        
sentences. 
Finally, this account of constitutional meaning recognizes the two 
very different dimensions of the text, as performative and as articulat-
ing conceptual content with inferential commitments and entitle-
ments. Both aspects are important to understanding constitutional 
law and the nature of constitutional arguments and decision. The de-
bate over classical originalism and New Originalism emphasize the 
meaning of the constitutional text to the virtual exclusion of the per-
formative role of the text and constitutional decision. Moreover, the 
account of constitutional meaning is itself mistaken, ignoring the in-
ferential content of that meaning in favor of a representational       
account. 
D. Enlisting Philosophy in the Semantic Claims of the New 
Originalism 
Both sides of the debate over originalism have enlisted recent 
philosophical work with respect to meaning and pragmatics to but-
tress their respective claims. Larry Solum, on behalf of originalism, 
314 Andre Marmor as a critic of originalism,315 and Scott Soames, as 
the proponent of a post-originalist synthesis,316 have all, among oth-
ers,317 employed this strategy. I discuss certain key arguments they 
have made here for two reasons: first, because they are original; sec-
ond, because they constitute an effort to employ philosophical argu-
ment in a foundational way in the debate. I have previously argued 
that such a use is a wrong turn.318 
A couple of years ago I argued against the claim to employ philo-
sophical argument to defend the claims advanced in the debate over 
 
rights against the will of the majority). 
 314.  See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2. 
 315.  See MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 132–36 (exploring the Scalia-Dworkin 
debate). 
 316.  See Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2. 
 317.  See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 2 (rejecting the dominant legal theory that focuses 
on legal authorities as communicative texts).  
 318.  See LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 6. 
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originalism.319 Protagonists on both sides of the debate have either 
missed or ignored that argument.320 I want to explore here the extent 
to which my claims continue to be persuasive against the foundation-
al use made of philosophical arguments in the debate. I think they 
are.  
Larry Solum breaks from the two other theorists, Scott Soames 
and Andrei Marmor, discussed below, in two central respects: he em-
phasizes semantic meaning (although he acknowledges the im-
portance of pragmatics) in his account of constitutional meaning and 
he defends originalism.321 In doing so, Solum constructs a theory that 
purports to rely on objective linguistic theory.322 He styles his ac-
count as semantic originalism as distinguished from traditional nor-
mative originalist theories and asserts that his theory can be defended 
on objective arguments.323 Solum has offered an extended, compre-
hensive defense of a sophisticated account of the meanings that 
originalism privileges. It is more philosophically sophisticated than 
the theories defended by most other originalists.324 It is a new version 
of originalism he dubs semantic originalism.325 Solum articulates four 
principal theses of semantic originalism: the fixation thesis, the clause 
meaning thesis, the contribution thesis, and the fidelity thesis.326 So-
lum’s semantic originalism is not a semantic account of constitutional 
meaning; it incorporates implicature and pragmatics as sources of 
meaning. But it is an originalist account of constitutional meaning. 
Solum defends all four of these theses, at least in part, on philosophi-
cal arguments.327 
First, the fixation thesis asserts that the semantic content of the 
constitutional text was “fixed at the time of its adoption.”328 Perhaps 
because Solum formulated his theory before Soames and Marmor 
fully developed their accounts of the limitations of austere semantic 
meaning, Solum initially associates constitutional meaning with se-
 
 319.  See id. 
 320.  See, e.g., Fallon, Meaning, supra note 2. 
 321.  See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2. 
 322.  See id. at 30. 
 323.  Id. at 28–30.  
 324.  Id.  
 325.  See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2. 
 326.  Id. at 2. 
 327.  See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2. 
 328.  Id. 
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mantic meaning.329 Solum argues that meaning, in the relevant sense, 
is determined as a matter of historical fact and that the task in consti-
tutional decision is a matter of determining the historical facts about 
linguistic usage.330 
As Solum refines his analysis, he incorporates an account of 
pragmatics into his account of constitutional meaning.331 On Solum’s 
account pragmatics may contribute to the meaning of constitutional 
texts by potentially resolving “ambiguities and vagueness” and by 
conveying meaning beyond the semantic.332 But Solum does not ex-
plore these aspects of constitutional meaning in any detail, and the 
introduction of the pragmatic dimension appears almost an after-
thought to Solum’s account. While Solum acknowledges that mean-
ing is not simply a matter of semantics, he is nevertheless committed 
to an account that accords semantic meaning primacy. 
Central to Solum’s account is a positivist claim that there is an 
objective fact of the matter with respect to semantic meaning.333 It is 
an intuitive claim,334 but I have argued elsewhere that it is ultimately 
implausible.335 It is implausible because the performative role of con-
stitutional texts within our practice of constitutional argument and 
decision does not reflect the existence of an objective meaning that 
the project of interpretation can discover or recover. Instead, the 
meaning and import of such texts reflects their use within the prac-
tice of constitutional argument and decision. There those texts are 
used to make arguments, employed as premises in making arguments, 
and, as the conclusions of other arguments, commit us to other 
premises.336 
Second, Solum’s clause meaning thesis is complex.337 It asserts 
 
 329.  Id. at 2–3. As Solum develops and refines his descriptive theory of the linguistic 
meaning of the constitutional text he takes pragmatics into account in limited ways. 
 330.  Id. at 3–4. 
 331.  Id. at 32–33.  
 332.  Id. 
 333.  Id. at 36–37 (arguing that questions about a constitutional text’s meaning are “factu-
al” questions).  
 334.  See generally André LeDuc, Originalism’s Claim, sec. I (July 15, 2014) (unpublished 
manuscript) (on file with author) [hereinafter LeDuc, Originalism’s Claim] (acknowledging and 
exploring the intuitive appeal of originalism). But see LeDuc, Therapy and Promise, supra note 
8 (presenting a therapeutic strategy to work through the intuitive appeal of originalism and its 
alternatives). 
 335.  See LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 10. 
 336.  See generally LeDuc, Therapy and Promise, supra note 9; LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge, supra note 10. 
 337.  Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 50–51. 
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that the meaning of the Constitution may be constructed in five 
steps.338 It is not immediately clear, however, why Solum terms it the 
clause meaning thesis, but Solum goes on to explain that it is by anal-
ogy to the concept of sentence meaning in the philosophy of lan-
guage.339 This thesis provides the core of Solum’s claims about con-
stitutional meaning. Solum begins by offering two statements of the 
thesis that he styles approximations.340 The first defines clause mean-
ing as the semantic and pragmatic meaning of the provision from the 
perspective of the relevant drafters.341 The second amends that defi-
nition to introduce pragmatic meaning associated with the public un-
derstanding of the relevant sentence or clause itself as adopted in its 
original context.342 Solum then introduces a number of special rules 
to take into account technical meanings, stipulated or constituted 
concepts and terms, and implicature.343 On incorporation of the se-
mantic and pragmatic meaning and import of the constitutional text, 
refined with the particular conventions for meaning and use in the 
constitutional text, Solum believes that he has constructed a substan-
tially complete originalist account of the meaning of the constitu-
tional text.344 Without according it the status of a separate, named 
thesis, Solum accompanies his defense of semantic originalism with 
his extended account of the distinction between construction and in-
terpretation and the role of that distinction in constitutional         
theory.345 
Third, Solum’s contribution thesis explains how that constitu-
tional meaning translates into law. It states that the semantic content 
of the Constitution contributes to the legal content of the Constitu-
tion.346 Solum insists that this thesis is independent of the first two 
theses he defends.347 While the thesis asserts an important conse-
 
 338.  Id. at 50–58.  
 339.  Id. at 52 (“Just as the speakers meaning of a Constitution can be called ‘framers 
meaning,’ likewise, the ‘sentence meaning’ (or ‘expression meaning’) of a Constitution can be 
called ‘clause meaning.’”).  
 340.  Id. at 50–52. 
 341.  Id. at 51. 
 342.  Id. at 52. 
 343.  Id. at 52–58. 
 344.  Id. at 58–59. 
 345.  Id. at 67–89. I explore Solum’s account in more detail in LeDuc, Interpretation and 
Constitutional Argument, supra note 17, when I explore the role of interpretation in the debate 
over originalism. 
 346.  Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 5, 134–49. 
 347.  Id. at 126. 
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quence of the existence of the constitutional meaning asserted by se-
mantic originalism, the interpretative claim stated by the first two 
premises of that theory stand independently of the truth of the con-
tribution and fidelity theses. 
The contribution thesis states one of Solum’s most abstract 
claims. Solum distinguishes three forms of the contribution thesis, 
but his focus is on the moderate version.348 According to that version, 
if the meaning of a provision of the Constitution, as determined by 
semantic originalism, is identical to a rule of law, then that rule is a 
rule of constitutional law, unless an exception applies.349 Solum is ag-
nostic on the question whether any exceptions exist, noting only that 
any such exceptions would be very limited if they do.350 Thus, the 
contribution thesis begins with the assumption that we can identify 
rules of law. Somewhat puzzlingly, under the contribution thesis the 
text of the Constitution, standing alone, does not necessarily state 
rules of law. Solum is largely silent in his account as to how rules of 
law arise and can be recognized or known.351 He notes arguments 
from practice as well as positivist jurisprudential arguments. He dis-
misses the nihilist claim that the meaning of the Constitution can 
make no contribution to our law.352 
Fourth, Solum’s fidelity thesis asserts that we are obligated to 
conform to the legal content of the Constitution.353 That obligation 
arises because it is law; Solum acknowledges that his analysis does not 
explore how law creates obligations.354 According to Solum, the fidel-
ity thesis is independent of the other three theses of semantic 
originalism.355 More importantly, it is a thesis that asserts the exist-
ence of an obligation of political morality, not a claim about the na-
ture of constitutional law and semantics.356 Thus, Solum’s defense of 
 
 348.  Id. at 134–39 (distinguishing the moderate version from the strong version that as-
serts that the constitutional law is congruent with the linguistic content of the constitutional 
text and with the weak version that asserts only that the linguistic content of the constitutional 
text contributes indirectly to constitutional law). 
 349.  Id. at 134. 
 350.  Id. at 7 (“the power to adopt supplementary rules of constitutional law that contra-
dict the semantic content of the constitution is limited to exceptional cases of constitutional 
necessity.”).  
 351.  Id. at 134–43. 
 352.  Id. at 143. 
 353.  Id. at 149. 
 354.  Id.  
 355.  Id. at 9. 
 356.  Id. at 149. 
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our political obligation to conform to the Constitution is based upon 
conventional accounts of legal obligation in the Republic; there is lit-
tle that is novel in this part of Solum’s theory. 
Much of Solum’s defense of semantic originalism is based upon 
his account of constitutional texts as communications.357 On Solum’s 
functional account the constitutional text communicates legal con-
tent, legal rules that the polity has put in place to bind the political 
community. That legal content is communicated to the community 
as law.358 Solum’s account is thus focused on providing an explanation 
of how that communication works best. But Solum is at pains to dis-
tinguish communicative content and legal content of a constitutional 
text.359 The distinction between the two is that legal content is “the 
content of the legal norms the text produces.”360 That conceptual 
content is produced, according to Solum, through the accepted con-
stitutional decision process, albeit constrained by originalist theory.361 
More precisely, the legal content augments the austere communica-
tive content through originalist judicial decision.362 
A good example of the difference between linguistic meaning and 
the law may be found in the Court’s recent decision addressing the 
scope of the recess appointments clause.363 In Canning, the Court 
confronted the question of when the Senate was to be treated as in 
recess. It articulated a relatively bright line rule that a recess arose 
when the Senate was not in session for at least ten days.364 This rule, 
however sensible it may be, is nowhere to be found, at least expressly, 
in the linguistic meaning of the Constitution. The constitutional text 
refers only to Senate recesses. Communicative content is the linguis-
 
 357.  Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2, at 480 (asserting that all legal texts 
have communicative content, but distinguishing communicative content from legal content); 
but see ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 171, at 18 (characterizing the term “substantive due pro-
cess” as an oxymoron). 
 358.  Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2, at 507–08. 
 359. Id., at 480–82 (taking the First Amendment’s protection of freedom of the press as 
an example of a text for which the legal content now extends well beyond the semantic or lin-
guistic meaning of the text). Justice Scalia addressed the same challenge when he characterized 
“press” as a synecdoche in an effort to explain how, as a matter of public meaning originalism, 
the broader legal content could be created. See SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19,       
at 38.  
 360.  Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2, at 480. 
 361.  Id. at 480–82. 
 362.  Id. 
 363.  NLRB v. Noel Canning, 134 S. Ct. 2550 (2014). 
 364.  Id. at 2566–67. 
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tic meaning of the text.365 According to Solum’s semantic originalism, 
the legal content of the Recess Appointments Clause now incorpo-
rates that rule; it does so now because that legal content has been 
constructed by the Court in its holding and opinion.366 Neither legal 
content nor communicative content is a proper subset of the other; 
one is a linguistic notion and the other is a legal notion. 
Solum argues that the communicative content is prior to the legal 
content.367 But the legal content of a text may be far richer than the 
communicative content.368 That richness is not simply a matter of the 
difference between the austere semantic meaning and the additional 
import or force carried by pragmatics.369 It also incorporates the con-
tribution of constitutional content created by the Court through its 
decisions, both by its decision and in its opinions. Legal content goes 
beyond the communicative content. It is context specific, but Solum 
does not articulate a comprehensive theory of how legal or constitu-
tional content may be derived from communicative content, although 
he notes that the question whether constitutional content may be in-
consistent with the communicative content is controversial.370 But 
communicative content always contributes to the constitutional    
content. 
Solum’s semantic originalism expressly incorporates insights and 
claims from contemporary analytic philosophy of language.371 But 
Solum’s account fails to acknowledge the fundamental conflict be-
tween his normative account of constitutional law and the actual 
practice of constitutional argument and decision. To put it another 
 
 365.  Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2, at 480 (“”communicative content’ is 
simply a precise way of labeling what we usually call the ‘meaning’ or ‘linguistic meaning’ of the 
text.”).  
 366.  See generally Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2. 
 367.  Id. at 481–82. My claim that Solum makes the communicative content of statements 
of constitutional law logically prior to the legal content of such statements is not made expressly 
by Solum. But he is committed to that claim, both because he begins his analysis with commu-
nicative content or linguistic meaning and because of the contribution thesis that asserts that 
the communicative content of statements of constitutional law contributes to the legal content 
of such statements. 
 368.  Id. at 511 (“In practice, many legal texts are associated with legal content that is 
richer than the communicative content of the text.”). 
 369.  See generally SOAMES, Legal Texts, supra note 2 (explaining that the linguistic con-
tent of a legal text is not derived exclusively from its semantic meaning). 
 370.  Solum, Communicative Content, supra note 2, at 480, 511–12 (noting that the con-
stitutional content of the term “Congress” in the First Amendment is not the same as that text’s 
communicative content because constitutional law understands the protection of the Amend-
ment to extend to acts by the courts and the Executive Branch of the federal government). 
 371.  Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 31–38. 
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way, while Solum recognizes the performative dimension of the con-
stitutional text as a matter of accounting for the meaning of that text, 
he fails to understand the implications of that performative role for 
an account of constitutional law. He fails to recognize that the em-
bedding of authoritative statements of constitutional law in our prac-
tice of making constitutional arguments to courts, and by courts, and 
the decision of constitutional cases gives those statements a pragmatic 
dimension that is independent of the dimension or metric of linguis-
tic meaning. Statements of constitutional law are markers within a 
language game, but the social practice they are part of is also a matter 
of political power and moral authority and legitimacy. 
Returning to Solum’s example of the First Amendment, the term 
“Congress” in that text acquires its force not as a matter of semantic 
or pragmatic linguistic meaning, but as a matter of our practice of de-
ciding the limit, first of federal power and, since the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, of all state power. The Court’s choice to ex-
tend the protection of the First Amendment to actions by the Execu-
tive Branch and by the courts can be understood not as a judgment 
about semantics, pragmatics, or communication, but about how to 
decide the cases the courts faced, including New York Times Co. v. 
Sullivan.372 In that case, after all, the Court’s opinion did not rely up-
on the language of the constitutional text but upon a consideration of 
the chilling effect libel verdicts would have upon the exercise of clas-
sical free speech addressing public questions in the public space of 
reason.373 Thus, the Court’s holding relied upon precedent that had 
interpreted First Amendment protections broadly, prudential consid-
erations about the impact of libel judgments on the press and other 
exercise of free speech, and, perhaps, to implicit ethical arguments, in 
Bobbitt’s sense,374 of the place of public discourse in our republic. 
The task of interpreting or construing the language, meaning, or im-
port of the constitutional text was quickly glossed over. The opinion 
is thus a stark demonstration that the meaning of the First Amend-
ment follows the flag of our constitutional practice. Attempting to 
reduce that practice to linguistic meanings is a fool’s game. 
Solum expressly addresses the challenge that philosophical analy-
 
 372.  N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (adopting a restrictive interpreta-
tion of the protection of libel law for public officials on First Amendment grounds). 
 373.  Id. at 268–70 (emphasizing the importance of robust and uninhibited public dis-
course on public questions). 
 374.  See generally BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 52. 
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sis cannot resolve the questions that face constitutional theory and 
practice, but he dismisses the challenge in a short paragraph in his 
several hundred-page long magnum opus.375 His response is simple: 
the test whether analytic philosophy can make a contribution to con-
stitutional theory is whether the application of the methods and in-
sights of analytic philosophy to constitutional theory makes a contri-
bution to constitutional theory.376 That is a fair standard. 
It is nevertheless far from clear that Solum makes his case that his 
arcane philosophical argument has enhanced his constitutional theo-
ry. In introducing philosophical arguments and analysis, Solum 
acknowledges that such analysis is admittedly complex. He pointedly 
notes that pluralist or modal accounts of constitutional law are com-
plex, too.377 But his claim for the contribution of philosophical argu-
ment to constitutional theory and constitutional decisional practice 
turns on the power of his semantic originalism. If that theory fails to 
explain how mere philosophical theory can change our practice of 
constitutional law, then the metaphilosophical claim fails, too. 
Solum accords philosophy a systematic, foundational role.378 In so 
doing, he would fundamentally change the nature of constitutional 
argument and practice.379 He asserts that philosophical analysis and 
argument about language can generate conclusions about constitu-
tional decision theory and about the proper decision of constitutional 
cases.380 But he does not offer an argument for that claim beyond 
pointing to the account of the Constitution that he has articulated. 
Most fundamentally, Solum asserts that his sophisticated philosophi-
cal analysis simply confirms the intuitive, common sense view that 
the Constitution is binding, authoritative law and that the original 
linguistic understanding of the Constitution is that law.381 That theo-
ry appears problematic as a description of our practice of constitu-
tional argument and decision, and uncompelling as a prescriptive 
matter. 
 
 375.  Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 169–70. 
 376.  Id. at 31–38 (introducing the philosophy of language of Austin, Searle, Grice, and 
Lewis). 
 377.  Id. at 169–70 (addressing the objection to semantic originalism that it is an illicit 
colonization of law by philosophy). 
 378.  Id. 
 379.  See generally id. at 21–22 (endorsing the radical implications claimed by the classical 
originalists as a matter of the philosophy of language while arguing that more sophisticated ar-
guments are needed). 
 380.  Id. at 168 (“Semantic Originalism is a robust theory that makes strong claims.”). 
 381.  Id. at 173. 
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Solum’s use of philosophical argument to radically reform our 
constitutional practice is flawed. Three objections warrant particular 
mention. First, his emphasis upon the semantic meaning of the con-
stitutional text, even as enriched by pragmatics, fails to give adequate 
attention to the fundamentally performative character of authorita-
tive statements of constitutional law. That performative role provides 
the reasons for the constitutional arguments made and accepted as 
well as the associated statements of constitutional law advocated and 
accepted. That process does not require the intermediation of a so-
phisticated and comprehensive theory or account of the meaning of 
the constitutional text. Moreover, such a theory cannot capture the 
performative dimension of our constitutional argument and the 
statement of the conclusions derived in such argument.382 That per-
formative dimension is central to the Constitution and to our under-
standing of the constitutional text. It is inconsistent, however, with an 
originalist theory, even one as sophisticated as Solum’s. Our practice 
of constitutional argument and constitutional decision does not fit 
Solum’s originalist account. Solum can privilege the semantic or lin-
guistic content of the constitutional text only by ignoring the per-
formative role of that text and the rest of our constitutional practice. 
Second, Solum’s account of the relationship between communi-
cative content and constitutional or other legal content is ultimately 
unsatisfactory on its own terms. That account fails to explain how 
communicative content can contribute to, or generate, constitutional 
content. The distinction produces a black box, seemingly without 
particular explanatory power or falsifiable consequences. 
Solum might respond that his account is no more or less opaque 
than the pluralist, modal account that I defend.383 In the modal ac-
count, conflict between or among the various canonical types of con-
stitutional argument can only be resolved by the exercise of an un-
specified faculty of judgment.384 But the modal account has the 
advantage that it offers a compelling description of our constitutional 
 
 382.  Admittedly, of course, there is also conceptual content to the statements of constitu-
tional law and to constitutional argument, as discussed above, and a performative account does 
not capture that dimension. 
 383.  See LeDuc, Therapy and Promise, supra note 9; LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Chal-
lenge, supra note 10. 
 384.  See PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 178–86 (1991) [here-
inafter BOBBITT, INTERPRETATION] (describing the decision of cases in the face of inconsistent 
incommensurable modalities of argument perhaps somewhat misleadingly as a matter of “moral 
decision”). 
LEDUC.MACRO.FINAL_3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017  6:51 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
188 
decisional argumentative practice. Moreover, the modal account 
makes a place for the exercise of judgment in constitutional decision. 
Solum’s semantic originalism appears to provide a decisional algo-
rithm—at least for constitutional provisions that do not require con-
struction. In the end, Solum’s analysis delivers little more than the 
recognition that an account of communicative content—linguistic 
meaning—provides an incomplete account of our constitutional ar-
gument, decision, and law. Solum is right in that conclusion, but he 
draws the wrong lesson from it. 
Third, Solum’s strategy is also questionable as a matter of 
metaphilosophy. I have previously argued that the course of the clas-
sical debate over originalism demonstrates that there are metaphilo-
sophical reasons to doubt a constitutive role for philosophy in consti-
tutional theory or decision.385 I will take that argument as a 
foundation for my review of the use of philosophical argument by the 
New Originalists like Solum. Solum argues that the analytic philoso-
phy of language can provide the tools to reformulate originalism and 
refute its critics;386 that’s the source of Solum’s semantic originalism. 
Solum argues, for example, that his originalism rebuts Dworkin’s at-
tack on originalism’s central concept of a shared understanding of 
meaning.387 Solum believes that the common sense appeal of 
originalism, buttressed by appropriate philosophical argument, can 
trump our established constitutional practice. Philosophical argu-
ment can radically reform that practice and discredit the non-
originalist modes of that argument. Those arguments are available, if 
at all, not as a matter of interpretation of the constitutional meaning 
but, where that meaning is missing or indeterminate, as part of the 
process of constructing constitutional law consistent with the availa-
ble text. 
Solum offers no evidence or argument for that bold and ambi-
tious claim.388 Solum makes his claim for the power of philosophical 
argument by largely ignoring the pluralist, anti-foundational alterna-
tive. All he says about the pluralist theory is that it is complex.389 He 
 
 385.  See LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 6. 
 386.  Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 169–70 (arguing that the contribu-
tion of philosophy to constitutional theory and decision is in the pudding, but arguably failing 
to bring that pudding to the table). 
 387.  Id. at 82–86 (defending the distinction between interpretation and construction 
against potential criticism). 
 388.  See LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 6. 
 389.  Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 169–70. 
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does not engage the anti-foundational alternative at all. With respect 
to his implicit metaphilosophical claim, Solum simply fails to address 
the question whether philosophical argument can be deployed to 
fundamentally reform our constitutional practice. In fairness, he is 
only making the same mistake that others, like Dworkin, have made 
before him. Given Solum’s general philosophical sophistication, his 
metaphilosophical stance may appear puzzling. Nothing about So-
lum’s sophisticated originalist philosophical argument makes it more 
potent than the tacit philosophical argument of his predecessors or 
the express arguments of critics like Dworkin. 
E. Classical and Modern Critics of Originalism’s Semantics 
Originalism’s semantic account of the Constitution’s language 
has attracted substantial criticism. A couple of examples may help 
capture the alleged weaknesses of the originalists’ account. At issue 
for both the majority and the dissent in Heller was what the protect-
ed right “to keep and bear arms” covered. The dueling opinions of 
Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, and Justice Stevens, writing in 
dissent, explored principally the original understanding of the mean-
ing of the Second Amendment.390 The Court appeared to treat the 
dispute as a controversy to be resolved on a semantic analysis of the 
meaning of the text of the Second Amendment.391 By so doing, the 
Court eschewed and, indeed, foreclosed, consequentialist argument 
and considerations. At least in the Court’s opinion and in the dissent 
by Justice Stevens, there was no particular attention paid to the 
Court’s precedent, to the question of how the protections of the Sec-
ond Amendment should be carried forward into the Twenty-First 
Century, or the prudential considerations that might bear on the case 
before the Court.392 None of these non-semantic considerations were 
treated as relevant in these two opinions.393 The dissent by Justice 
Breyer, by contrast, directly addressed some of these considerations 
 
 390.  District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636–37 (2008) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 391.  Id. at 576 (“We turn first to the meaning of the Second Amendment.”). 
 392.  Justice Breyer, by contrast, after suggesting that the right protected by the Second 
Amendment must be balanced against the governmental interest in the regulation of firearms, 
proceeds to a prudential analysis of the stakes involved in that interest in regulation. See id. at 
681–89. 
 393.  In the Court’s opinion, once the semantic analysis was complete, the consequences 
of the decision were considered only to dismiss Justice Breyer’s concern with the societal costs 
imposed by the Court’s decision. See id. at 635–36. 
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and made arguments for the decision of the case based upon them, 
including, in particular, the prudential issues.394 
Second, the Court recently considered the scope of federal and 
states’ power of eminent domain in Kelo.395 At issue was the import 
of the requirement of the Fifth Amendment that such takings be for a 
public use. The majority opinion followed the Court’s precedent, 
finding that requirement satisfied by a legislative finding that need 
withstand only the most deferential judicial scrutiny.396 That prece-
dent emphasized the prudential claims of economic redevelopment; 
Kelo also applied a prudential analysis.397 The dissents, by contrast, 
focused on the language of the Constitution.398 They made several 
arguments, the most direct of which was that the original meaning—
the original understanding of the meaning—of the requirement of 
“public use” precluded the taking of property from one private party 
for the benefit of another private party.399 Thus, the dissent by Justice 
O’Connor answered the prudential and precedential arguments of 
the majority with an argument from original meaning. Justice 
O’Connor would have left the precedents finding the public use re-
quirement satisfied in the case of redevelopment of blighted urban 
areas but would have declined to extend those precedents to the facts 
of Kelo.400 The dissent by Justice Thomas went further, highlighting 
the inconsistency between the precedent and the constitutional text 
and would have overturned the precedent on which the Court re-
lied.401 In so doing, Justice Thomas emphasized that an expansive 
reading of the power of eminent domain would likely disadvantage 
insular minorities unable to adequately protect themselves in the po-
litical process from rapacious majorities.402 That argument was de-
ployed against the expansive reading of the Taking Power endorsed 
 
 394.  See id. at 681 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (addressing the potentially undesirable social 
consequences of liberalizing the regulation of handguns and permitting broader handgun    
ownership). 
 395.  Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469 (2005). In that case, the private property 
taken was promptly transferred to a private developer in support of its development project, 
which was part of a local government’s so-called community redevelopment plan. 
 396.  Id. at 483–92 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954)). 
 397.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 480–81. 
 398.  Id. at 494, 495–99 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Id. at 505, 505–06 (Thomas, J.,      
dissenting). 
 399.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 496 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 400.  Id. at 498–99. 
 401.  Id. at 514–21 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 402.  Id. 
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by the Court. 
The Court and the dissenters’ opinions largely failed to engage in 
a persuasive way.403 The dissent asserted that “public use” means use 
by the public, and that the Court’s Fifth Amendment jurisprudence 
had effectively read that requirement of the text out of Constitu-
tion.404 The majority was making prudential and precedential argu-
ments about the needs of modern government and the doctrine of 
Fifth Amendment that had developed in the Court’s precedents; the 
dissents’ were arguing from the original meaning of the Fifth 
Amendment. While the dissenting opinions clearly make arguments 
about the meaning of the term “public use,” the Court’s opinion, and 
Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, cannot easily be characterized as 
holdings about semantic meaning or the understanding thereof. Nor 
do the opinions present themselves in that way. Instead, the opinions 
purported to explore the concept of “public use”. Thus, the core of 
the Court’s analysis of Kelo is twice removed from an interpretation 
of the constitutional text. First, the majority focused on the require-
ment of “public use”, which is a requirement that has been articulated 
in the Court’s constitutional jurisprudence, not expressly stated in the 
Constitution itself. Second, the majority did not purport to analyze 
semantic or linguistic meaning of that term; instead, it explores the 
nature of the substantive requirement. The Court found that the tex-
tual requirement of “public use” is satisfied by a finding that the tak-
ing is for the public good. It does not hold that “public use” means 
found to be in the public interest. Justice Kennedy’s arguments do 
not appear to be examples of positivist or semantic modes of constitu-
tional adjudication. 
These two cases demonstrate that Dworkin’s claim that constitu-
tional disputes are not linguistic is overstated. Dworkin fails to cap-
ture the complexity of our constitutional decision practice. Some of 
these authorities exemplify the kind of linguistic argument that 
originalism mandates; in those disputes, textual and historic argu-
ments are made and may be decisive. In other cases they are not. 
Dworkin would sometimes appear to deny any legitimacy to the con-
 
 403.  Bobbitt’s typology of constitutional argument is one way to articulate what was hap-
pening. The Court was making prudential arguments, and the dissent, historical and textual 
arguments. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 52, at 7–8. But there may be better ways to describe 
the failure of the various opinions to engage with each other because Bobbitt’s typology does 
not capture Takings Clause jurisprudence very successfully. 
 404.  Kelo, 545 U.S. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
LEDUC.MACRO.FINAL_3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017  6:51 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
192 
struction of constitutional argument as a debate over meanings.405 At 
other points Dworkin would appear to acknowledge a role for argu-
ments from original meaning as arguments from one strand in the 
holistic, comprehensive web of legal obligation that Hercules must 
weave.406 But Dworkin’s theory clearly explains both why the pruden-
tial considerations raised by Justice Breyer and the associated pruden-
tial deference appear powerful arguments. Dworkin’s analysis also 
explains the power of Justice Thomas’s non-originalist Elyesque 
Carolene Products407 argument.408 
That description of a constitutional case as a dispute that is to be 
resolved as a controversy about the meaning of a constitutional provi-
sion cannot be reconciled with our experience. Constitutional dis-
putes do not feel like disputes about linguistic rules. The kinds of ar-
guments that are made do not fit that description; the Brandeis brief, 
emphasizing the consequences of social legislation and arguing that 
those consequences must be taken into account in constitutional ad-
judication is a notable example of a type of argument that does not fit 
the semantic description. The originalist asserts not just that those 
cases present disputes about rules, but a very specific set of rules: 
those set forth in the Constitution by the Founders (or their counter-
parts with respect to later amendments). Finally, how compelling is 
Dworkin’s claim that the dispute is not about linguistic rules? 
The claim about rules and principles in Dworkin’s first formula-
tion of his attack on Hart’s positivism,409 and his claim of the seman-
tic sting in his later formulation,410 have captivated, transfixed, and 
 
 405.  See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 31–44, 43 (“If legal argument is 
mainly or even partly about pivotal cases, then lawyers cannot be using the same factual criteria 
for deciding whether propositions of law are true or false. . . . So the project of the semantic 
theories must be doomed to fail.”) (emphasis added). That would appear, perhaps, to go too far 
and to strip significance from the underlying text. Textual and historical arguments are them-
selves canonical forms of argument in our constitutional practice. See, e.g., District of Colum-
bia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008); McDonald v. Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010) (extending the 
protections of the broad reading of the Second Amendment in Heller to apply to state           
legislation). 
 406.  See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 176–86. 
 407.  United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (giving classic 
statement of the role of the Court when ordinary democratic processes may break down). 
 408.  See Kelo, 545 U.S. at 520–23 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the broad emi-
nent domain power upheld by the Court will disadvantage minorities); see also United States v. 
Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938). 
 409.  See DWORKIN, Rules I, supra note 159. 
 410.  See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 33–35, 43–44. The relationship between 
Dworkin’s two arguments—that against rules and that against semantic accounts of law—has 
not been clearly articulated. They share a broader conception of law and of the sources of law. 
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distracted—and generally set the agenda for—theoretical English-
speaking jurisprudence for nearly half a century.411 Any theory that 
reduces legal disputes to disputes about language alone or about the 
application of legal rules alone does appear to lose much of the rich-
ness and complexity of legal disputation. Portia’s argument412 may 
capture one dimension of the law, but it does not follow that such an 
argument is the exclusive paradigm of legal argument. So, without 
conceding Dworkin’s argument, I will for purposes of argument 
acknowledge the intuitive appeal of such an argument against any re-
ductive theory that seeks to assimilate legal disputes to disputes about 
language. According to Dworkin, one of the prevalent flaws in juris-
prudence is the reduction of legal disputes to disputes over rules or 
the meaning of rules.413 Such controversies all too often require the 
working through, and working out, of previously unarticulated vi-
sions of our humanity414 and fundamental value choices for our socie-
ty;415 it is particularly and peculiarly the mission of judges to engage 
 
A theory of law that reduces legal disputes to disputes about rules is not necessarily a semantic 
theory. But if one adds an account of legal rules as interpreted by judges in adjudication then 
the model of rules becomes a semantic theory. It is less natural to reduce a theory of law as en-
compassing both rules and principles to a semantic theory, because the nature of principles’ role 
in adjudication turns so much less on the precise formulation of the stated principle. Principles 
don’t appear to operate on Dworkin’s account like linguistic meaning, even recognizing the 
vagueness and other complexities inherent in natural language. Thus, dispute over the applica-
tion of the principles is not easily reduced to semantic dispute. 
 411.  See, e.g., EXPLORING LAW’S EMPIRE (Scott Hershovitz ed., 2006); DWORKIN AND 
HIS CRITICS (Justine Burley ed., 2004); JULES COLEMAN, THE PRACTICE OF PRINCIPLE: IN 
DEFENSE OF A PRAGMATIST APPROACH TO LEGAL THEORY 103–07, 105 (2001) (“Alt-
hough . . . no one nowadays considers [Dworkin’s] argument convincing, it would be hard to 
find an essay that has been more influential in the development of contemporary jurispru-
dence.”); but see Brian Leiter, The End of Empire: Dworkin and Jurisprudence in the 21st Cen-
tury, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 165 (2005) (arguing that Dworkin’s attack on positivism and his own 
theory of law as integrity had been largely a sideshow in Anglo-American jurisprudence and 
that his most notorious claims had been broadly rejected). 
 412.  See SHAKESPEARE, supra note 143, at act 4, sc. i, lines 309–10, 312–13, 315–22, 
336–44. 
 413.  DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 31–43; DWORKIN, Rules I, supra note 159. 
 414.  Thus Dworkin writes, describing the application of his theory of adjudication to the 
decision of Brown v. Board of Education: 
The Constitution is different from ordinary statutes in one striking way. The Consti-
tution is foundational of other law, so Hercules’ interpretation of the document as a 
whole, and of its abstract clauses, must be foundational as well. It must fit and justify 
the most basic arrangements of political power in the community, which means it 
must be a justification drawn from the most philosophical reaches of political theory. 
Lawyers are always philosophers . . . . 
DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 380. 
 415.  Id. 
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in such a project.416 
Turning away from Dworkin’s own surprising diffidence in argu-
ing that the originalists are vulnerable to the semantic sting, what ac-
counts for the power of the claim that legal controversies are not to 
be treated simply as controversies about the meaning of words? The 
answer lies in the kinds of arguments our practice of constitutional 
argument includes. Simply put, these arguments are not exclusively 
about meaning. This claim is not that arguments about the mean-
ings—including the original meanings—of words are not themselves 
good arguments, sometimes even conclusive arguments. The claim is 
only that such arguments are not the exclusive type of arguments that 
our constitutional practice permits. 
This observation is not merely a description of our constitutional 
practice. It is also an affirmation of the way in which constitutional 
decisional discourse is practiced. For most of us, and for most of the 
participants in our constitutional practice, the broad array of types of 
argument actually employed in our constitutional decisional practice 
are, to a greater or lesser degree, persuasive or compelling. So the 
claim that we should dispense with these forms of argument is incon-
sistent with our endorsement of these arguments, and our choice, as 
constitutional practitioners, to keep them available to us. To establish 
the claims of exclusive versions of originalism we must therefore del-
egitimize large parts of practice and broad swathes of our constitu-
tional precedent.417 
 
 416.  Dworkin’s semantic sting argument would appear an obvious choice for deployment 
against originalism. Originalism, after all, offers an account of interpretation and, implicitly, 
disputes about constitutional interpretation, as disputes about the meaning of constitutional 
provisions. Why does Dworkin fail to deploy the semantic sting argument against originalism? 
The answer crudely put, I believe, is that Dworkin does not believe he needs this argument, and 
does not care to dignify originalism by including it among other semantic theories that 
Dworkin finds more plausible and cogent. Thus, in Law’s Empire, while criticizing, positivism, 
conventionalism, and pragmatism, Dworkin clearly finds them worthy adversaries. See 
DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 33–35 (legal positivism); 114–75 (conventionalism and 
pragmatism). He never shows originalism—in any of its forms—the same respect. See generally 
id. at 359–69. It is not that the semantic sting would not tell against originalism; it would. But 
for Dworkin, it is perhaps too subtle and strong an argument to make against a fundamentally 
unsatisfactory theory. Dworkin may not want to distract attention from what he implicitly views 
as more obvious and fundamental flaws; he does not want to treat originalism with the same 
respect as other positivist theories. See also MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 150 (sug-
gesting that Dworkin sought to refute originalism on its own terms). 
 417.  The doctrinal impact of a robust originalism has been articulated by, among others, 
Cass Sunstein and David Strauss. See, e.g., SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 20, at 18–19; 
DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION 12–16 (2010) [hereinafter STRAUSS, 
LIVING]. 
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Some originalists recognize this choice; those who would so disa-
vow our precedents frequently invoke the metaphor of the Lost Con-
stitution.418 They are prepared to radically excise significant portions 
of our constitutional law.419 In so doing they would restore the Lost 
Constitution. That strategy appears grounded, at least in part, on 
certain ontological commitments. We can meaningfully and properly 
talk about excising portions of our constitutional law if we have a 
theory about the truth of propositions of constitutional law that looks 
to the correspondence of these propositions with the constitutional 
world. Such a correspondence theory of truth would hardly be nov-
el,420 even if increasingly under assault in the philosophical acade-
my.421 On the basis of such a theory, the propositions of constitution-
al law that do not correspond to the Constitution in the world can be 
safely and neatly excised from our constitutional doctrine because 
those propositions are false. 
By contrast, if we believe that our constitutional law is simply the 
law that is supported and determined by our current constitutional 
arguments and practices, then such radical surgery appears more dif-
ficult to sustain. We do not have a correspondence theory of truth by 
which to test propositions of constitutional law that are generally ac-
cepted and believed within the constitutional interpretative or adjudi-
cative communities. Because the originalist critique requires running 
roughshod over many of our established practices, the basis for the 
rejection of such practices and arguments must be established on oth-
er grounds. So, on this reply to the originalist project, there is no 
foundation from which we can so radically revise our constitutional 
law.422 
 
 418.  See, e.g., BARNETT, LOST, supra note 60. See also Akhil Reed Amar, Our Forgotten 
Constitution: A Bicentennial Comment, 97 YALE L.J. 281 (1987) (exploring the question of 
what constitutes the definitive constitutional text but without the radical agenda defended by 
Barnett). 
 419.  See BARNETT, LOST, supra note 60, at 354–57. 
 420.  See, e.g., H. H. JOACHIM, THE NATURE OF TRUTH § 1 (1914) (giving classic state-
ment of a robust correspondence theory of truth); J. L. Austin, Truth, 24 ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 
111 (1950) (arguing that truth describes a relationship between statements and the world). 
 421.  See, e.g., P. F. Strawson, Truth, 24 ARISTOTELIAN SOC. 129 (1950) (arguing that 
“the correspondence theory [of truth] requires, not purification, but elimination.”); Donald Da-
vidson, The Folly of Trying to Define Truth, 93 J. PHIL. 6 (1996) (arguing that the fundamen-
tal nature of the concept of truth makes a reductive definition of truth impossible); Hartry 
Field, Tarski’s Theory of Truth, 64 J. PHIL. 347 (1972) (analyzing a classic, deflationary ac-
count of truth). 
 422.  See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 10 (arguing that our 
constitutional law in general and the practice of judicial review in particular neither needs nor 
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Without invoking such an anti-representationalist, anti-
foundationalist account, however, the ability of originalism’s critics to 
reject the semantic originalist account must turn on defending an al-
ternative, non-semantic theory as preferable. From this vantage, 
which Dworkin apparently shares,423 the originalists are wrong not 
because they believe that propositions of constitutional law are true if 
they correspond to an external constitutional world.424 But, because 
their critics believe the world is different, richer, and fuller and that 
correspondence is more complex than the originalist account of 
meaning and truth would allow.425 It should thus be apparent why the 
dispute here is so fundamental. The critics of the semantic account of 
law need to persuade us that law can have the richness they describe, 
without creating the specter of unstructured law that dissolves into a 
pattern defined by mere judicial discretion.426 Were that to happen, 
as the originalists fear, we are left lawless.427 The strongest argument 
that the critics of the semantic account offer is that a semantic ac-
count of fundamental constitutional disputes appears inadequate and 
unrealistic. 
Critics of originalism’s account of constitutional meaning and 
semantics have also pressed philosophy into action.428 Andrei Mar-
mor initially dismissed originalism, questioning whether it ought to 
 
can have a foundational defense; it is already bedrock). 
 423.  See DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 4 (“The proposition that no one may 
drive over 55 miles an hour is true . . . because a majority of that state’s legislators said ‘aye’ or 
raised their hands when a text to that effect lay on their desks.”). 
 424.  There is reason to question this shared correspondence theory. See LeDuc, Anti-
Foundational Challenge, supra note 10. 
 425.  See, e.g., Dworkin, Interpretation, supra note 27, at 117 n.6 (cryptically referencing 
the philosophical work of Quine and Davidson). For the argument that originalism’s critics 
generally share originalism’s commitment to a correspondence theory of truth, see LeDuc, On-
tological Foundations, supra note 6 (attributing such an account to Dworkin). 
 426.  Dworkin, for example, believes that moral theory must be introduced to ground 
constitutional theory and decision making, and Tribe believes value choices must be made in 
constitutional decision and interpretation. DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 285–86 (de-
scribing the requirement of articulating a moral theory as an intrinsic element of constitutional 
decision); Tribe, Interpretation, supra note 240, at 87–93 (exploring the implications of those 
constitutional provisions that Tribe characterizes as “aspirational”). 
 427.  See SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 20, at 54; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, 
at 261–65. 
 428.  One critic who enlists philosophical arguments with substantial sophistication whose 
views will not be explored here is Richard Fallon. See generally Fallon, Meaning, supra note 2. 
Those sophisticated views are, given their pluralist commitments, likely closer to the position 
defended here than other originalists or critics whose views are explored here. The constraints 
of time and space preclude an exploration of Fallon’s views here. 
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be taken seriously as a theory of constitutional interpretation.429 
More recently, Marmor has treated originalism and its semantic and 
interpretative claims more seriously, while continuing to reject its 
claims.430 After a sophisticated and complex analysis of language in 
law, Marmor concludes that the philosophy of language cannot pro-
vide the tools or arguments to choose sides between originalism and 
its critics.431 Instead, that choice must be made on normative or polit-
ical grounds.432 The choice between the competing methods requires 
a substantive judgment about the kind of constitutional law we want. 
The analysis here will focus on two of Marmor’s important 
claims. Marmor claims that statements of constitutional law have 
truth values.433 Second, Marmor claims that the debate between Jus-
tice Scalia and Ronald Dworkin and, by extension, the debate over 
originalism, can be resolved only on the basis of normative moral and 
political judgments. Marmor’s claim for the existence of truth values 
is important, because he asserts that if that were not the case, then le-
gal inferences could not be validly made.434 Marmor simply makes 
this bald assertion, but offers no argument.435 We frequently make 
practical inferences on the basis of expressive claims that do not have 
truth values.436 Moreover, Marmor’s account is fundamentally schiz-
ophrenic, because together with his argument for the truth content of 
constitutional propositions he argues that the truth content of such 
propositions is like that of propositions about fiction.437 On Lewis’s 
account, truth in fiction is not a concept that is congruent with truth 
in fact.438 Marmor believes that the legal and constitutional domain is 
 
 429.  MARMOR, INTERPRETATION, supra note 40, at 155 (characterizing the widespread 
appeal of originalism as a classic jurisprudential puzzle).  
 430.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 132–36, 152–155 (criticizing Dworkin’s ar-
guments against originalism as ineffective).  
 431.  Id. at 146–50. 
 432.  Id. at 150–55. 
 433.  Id. at 61–84. 
 434.  Id. at 61 (“It is difficult to see how [legal] inferences can be valid if the premises are 
not truth-apt . . . .”). 
 435.  Id. 
 436.  Thus, for example, when I assert, I like ice cream and then order ice cream for des-
sert at dinner, my expression of a preference for ice cream is the basis for the practical conclu-
sion that I should order ice cream for my dessert. While Marmor might assert that there is a 
truth value to my claim to like ice cream—I do or I don’t—it is not clear that such a trivial truth 
condition adds anything to the analysis of my practical reasoning.  
 437.  Id. at 77–84. 
 438.  See generally 1 DAVID K. LEWIS, Truth in Fiction, in PHILOSOPHICAL PAPERS 261 
(1983) [hereinafter LEWIS, Truth in Fiction] (exploring the discontinuities between statements 
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similarly distinct, such that what is true as a matter of law may not be 
true in fact.439 Marmor, in both respects approaches acknowledging 
the import and implications of his recognition that, in constitutional 
law, saying makes it so, but in both cases seems to pull back. The im-
portance of the property of authoritative statements of constitutional 
law that saying makes it so, is that it signals to us that the performa-
tive role of such statements is as important in our constitutional prac-
tice of adjudication as the conceptual content of such statements. 
Marmor takes almost for granted that constitutional reasoning 
employs logical inference as a central form of argument.440 He char-
acterizes inference as a common form of reasoning in law, character-
izing it as part of the “regular business” of lawyers.441 Inference is 
part of that business but there are many other forms of practical rea-
soning in law, too.442 Marmor’s examples of constitutional inference 
are more complicated than Marmor acknowledges. First, such infer-
ences play a smaller role in constitutional argument than Marmor at 
least implicitly suggests.443 Practical reasoning, including constitu-
tional reasoning in adjudication, relies more heavily on reasoning 
from analogy, synthetic argumentative strategies, and the drawing of 
distinctions.444 Logical inference is not a dominant form of constitu-
tional reasoning. 
An even more important objection may be made on the basis of 
an alternative account of material inference that Brandom refines and 
endorses.445 Materially good inferences, like logical inferences, draw 
new true consequential statements or performatives from true ante-
cedent statements or performatives.446 But such material inferences 
do not necessarily express a logical relationship between the premises 
 
about characters and events in fiction and statements about characters and events outside those 
fictional contexts). 
 439.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 78–80. 
 440.  Id. at 61. 
 441.  Id. 
 442.  See generally LeDuc, Interpretation and Constitutional Argument, supra note 140 
(describing the tacit models of constitutional reasoning in the debate and arguing against the 
formal account endorsed my many originalists); PATTERSON, TRUTH, supra note 52, at 169–76 
(describing the complex and informal process of legal reasoning); SUNSTEIN, LEGAL 
REASONING, supra note 20, at 74–93 (describing the role of analogical reasoning). 
 443.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 61. See generally PATTERSON, TRUTH, 
supra note 52, at 169–76. 
 444.  See generally STEPHEN TOULMIN, THE USES OF ARGUMENT (1958). 
 445.  See BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 88, at 79–92. 
 446.  Id. 
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and the conclusion.447 They are often true because of the content of 
their nonlogical vocabulary, as Brandom puts it;448 for Brandom, 
there is nothing privileged about logical inference.449 Brandom offers 
a number of examples and it is easy to construct others from state-
ments of constitutional law. For example, consider the inference: 
The First Amendment protects freedom of the press. 
In the twenty-first century, the Internet serves as a medium for 
communication in the public sphere like the public press of the 
eighteenth century. 
Therefore, the protection of the First Amendment extends to the 
dissemination of opinions and information on the Internet. 
Such an inference is not, and could not, be cast in a logical form 
as a syllogism.450 It is easy to see that this inference is not cast as a syl-
logism. The critical second step simply employs an analogy between 
the function of the Internet and that of the press to support the ex-
tension of the protections of the First Amendment for the press to 
communication on the Internet. 
My stronger claim is that the inference could not be recast as a 
syllogism or series of syllogisms. The critical second step, analogizing 
the Internet to the classical press on the basis of its communicative 
and socio-political function expresses a judgment—a synthetic judg-
ment, in Kantian terms—that cannot be reduced to a logical, syllo-
gistic form solely on the basis of premises that state propositions ex-
pressed by the constitutional text. The additional premises necessary 
to support the inference do not appear to be matters of fact; rather 
these premises require normative judgments about the nature of our 
social practices and our technology. The dissemination of news and 
information in the public sphere is a feature common to the tradi-
 
 447.  Id. 
 448.  Id. at 85. 
 449.  Id. at 85–86. 
 450.  In particular, such an inference could not be cast as: 
  The First Amendment protects the freedom of all press. 
  The Internet is a press. 
  Therefore the First Amendment protects the freedom of the Internet. 
That is because the Internet is not a press. There are features of the Internet—including, im-
portantly as we have learned—its disintermediating role with respect to the dissemination of 
news and information that leaves it potentially particularly vulnerable to fakery and deception, 
for example. But there are also features of the Internet that make it like a press that ought to 
entitle publication on the Internet to the protections of the First Amendment. The argument 
for that inference is not easily, if at all, reducible to one more syllogisms, at least in the way that 
we articulate and, Brandom argues, actually make such arguments. 
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tional press and to the Internet that has overriding importance in de-
fining the scope of First Amendment protection. These premises may 
also require judgments about our values. The dissemination of news 
and information is a critical function in the so-called marketplace of 
ideas protected by the First Amendment. Recognizing that centrality 
and thus the value of such dissemination factors into the conclusion 
that communication on the Internet is entitled to First Amendment 
protection. 
It is unclear that those premises qualify as authoritative sources of 
constitutional law for the originalists because they are so obviously 
extraconstitutional in origin. It is not clear how Marmor or New 
Originalists would respond to this inference. It hardly seems that 
they would reject the conclusion—or could be right if they did. But 
on what basis can they to reject the inference itself? The originalist 
account of extraneous sources of constitutional law is complex and 
perhaps inconsistent.451 If the New Originalists are to reject the in-
ference they likely must do so on this basis of rejecting one of the 
premises. If they do so, however, it is unclear how they can construc-
tive an alternative inference that would extend the protections of the 
First Amendment to the Internet. 
Like his former colleague Scott Soames, Marmor acknowledges 
the performative, illocutionary role of statements of constitutional 
law and asserts that it makes an important contribution to the import 
of statements whose meaning is not adequately captured by mere aus-
tere semantic meaning.452 He also acknowledges that statements of 
constitutional law do not express propositions about the world.453 
Marmor argues that propositions of constitutional law have truth 
functional content by analogy to conversational exhortatives.454 
Marmor asserts that exhortatives have truth conditions and that an 
exhortative is true if the speaker uttered the exhortative sincerely 
(and certain other contextual conditions are satisfied).455 Thus, on 
 
 451.  See André LeDuc, Originalism’s Claim and Its Implications, Part II.D, Accounting 
for Constitutional Flux (Oct. 31, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). 
 452.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 22–27  
 453.  Id. at 62. 
 454.  Id. at 61–70. In this discussion of Marmor’s philosophical account of statements of 
law, I shall accept arguendo his assumption that the concept of truth and truth conditions are 
generally useful and well understood concepts. I have elsewhere explored reasons to be skeptical 
of this premise. See LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 10.  
 455.  Id. at 64. The relevant contextual conditions parallel the requirements that Austin 
identified for a felicitous utterance of a performative. 
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Marmor’s account, as he notes, saying makes it so.456 
Marmor’s claim that exhortatives have non-trivial truth condi-
tions appears problematic. When somewhat utters a performative, we 
do not ordinarily think that such an utterance is true or false. When a 
couple exchanges wedding vows, we do not ordinarily attribute truth 
or falsehood to the respective utterances (although we may, in un-
happy situations, recognize that one party is committing a fraud), and 
when two persons exchange utterances to make a wager, again, we do 
not think such utterances are true or false. Austin was right in his 
substitution of felicity conditions for truth conditions, at least as a 
matter of our linguistic practice and, at least for me, linguistic intui-
tions.457 Marmor does not address Austin’s argument that the salient 
feature of performative utterances is their felicity, not their truth val-
ue, expressly. Marmor’s intuition that we need an account of the con-
ceptual content of statements of constitutional and other law is 
sound. It is not enough to assess the felicity vel non of such state-
ments and texts. 
Marmor argues for the existence of truth values and truth condi-
tions for exhortatives on the basis that the truth of an exhortative E 
consists in the utterance or creation of the text E.458 Marmor thus ac-
cords truth aptness to utterances or texts that, in Brandom’s phrasing, 
make something true rather than beliefs or assertions that take some-
thing as true.459 Marmor does not appear to attach any significance to 
this move. He also does not address the apparent incorporation of the 
practice of inference in other contexts in which the premises lack 
truth values. For example, some ethical theories assert that moral 
judgments express feelings or emotions.460 On that expressivist or 
emotivist account, such judgments do not assert propositions about 
the world, but instead merely express feelings about the world.461 
While we sometimes talk about the truth of moral judgments, that 
talk is limited and may be reducible to endorsement of the judgment 
 
 456.  Id. at 84. 
 457.  AUSTIN, WORDS, supra note 55, at 139–45 (simplifying substantially, arguing that 
the truth aptness of performative utterances is less significant than their performative felicity, 
and the opposite relationship holds for constatives). 
 458.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 64–65. 
 459.  BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 88, at 83. 
 460.  See generally GILBERT HARMAN, THE NATURE OF MORALITY 26–40 (1977) [here-
inafter HARMAN, MORALITY]. 
 461.  Id. at 27–32. 
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asserted to be true.462 But expressivists do not think that there is any 
problem with inference in moral theory.463 Marmor might reply that 
such expressivist statements also have self-referential truth condi-
tions. It is not clear what such a claim adds. 
Marmor also explores the parallel between truth with respect to 
fiction and truth with respect to statements of law at some length, ar-
guing that it sheds light on the nature of truth in law.464 Truth with 
respect to propositions about places, persons, and events described in 
fiction has received ongoing philosophical attention.465 For example, 
David Lewis, in an account that Marmor endorses, has argued that 
statements about fictional events and persons must be understood to 
be true or false only within the context of the fictional world.466 
Marmor is particularly concerned with the logical relationships be-
tween statements about the world and statements about the fictional 
world.467 Marmor takes as his point of departure what he terms Lew-
is’s paradox, which calls out the confusions that arise when state-
ments about the real world are combined with statements about the 
fictional world, leading to error and confusion.468 Marmor asserts 
that a similar problem arises with respect to inferences that draw on 
statements of law and statements about the world, leading potentially 
to similar confusion and error.469 To solve that potential problem, 
Marmor adopts a solution analogous to that proposed by Lewis with 
respect to fiction, the concept of restricting statements that serve as 
premises for legal inference to statements that are, at least implicitly, 
statements about facts or conditions within the realm of legal dis-
course.470 While Marmor has to work hard to make that argument for 
an implicit restriction plausible (and it remains at odds with our ordi-
nary truth talk with respect to exhortatives), its introduction is central 
to Marmor’s argument as to how to make the rules for logical infer-
ence work in law.471 
 
 462.  Id. at 33–35 (exploring the tensions that arise when expressivism denies ordinary 
truth values to moral statements). 
 463.  Id. at 36–39, 41 (describing expressivist moral reasoning and argument in the terms 
of ordinary logical inference). 
 464.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 77–84. 
 465.  See generally LEWIS, Truth in Fiction, supra note 438.  
 466.  Id. at 77–78; MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 77–78. 
 467.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 77–84. 
 468.  Id. 
 469.  Id. 
 470.  Id. at 82–84. 
 471.  Marmor asserts that such statements are self-referentially true. Id. at 65–66. It is far 
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Marmor’s claim that statements of law have truth conditions ap-
pears open to challenge. The first question is what the concept of 
truth adds to Marmor’s account of statements of law. Marmor 
acknowledges that statements of law are not statements about the 
world, and in so doing, both distinguishes the concept of the truth of 
such statements from traditional accounts of truth and accords it a 
small importance with respect to such statements.472 Moreover, 
many, like Austin, have doubted that such statements have significant 
truth conditions.473 Marmor asserts that the concept of truth is neces-
sary for inferences to be valid.474 Marmor believes that he must make 
statements of law truth-apt to make inference possible in the world of 
law.475 
Classically, the rules of first order logic permit the construction 
of truth value or truth tables for logical inferences that relate the 
truth of premises with the truth of the conclusion.476 But while that is 
a valuable project, Brandom explains why it is not a necessary ele-
ment in accounting for inference in practical reason.477 Briefly, Bran-
dom argues that logical inference is simply the formalization for 
premises stated in a logical vocabulary of a type of materially good 
inference that is used across a wide array of contexts.478 Such infer-
ence is not limited to logical inference and it is not limited to true or 
truth-apt premises. One possibility would be to jettison the concept 
of truth for authoritative statements of law, substituting a concept, 
say, of “generally accepted after inquiry” and define rules of inference 
with respect to law as those rules that preserve such concept of gen-
erally accepted after inquiry. Such a concept of generally accepted af-
ter inquiry (drawn from classical pragmatist accounts of truth) would 
not appear to be a proxy for truth in any classical sense. Even if we 
 
from clear what such a reductive concept adds to our understanding of law, language, or infer-
ence.  
 472.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 61–67. 
 473.  See generally AUSTIN, WORDS, supra note 55, at 139–46. But see Lewis, Score-
keeping, supra note 122, at 247–48 (defending the existence of truth conditions for such        
utterances). 
 474.  See MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 61 (“It is difficult to see how such [legal] 
inferences can be valid if the premises are not truth-apt . . . .”). 
 475.  Id. 
 476.  See, e.g., GEOFFREY HUNTER, METALOGIC: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
METATHEORY OF STANDARD FIRST ORDER LOGIC 48–51 (1973); see generally WILLARD 
VAN ORMAN QUINE, ELEMENTARY LOGIC 54 (rev. ed. 1980). 
 477.  See generally BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 88, at 84–87. 
 478.  Id. at 85. 
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characterize such statements generally accepted after inquiry as taken 
as true or treated as true, the implicit contrast with statements that 
are true remains.479 Yet we would have a formal account of inference 
for such concepts that would seem to work just fine. An inference 
from premises that are taken as true is as good as an inference from 
premises that are true, as a matter of inference. 
Marmor might respond that statements that are taken as true or 
treated as true are true enough to satisfy his account of the truth of 
authoritative statements of law. He might declare himself agnostic on 
the question whether such statements are, in fact, true. What, then, is 
important in Marmor’s concept of truth for exhortative or other per-
formative utterances or texts? It is, I think, that we act with respect to 
what Marmor characterizes as the truth or falsity of such texts and ut-
terances in ways that resemble the ways that we act with respect to 
the truth or falsity of declarative statements. That is, truth is good, 
falsehood is bad. 
Also important in the approach to authoritative sentences about 
constitutional law is often their place and mission as performatives. 
That is, the most salient feature of such utterances or texts is what 
they are doing, not what the statements are saying. For example, in 
Cohen v. California, the Court confronted the conviction of a young 
man for disturbing the peace.480 The defendant had worn a jacket 
with a printed slogan “Fuck the Draft” into a Los Angeles court-
house.481 In the context of the Court’s review of the conviction, when 
the Court asserted in its opinion that “words are often chosen as 
much for their emotive as their cognitive force”482 the conceptual 
content of the Court’s recognition of the importance of rhetorical 
punch (which in a different context might have been significant) was 
less important than its place in a practical inference as to why offen-
sive speech about public questions in the public square had to be pro-
tected under the First Amendment. In that context, simply reminding 
us that public argument and discourse is far from a world of cold, 
crystalline, dispassionate reason. If we recognize the richness and the 
emotional and rhetorical dimension of public discourse in the public 
sphere then we also understand the breadth of the protections needed 
for a robust and vital free speech. That recognition, captured in part 
 
 479.  As is classically emphasized in criticisms of pragmatist theories of truth. 
 480.  403 U.S. 15 (1971). 
 481.  Id. at 16. 
 482.  Id. at 26. 
LEDUC.MACRO.FINAL_3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017  6:51 PM 
111] Making the Premises of Constitutional Meaning Express 
205 
by the statement quoted, makes for a compelling opinion holding for 
the defendant. 
Most fundamentally, Robert Brandom’s theory of the nature of 
logic and inference, introduced above,483 is inconsistent with Mar-
mor’s argument. Brandom’s inferentialism begins, in a sense, with 
our practice of reasoning, finding the meaning of propositions not 
simply in their use, but in the inferential commitments they support 
and the commitments they entail.484 Brandom argues that it is the 
concept of materially good inferences rather than formal validity that 
is important in our language.485 This is the alternative to Marmor’s 
tacit endorsement of the critical importance of syllogistic inference in 
law. From Brandom’s stance, our inferential practice with respect to 
authoritative statements of law accounts for the meaning of those 
statements on a non-representational theory. That account is neces-
sary because a performative account of such statements, while needed 
to account for important aspects of our practice with respect to such 
statements, does not adequately capture the conceptual content of 
our authoritative statements of constitutional law or our practice of 
constitutional argument. With Brandom’s theoretical apparatus in 
hand we can dispense with a need for truth conditions to account for 
the meaning of statements of constitutional law, contrary to Mar-
mor’s account486 (and to Dworkin’s account before him).487 Neither 
do we need such an account to explain the practice of inference in 
our constitutional decision.488 Brandom’s account of practical infer-
ence explains constitutional argument and reasoning without the 
need for a non-trivial notion of truth conditions. 
An example may make this clear. Consider the following practical 
inference drawn, loosely, from the Court’s opinion in Kelo v. City of 
New London.489 
The Takings Clause requires that private property may only be 
 
 483.  See generally BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 88, at 10–15. Bran-
dom’s theory is hardly uncontroversial, but it appears to shed light on our constitutional prac-
tice, both in providing a non-representational account of meaning and truth and in emphasizing 
the inferential role of our texts and utterances. 
 484.  Id. at 45–77. 
 485.  Id. at 52–55. 
 486.  See MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 70–74. 
 487.  See DWORKIN, PHILOSOPHY OF LAW, supra note 88, at 5 (characterizing the ques-
tion of what legal propositions mean is “the same thing” as when those propositions are true). 
 488.  See generally BRANDOM, ARTICULATING REASONS, supra note 88, at 80–96.  
 489.  545 U.S. 469 (2005) (upholding a state taking of non-blighted urban land for private 
redevelopment as satisfying the public use requirement of the Fifth Amendment). 
LEDUC.MACRO.FINAL_3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017  6:51 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
206 
taken for public use. 
If private property is taken for a public purpose, then it is taken 
for public use. 
The subject property was taken for the public purpose of urban 
redevelopment. 
Therefore the public use requirement of the Takings Clause is 
satisfied. 
It is not clear that the any of the sentences in the inference have non-
trivial truth conditions.490 They are true because the Court asserts 
them in the course of its decision (they are not dicta). Saying makes 
them so. We can agree with the decision or disagree with it, but it 
qualifies as a summary of an important part of the relevant constitu-
tional on takings. Truth aptness hardly appears a requirement for our 
practice of constitutional reasoning and argument. 
If Marmor’s account of truth is unnecessary to ground the con-
cept of inference, does that notion have any other virtues that makes 
it valuable and can it withstand our skepticism about the concept of 
truth that Marmor has created? If we look at statements of and about 
the law and reasoning about those statements in the context of our 
practice of constitutional adjudication, we find that, to a significant 
degree, what a court says about the constitutional law makes it so. In 
the case of a lower court a more senior court may overrule such 
statements (thus making them false), and in the case of the Court a 
subsequent case may overrule a decision (again, thus making the ear-
lier decision false as to its statements of the law). There is not other-
wise any fact about the Constitution or about the world that makes 
such statements true or false. 
Marmor concludes with a review of the debate between Justice 
Scalia and Ronald Dworkin.491 In scoring the debate between Justice 
Scalia and Dworkin, Marmor concludes that Dworkin’s arguments 
against originalism were unpersuasive.492 Briefly, he rejects those ar-
 
 490.  These statements have the trivial truth conditions of being true by virtue of having 
been stated. But if we look at the second premise, for example, it is unclear what states of the 
world might make the conditional true. 
 491.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 132–55. The debate is most expressly articu-
lated by the protagonists in SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19 (direct engagement by 
Dworkin and Tribe with an important statement of originalism by Justice Scalia, along with 
rebuttals of those criticisms by Justice Scalia). 
 492.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 150 (concluding that Dworkin needed a 
moral-political argument, not a linguistic argument against Justice Scalia’s originalism). One of 
the puzzles in Marmor’s account is that he denies that Dworkin is a moral realist. Id. at 138 
n.15 (citing Ronald M. Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & 
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guments because he denies that linguistic arguments can refute the 
originalist claims. Marmor claims that Dworkin sought to show that 
the originalist methodology relied upon a conception of the Consti-
tution that Dworkin rejects.493 The originalists’ conception of the 
Constitution relies on the historic, original meanings of what Mar-
mor calls the super-polysemic constitutional terms.494 Marmor makes 
it clear that he believes this to be a semantically proper choice—
howsoever suspect it may be as a matter of political or moral theo-
ry.495 Dworkin’s conception, by contrast, is of a Constitution that is 
pervasively informed by moral and political philosophical argument 
in a Rawlsian liberal vein. That Constitution is not and cannot be fet-
tered to historic understanding of political and moral philosophy or 
historical values or rights.496 
Marmor denies that any argument from the philosophy of lan-
guage can show that Dworkin’s Constitution is right.497 That is, on 
Marmor’s account, that Dworkin’s Constitution is the right interpre-
tation of the Constitution for us to choose. Marmor rejects 
Dworkin’s claim that philosophical accounts of language determine 
the force of the Constitution because the constitutional text is too in-
determinate to admit of definitive interpretation. Instead, Marmor 
asserts that the choice between originalist and non-originalist theo-
ries requires a normative, moral and political philosophical judg-
ment.498 Thus, on Marmor’s account, the debate over originalism can 
be resolved not on philosophical grounds, but on the basis of a sub-
stantive normative judgment underlying a substantive, normative 
conflict. The implication of Marmor’s criticism is that constitutional 
decision cannot be determined merely on the basis of a linguistic, 
philosophical account of the force of the constitutional provisions. If 
he is right about that—and I think that he is—then the determination 
 
PUB. AFF. 87 (1996) [hereinafter Dworkin, Objectivity]). Marmor does not explain his claim, 
and Dworkin’s unified value theory is a moral realist theory; Dworkin believes that there are 
moral facts. See RONALD M. DWORKIN, JUSTICE FOR HEDGEHOGS (2011). 
 493.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 146–50. 
 494.  Id. Marmor defines a super-polysemic term as one encompassing a particularly wide 
range of meanings sensitive to a wide range of contexts and considerations. One might question 
whether this concept is similar to Molière’s dormative power, but I cannot explore that possibil-
ity here. 
 495.  Id.  
 496.  Id. at 149–50. 
 497.  Id. at 150 (concluding that Dworkin’s claim needs a “moral-political argument, not a 
linguistic one.”). 
 498.  Id. at 150. 
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of what the Constitution says, or how to decide cases, must be made 
on another ground. 
Marmor characterizes the determination of the meaning of the 
Constitution as a matter of moral and political theory.499 While he is 
right to reject linguistic considerations as determinative of constitu-
tional meaning, he is mistaken in turning to another, extra-
constitutional source for the determination of what the Constitution 
says. Marmor does not explore or defend his claim that political and 
moral choices are prior to the constitutional determinations, so his 
conclusion may perhaps not reflect a considered view.500 But Marmor 
endorses the view that the determination of the linguistic content of 
the Constitution is determined by logically prior moral and political 
choices.501 He asserts that the anti-democratic nature of the Consti-
tution’s fundamental status as a pre-commitment social construct 
creates the fundamental theoretical constitutional question.502 That 
is, how far and in what directions are we willing to go in limiting or 
reversing democratic decision making because of the Constitution? 
Marmor simply generalizes the statement of Bickel’s countermajori-
tarian challenge to judicial review. Marmor rightly highlights that the 
undemocratic features of the Constitution go beyond the exercise of 
judicial review by the Court. 
Having posited the pre-commitment puzzle as the fundamental 
theoretical metric to constitutional theory, Marmor places the 
originalists and their critics on different places with respect to this 
puzzle.503 The originalists give the pre-commitment commitment 
greater weight than do originalism’s critics.504 I have argued in earlier 
articles that our constitutional decisional practice does not need a 
foundation and cannot be grounded on a foundation.505 Our constitu-
tional decisional practice is a matter of determining whether a consti-
tutional case makes a claim for relief on the basis of one or more of 
our accepted, canonical modes of constitutional argument and then, 
 
 499.  Id. 
 500.  Id. at 148–50 (giving the example of the Eighth Amendment prohibition of cruel 
and unusual punishment as an instance of a constitutional text that cannot be interpreted on the 
basis of a linguistic account of meaning alone). 
 501.  Id. at 150. 
 502.  Id.  
 503.  Id. at 150–52. 
 504.  Id. at 151–52. 
 505.  See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 10; LeDuc, Philos-
ophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 6. 
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if so, deciding whether that claim is sufficiently compelling, in light 
of any canonical arguments against relief. Even if that claim cannot 
be sustained, Marmor’s reduction is manifestly simplistic. 506 
More fundamentally, Marmor denies that linguistic content alone 
can provide us the meaning of constitutional texts.507 Many of the 
originalists simply assert that the meaning of the constitutional text is 
generally clear; Justice Scalia made this claim expressly at Prince-
ton.508 But originalists have a second, last line of defense against 
Marmor’s claim. Even if moral and political choices are necessary, 
they argue, those choices are inherent in, and made by, the Constitu-
tion itself.509 Those choices are sufficient to determine the meaning 
of the Constitution. 
This reply misses the force of Marmor’s criticism, but that criti-
cism is misdirected. Marmor is arguing that we need a political or 
ethical reason to adopt an originalist account of the meaning of the 
Constitution. In a sense, he is offering a philosophical version of the 
Dead Hand argument.510 That the normative choices are inherent in 
the Constitution is not an argument for following those choices. 
Marmor’s argument relies upon the tacit premise that we need such 
an argument.511 The anti-foundational account I have defended be-
fore entails that no such argument is necessary for arguments from 
the historical understanding of the text or from the text itself, as ca-
nonical forms of our constitutional decisional argumentative practice, 
remain good modes of argument.512 If we do not need such an argu-
ment to support the originalist modes of argument nor the non-
originalist modes of argument then Marmor’s argument has not ad-
vanced the fruitless debate over originalism in any way that makes a 
difference to our constitutional practice. 
 
 506.  Thus, for example, in the three important recent cases I discuss in LeDuc, Beyond 
Babel, supra note 35, Marmor’s claim that we can reduce the argument to a two step process—
choice of political/moral theory coupled with an interpretation of the constitutional text—
appears wholly unsatisfactory as a description of the arguments of the Court and the dissenting 
Justices. See generally LeDuc, Beyond Babel, supra note 35. 
 507.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 154–55. 
 508.  SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 45. 
 509.  BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 176–77. 
 510.  See generally Frank Easterbrook, Textualism and the Dead Hand, 66 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1109 (1998); BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 170–73 (addressing an objection at-
tributed to Terry Sandalow and Paul Brest). 
 511.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 154–55. 
 512.  See generally LeDuc, Anti-Foundational Challenge, supra note 10; LeDuc, Onto-
logical Foundations, supra note 6. 
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As noted above, in a claim paralleling Dworkin’s linguistic argu-
ment, Solum claims to construct an originalist theory that is ground-
ed on objective, non-normative philosophy of language.513 Although 
Marmor does not address Solum’s theory directly, confining his focus 
to the Scalia-Dworkin debate, it is valuable to explore how Marmor 
would respond to Solum’s expansive originalist claims. Because So-
lum defends semantic originalism on semantic grounds, it may appear 
that Marmor would need to reject Solum’s claim if he is to maintain 
his stance that resolving the debate over originalism and constitu-
tional interpretation generally requires substantive, normative    
judgments. 
That conclusion is questionable for two reasons. First, Solum’s 
contribution thesis masks substantial gaps in his explanatory theory. 
The contribution thesis, which states that the linguistic content of 
statements of constitutional law contributes to the constitutional con-
tent of such statements, is a black box. How that contribution arises is 
never made very clear.514 The leading argument is made from within 
our constitutional practice in support of the moderate version of the 
thesis, which states that the linguistic content of the constitutional 
text is the privileged, non-exclusive source of constitutional law.515 
According to that argument our constitutional practice treats the lin-
guistic content of the Constitution as the law.516 Solum makes an in-
dependent argument that this version of the contribution thesis is 
consistent with our constitutional practice more generally.517 But So-
lum’s claim to privilege linguistic content is inconsistent with pru-
dential, structural, and doctrinal arguments made routinely in the 
Court—and accepted as determinative of constitutional cases pre-
sented there. 
Solum’s claim that the linguistic content of the constitutional text 
is privileged is mistaken. Solum recognizes the tension between his 
claim and our practice of constitutional argument and decision and 
tries to rehabilitate apparent counterexamples.518 For example, he ar-
 
 513.  Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 21–22 (endorsing the claim of classi-
cal originalism that the original meaning of the Constitution controls because it is the law). 
 514.  See Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 134–39 (distinguishing three ver-
sions of the Contribution Thesis). 
 515.  Id. at 134–36. 
 516.  Id. at 136–37. 
 517.  Id. at 136–39. 
 518.  Id. at 138. Baude undertakes a similar but more ambitious effort to rehabilitate the 
non-originalist precedents. See William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 
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gues that restrictive reading of the Privileges and Immunities Clause 
is now part of our law only as a matter of precedent.519 That is, So-
lum’s account fails to acknowledge the diverse modes of constitution-
al argument that often trump the linguistic import of the constitu-
tional text. Our practice does not privilege any of the canonical 
modes of constitutional argument. There is nothing special about the 
linguistic content or historical understanding of that content. 
It might be that Marmor would accept or reject Solum’s theory 
depending on the nature of the contribution mechanic. To the extent 
that linguistic content contributes to the content of the law while al-
lowing room for a fundamental contribution by political and moral 
normative choices, Marmor could accept Solum’s theory. It is more 
likely that Solum’s claim that the contribution thesis states a non-
normative objective claim about the source of constitutional law 
would compromise Solum’s theory for Marmor. Marmor asserts that 
the choices of interpretation (if done) and decision require moral and 
political judgment. Solum’s claim to derive some significant content 
of the constitutional law without recourse to such judgment would 
appear mistaken on Marmor’s account. The second path to harmo-
nize Solum’s theory with Marmor’s criticism of Dworkin’s argument 
in the debate with Justice Scalia relies on Solum’s acknowledgment of 
the normative nature of the fidelity thesis. Solum characterizes the 
source of our obligation to be faithful to the constitutional content of 
semantic originalism as grounded in moral and political theory. That 
requirement of a normative argument might also reconcile Solum’s 
theory with Marmor’s criticism. Again, however, I think that recon-
ciliation would be problematic. Marmor rejects the claim that seman-
tic analysis or theory can answer hard constitutional cases; he throws 
in his lot with Dworkin.520 As a result, it is not enough that constitu-
tional law rely globally on normative claims; the content of local con-
stitutional disputes must be determined by substantive normative 
claims. Solum’s fidelity theory does not satisfy this requirement. 
 
2349, 2376–86 (2015) (making a masterful, yet unpersuasive effort to demonstrate that our con-
stitutional decisional practice is overwhelmingly originalist, including the decision of prece-
dents like Brown that are widely thought to fall outside the originalist canon). Baude’s brilliant 
rendition of this reinterpretation is one of the most powerful pieces of evidence for the patho-
logical scholasticism of the originalism debate. 
 519.  Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 138. 
 520.  Ronald Dworkin, Is There Really No Right Answer in Hard Cases?, in A MATTER 
OF PRINCIPLE 119, 119 (1985) (arguing that there is indeed one right answer, even to hard le-
gal questions, through the application of moral and political philosophical argument). Marmor 
might permit some constitutional law to be determined semantically. 
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Marmor’s argument that the debate over originalism is funda-
mentally a substantive political disagreement is mistaken. Proof of 
that error arises from careful attention to the practice of constitu-
tional argument and decision. Argument in constitutional law is not 
made as, and is not reducible to, what we recognize as political or 
moral argument.521 Doctrine and the other modes of constitutional 
argument have a vitality that appears resistant to such political re-
characterization.522 Thus, disagreement over constitutional cases and 
questions, while admitting of an obvious political dimension, also 
proceeds within the autonomous realm of constitutional argument. 
The debate over originalism is a debate purportedly about the proper 
methods to decide such cases. It is similarly irreducible to political or 
moral argument or calculus. 
More subtly, Marmor is mistaken because there can be no winner 
or loser in the debate over originalism. That debate is founded on 
mistaken premises. Marmor is right, I think, in recognizing that both 
originalists and Dworkin appeal to an objective Constitution, but 
those Constitutions are very different. He is mistaken in his tacit as-
sumption that one of those objective Constitutions exists as the reali-
zation of our collective political choices. Neither has an independent, 
objective existence. Both Constitutions are partial descriptions of the 
potential result of the application of particular modes of constitution-
al argument. The nature of constitutional argument precludes that 
either will be realized, and neither is an ideal to which dispositive ap-
peal may be made in constitutional argument. To the extent Marmor 
is a moral relativist, this conclusion may not be far from the result 
that obtains on his account, but the path is radically different than he 
argues. To the extent that he is not, and thinks that Dworkin has the 
stronger side of the moral and political philosophical argument, 
Marmor’s assessment of the originalism debate is fundamentally mis-
taken. In sum, Marmor’s philosophical account of language in law is 
insightful and creative, but flawed in fundamental respects. In partic-
ular, he argues that constitutional interpretation must be premised on 
normative constitutional choices outside our constitutional law. He, 
too, fails in his philosophical assault on the debate over originalism 
despite the sophistication of his philosophical arguments and tools. 
 
 521.  See generally FRIED, SAYING, supra note 193; Fried, Constitutional Doctrine, supra 
note 278. 
 522.  See generally Philip Bobbitt, Is Law Politics?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 1233, 1249–50 
(1989) (generally rejecting the reduction of law to politics). 
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Scott Soames has recently defended a purportedly post-originalist 
account of constitutional interpretation that he dubs deferential-
ism.523 His account is a tour de force, at once suggesting a defense of 
Lochner,524 while discrediting Griswold525 and Roe v. Wade.526 
Soames calls his interpretative theory deferentialism because it defers 
both to the rationale of the authoritative legal actors who adopted the 
relevant authoritative law and to the legal content of such law.527 
Soames characterizes his account as “post-originalist” because his 
theory offers “a new conception of legal interpretation that has close 
affinities with originalism, while shedding much of its accumulated 
baggage.”528 He contrasts it as looking to linguistic content, not 
merely semantic meanings, on the basis that the austerity of semantic 
meanings is inadequate to perform the communicative function of 
the constitutional text.529 Soames defends a theory of interpretation 
that looks first to linguistic content of the legal text and only then to 
the purposes of the authors.530 
Soames begins with Justice Scalia’s analysis and decision in his 
dissent in Smith v. United States.531 He scores Justice Scalia as right 
in identifying the central question in the case, wrong in his semantic 
and linguistic analysis, and right in his decision.532 Although Soames 
would articulate it differently, Justice Scalia correctly focused on the 
question of what the legal content of the relevant statute was. For 
Soames, that is a question of what was asserted by the enacting dem-
ocratic legislative body.533 Soames denies Justice Scalia’s claim to re-
 
 523.  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2. The name derives from Soames’s theory of a 
unified theory of interpretation, applying both to statutory and constitutional interpretation. 
Soames’s account largely glosses over the different performative missions of statutes and consti-
tutions. Id. at 597 n.1. It is a subtle but perhaps unimportant question whether Soames’s defer-
entialism ought to be treated as a variety of the New Originalism or whether he ought to be 
treated as a critic, as I do here. Given my stance with respect to the debate over originalism, I 
do not believe much of substance turns on this classification. 
 524.  Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 525.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (recognizing a constitutional right of 
privacy). 
 526.  410 U.S. 113 (1973); Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 606–13. 
 527.  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 606. 
 528.  Id. at 597. The baggage that Soames believes originalism carries includes overly am-
bitious and mistaken claims about the nature of semantic meaning and the failure to recognize 
that in certain limited circumstances that the judge must make law. 
 529.  Id. at 598; see also SOAMES, Legal Texts, supra note 2. 
 530.  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 597. 
 531.  Id. at 598–600. 
 532.  Id.  
 533.  Id. at 598–99. 
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duce the meaning to the most common semantic meaning, instead 
emphasizing what Marmor would style the polysemy of the phrase.534 
Soames argues that in the absence of context that would support an 
alternative choice among the multiple semantic meanings the phrase 
“uses a firearm” should be understood in the same way urged by Jus-
tice Scalia.535 That is because the enacted statute “was used to assert 
or stipulate” that the firearm must be used as a firearm in the com-
mission of the crime for the enhanced penalty to apply.536 Soames 
immediately assumes that the judicial decision is determined by the 
identification of the asserted content of the statute.537 
Soames argues affirmatively for his approach on the basis that le-
gal and constitutional texts, like other natural language utterances 
and texts, often have underdetermined semantic meaning and under-
determined purpose on the part of the speaker or relevant actor.538 
Thus, while the identification of the legal content of a constitutional 
(or other legal) provision is the first step in interpretation, the process 
cannot end there. Instead, the second step of the interpretative pro-
cess in deferentialism, rectification, requires that the judge make 
law.539 Soames’s account of interpretation does not make that project 
a matter of filling the indeterminate interstices of the otherwise de-
terminate meaning of the text.540 He does not adopt a model of de-
terminate core, indeterminate penumbra and his is account of the 
sources of indeterminate meaning are richer than that traditional 
model.541 But while theoretically different, the process appears in 
many ways similar on its face to that traditional account. 
Soames identifies three types of rectification. The first he terms 
precisification.542 In that step, the judge seeks to adopt the (i) mini-
 
 534.  Id.; MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 121–23. 
 535.  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 600. 
 536.  Id.  
 537.  Id.  
 538.  Id. at 603–04 (arguing sarcastically that when the legal text does not have a determi-
nate meaning “we should not pretend that Beneficent Providence has rescued the legislation by 
transubstantiating the lawmakers’ flawed performance into a determinate, consistent, rational-
ized, and morally acceptable product.”). 
 539.  Id. at 604 (“[T]he task of the judge is not to discover an idealized law that is already 
there; it is to make new law.”). 
 540.  For what has been generally read as a classical statement of the interstices theory, 
see H.L.A. Hart, The Separation of Law and Morals, 71 HARV. L. REV. 593, 608 (1957). 
 541.  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 598–603. 
 542.  Id. Soames adopts the barbarism of “precisification” because while he believes it 
possible to make the statement of constitutional authorities more precise, he does not believe 
that those statements will always determine a unique semantic meaning. 
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mum (ii) principled determinate content consistent with the (iii) ra-
tionale of the enacting or adopting body.543 Soames acknowledges 
that this “process is not algorithmic”;544 by that I understand him to 
mean that it requires the exercise of judgment and is, itself, not fully 
determined. Yet without a concept of measurement, it is unclear how 
the process he describes could proceed. Like Justice Scalia defending 
the certainty possible with originalism, Soames asserts that the con-
tent sought is “epistemically discernable.”545 Each of the elements of 
Soames’s theory warrants comment. Soames repeatedly characterizes 
the process as requiring a minimal determination, but he never ex-
plains what that means. Soames requires the process of precisification 
to be principled, but does not explain what that requirement de-
mands. Soames articulates the concept of the rationale for a constitu-
tional provision to which his theory appeals more fully. Beginning 
with what the rationale is not, Soames distinguishes the causal mo-
tives behind the adoption.546 Instead, he focuses upon the express 
public reasons advanced for the adoption.547 Soames wants to offer an 
account of constitutional meaning in the space of reasons, not in the 
space of causes. 
The second type is harmonization of conflicting authorities.548 
Here Soames addresses the problem of potentially inconsistent 
sources of law.549 According to Soames, such potential inconsistencies 
are to be resolved and the potential conflicting legal authorities har-
monized by minimizing the surgery that must be done to the existing 
legal authorities while maximizing the realization of the rationales for 
the disparate enactments.550 Soames does not explain his metric for 
 
 543.  Id. at 605. 
 544.  Id.  
 545.  Id.  
 546.  Id. (“By ‘rationale,’ I do not, of course, mean the causally efficacious motives that led 
them to act, which are often epistemically inscrutable and constitutively irrelevant.”). 
 547.  Id. (characterizing the rationale as the “chief reasons publicly offered to justify and 
explain the law’s adoption”). 
 548.  Id.  
 549.  A constitutional example is the general provision that the Vice President presides 
over the Senate and the express provision that the Chief Justice presides over the impeachment 
trial of the President in the case of an impeachment trial of the Vice President—although tech-
nically, of course, there is not literal conflict. This example highlights, I think, that the concept 
of conflict is subtler and less formal than we sometimes imagine. 
 550.  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 606 (“[T]he judge is required to fashion the 
minimal modification of existing laws that removes the inconsistency and allows a unique ver-
dict to be reached, while maximizing the fulfillment of the discernable legislative rationales of 
the laws in question.”). 
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measuring the modification that must be made to existing authority, 
and the challenge of formulating a measure that would at least permit 
an ordering of potential readings would appear substantial. 
Measuring the extent of a modification to an authoritative consti-
tutional provision cannot be simply a matter of counting the number 
of words that must be imputed or deleted. In the absence of a canoni-
cal formal language to state constitutional provisions, that measure 
would be unworkable because it would vary with the linguistic ex-
pression of constitutional provisions. The measure must instead be a 
matter of the conceptual legal content of the subject. That is a com-
plex and unacknowledged and unarticulated concept. Moreover, the 
metric would somehow need to measure the rationales underlying the 
disparate authorities. Such a notion would be required for Soames to 
be able to measure the difference between a constitutional or other 
legal provision before the modification occurring in harmonization 
and the authority after such harmonization. A judgment must be 
made about the scope of the application of a provision and the nature 
of that application. The effect of some provisions, when and if they 
apply, is more profound than others. It is not clear how Soames 
thinks this judgment ought to be made under his theory. At the least, 
the philosophical precision that he purports to offer appears         
questionable. 
Soames cannot simply discard a notion of measure in his account 
of harmonization. A notion of measure makes it possible for Soames 
to assess the potential competing ways to harmonize conflicting or 
incomplete constitutional authorities without falling back on judg-
ments outside those authorities. The notion of measure purports to 
allow Soames to assess competing harmonizations for their fit and 
power. Without that measure he must acknowledge that the conflict 
and gaps cannot be resolved within the four corners of the linguistic 
content of the constitutional text. That linguistic step is central to 
Soames’s strategy to privilege the original linguistic content of the 
constitutional text. 
Third, and last, harmonization is also required when a case pre-
sents a conflict between the semantic meaning of a constitutional au-
thority and its rationale.551 Here, too, the modification of the existing 
authority is the least necessary to reach consistency with the ra-
tionale.552 A similar problem of measurement arises as with the modi-
 
 551.  Id.  
 552.  Id. 
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fication of inconsistent authorities. Soames appears to assume that a 
problem of inconsistency between the relevant authoritative provi-
sion and its rationale will be apparent. That inconsistency may in fact 
be quite uncertain and problematic.553 
In light of Soames’s commitment to principle and to harmoniza-
tion and his goal of maximizing the realization of the rationale, it is 
also helpful to compare deferentialism with Dworkin’s interpretative 
theory of law as integrity. The key difference is the role of political 
and moral theory. That theory is central in Dworkin’s account, deliv-
ering the fundamental measure for both consistency and justice in 
constitutional adjudication.554 It is invisible in Soames’s formulation 
of deferentialism,555 but it is perhaps not entirely missing. Soames ex-
pressly takes into account the “background” within which a constitu-
tional text is adopted.556 The potential scope of that opaque and per-
haps open-ended notion becomes clear when Soames discusses 
Lochner.557 There, Soames explains what he believes would have 
been required for a robust inclusion of unenumerated rights within 
the ambit of the Due Process Clause.558 He argues that a clear 
Thayerian statement of such a rule would be controlling, even in the 
absence of an express constitutional provision.559 Although Soames 
asserts that the historical evidence fails to support such a broad read-
ing of the Clause, his discussion suggests that with an express en-
dorsement of natural law theory, for example, unenumerated rights 
would be protected under the Due Process Clause. 
 
      553.   For example, when the First Amendment provides that the Congress “shall make no 
law. . . abridging the freedom of speech. . .” the relationship between legislative rationale and 
text is complex and controversial. The Court has never interpreted the provision to mean what 
it says, as a matter of linguistic content. By contrast, what makes the question of who presides 
over the impeachment of the vice president such a delightful academic parlor game is that the 
conflict between text and rationale is so manifest—even if we do not precisely how to reason to 
the right result. See generally Goldstein, supra note 192. 
 554.  See generally DWORKIN, EMPIRE, supra note 31, at 225–75 (describing adjudication 
under his theory of law as integrity). 
 555.  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 598 (asserting that the original public un-
derstanding of what the legislation meant—not the linguistic content of the words employed in 
the legislative enactment—is the law). 
 556.  Id. at 598–603 (exploring the history of the adoption of the Due Process Clause in 
the Bill of Rights and the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 557.  Id. at 608 (“[O]ne would have to argue that the framers and ratifiers of the Fifth and 
Fourteenth Amendments understood and announced in the public rationale offered on behalf 
of the amendments that the Due Process Clause was an intentionally vague, tabula rasa on 
which future interpreters could write.”). 
 558.  Id. Soames denies, of course, that there was any such express public statement. 
 559.  Id.  
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Soames claims his interpretative stance avoids some of the power-
ful challenges that originalism faces. In particular, he argues that the 
originalist commitment to a unique semantic meaning for constitu-
tional provisions should be discarded.560 Soames argues that com-
mitment is implausible as a matter of linguistic theory and the auster-
ity of mere semantic meaning.561 In its place he would introduce a 
broader semantic and pragmatic account of the meaning of the con-
stitutional text.562 He would also, however, go beyond that linguistic 
meaning.563 In doing so, he acknowledges that judges are sometimes 
called upon to make law.564 
Soames gives the example of the application of his theory in as-
sessing the development of the Court’s line of precedent in Gris-
wold565 and Roe v. Wade.566 Under deferentialism, Soames argues 
that the opinions in those cases were wrongly argued and the cases 
themselves wrongly decided, as were their progeny, including Law-
rence v. Texas.567 Beginning with Griswold, Soames argues that the 
reasoning that created the right to privacy that was held to be violat-
ed in that case is fundamentally flawed. As he puts it, “there is no ep-
istemically legitimate inference from which a general right to privacy 
encompassing matters of sexual morality such as contraception . . . 
can be derived.”568 When Soames asserts that there is no epistemical-
ly legitimate inference, what does he mean? How is the judgment ep-
istemic, rather than as a matter of logic or our constitutional prac-
tice? Why is the focus on what we may know rather than on what is 
or what we do? Both logic and constitutional practice would appear 
plausible candidates to explain and characterize the inference. Alt-
hough I cannot explain Soames’s claim, it is fully consistent with his 
metaphilosophical stance that accords philosophical argument the 
power the authority to substantively reform our constitutional law. 
Soames does not explain why he rejects Justice Douglas’s asser-
tion that a right to privacy is inherent in the other specific protec-
tions of the Constitution and that the penumbra of that general right 
 
 560.  See id. at 598. 
 561.  Id. at 604–07. 
 562.  Id. 
 563.  Id. 
 564.  Id. at 604. 
 565.  Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).  
 566.  410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 567.  539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 568.  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 609–10. 
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extends to the Griswolds’ right to procure contraceptives. From 
Soames’s position there is nothing inherently improper in such a 
construction of constitutional principle. Moreover, it warrants note, 
after all, that just such structural and principled arguments are ex-
pressly endorsed (if not the particular argument to a right to privacy) 
by New Originalists endorsing constitutional construction.569 
When Soames asserts that such an inference is not epistemically 
valid he is asserting that such an inference is not valid, either as a 
matter of induction or deduction. Yet, such kinds of arguments are 
made all the time—with respect to the First Amendment to extend its 
protection to broadcast television and to the Internet and, in the case 
of the academic question whether the Vice President may preside 
over her own impeachment trial, from principles of separation of 
powers—and perhaps from common sense—to conclude that she may 
not. The only flaw that Soames calls out echoes Bork’s own criticism 
of Griswold.570 He challenges the implicit distinction drawn between 
personal rights, which were constitutionally protected, and economic 
rights, which were not. Soames asserts that such a distinction is un-
founded and impermissible under deferentialism.571 This argument 
tracks pretty closely Bork’s earlier argument that principles of consti-
tutional law must be neutral.572 Thus, the objection under deferen-
tialism is substantially an argument that the underlying distinction is 
not neutral. Deferentialism, in this context, adds little to the five-
decade-long debate about the existence of a constitutional right of 
privacy. So Soames’s cryptic claim that deferentialism adds an im-
portant insight into the nature of the linguistic content of the consti-
tutional text is more puzzling than persuasive. 
Soames deploys his theoretical apparatus to characterize the 
Court’s reasoning in Griswold and Roe as Lochnerian.573 By that he 
means that the Court accepted or treated the constitutive guarantees 
of the Bill of Rights as fundamental in a reading of the Due Process 
Clause. Those rights, whose penumbra created the right of privacy 
 
 569.  See, e.g., BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM, supra note 37, at 3–4; BARNETT, LOST, 
supra note 60, at 122–25, 126 (“[C]onstitutional constructions are not wholly ‘political’ nor 
wholly ‘extraconstitutional.’”). 
 570.  See Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 609; BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, 
at 257–59 (arguing that the reasoning of the Court’s decision in Griswold was not based upon 
the application of neutral constitutional principles). 
 571.  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 609. 
        572.  See BORK, TEMPTING, supra note 18, at 96-100, 146-47,  
 573.  Id. at 609–10. 
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recognized in Griswold, encompass unenumerated rights that the 
Court may, virtually without limitation, recognize and give constitu-
tional force. On Soames’s deferentialist account, that reasoning de-
parts from the constitutional law. Soames purports to discredit Roe 
in two paragraphs, characterizing it as doing nothing more than 
“vastly extending” the right of privacy recognized in Griswold 
through Lochnerian reasoning and the application of stare decisis.574 
Soames’s criticism of Roe is startling for its naiveté. The argu-
ment moves so fast and boldly that it is difficult to reconstruct in a 
more reasoned way—ironically, Soames’s argument is not unlike 
Soames’s characterization of the Court’s reasoning in Roe itself. 
Soames concludes that the argument from stare decisis fails and the 
decision (and opinion) is flagrantly non-deferentialist and therefore 
wrong.575 
Although Soames does not discuss Brown,576 it is instructive to 
test the reasoning and decision in that case under deferentialist theo-
ry. One of the threshold issues presented is how to assess Plessy as 
precedent under that theory.577 It might be possible to read Brown 
simply as applying the separate but equal test of Plessy and finding 
that separate is never equal in public education.578 The deferentialist 
inquiry would begin with determining what the legal content of the 
separate but equal test, as prescribed by Plessy is. The school system 
in Kansas City pretty clearly satisfied the requirement of separate-
ness. The difficult questions turn on the content of the requirement 
that the two systems be equal. Under Soames’s deferentialism, the 
precisification of the content of the requirements of “equal protec-
tion” as glossed by the requirement that the benefits of state action 
be at least “separate but equal” is an inquiry that goes beyond the se-
mantic meaning of the words. It is hard to believe that the historical 
record showing that segregated schools were common, widely ac-
cepted, and expressly embraced by many of the members of the Con-
 
 574.  Id. at 610. 
 575.  Id.  
 576.  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 577.  Soames acknowledges the issues presented for deferentialism by precedent. See 
Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 613. 
 578.  That is, after all, a rather literal reading of the Court’s opinion. Read less literally, 
even before Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), the Court’s decision may be understood to 
signal that the racially discriminatory Jim Crow laws and associated structures of racial discrim-
ination were to be struck down under the Constitution. The view that I am defending is that 
the choice between those competing interpretations could only be made over time as the Court 
wrestled with the cases that came before it—and chose those cases (and rejected others). 
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gress that proposed the Fourteenth Amendment579 would not be dis-
positive of the historical question as to the public understanding of 
the scope of the Fourteenth Amendment. Under deferentialism, a 
new understanding that equal protection requires a richer equality 
than was accepted as sufficient at the time of Reconstruction is not 
available. Raoul Berger and Alexander Bickel have the better side of 
the historical controversy.580 We have made political and moral pro-
gress in our thinking about racial equality in the past two centuries. 
Soames might argue that the semantic meaning of “equal” pre-
cluded the understanding and expectations that the relevant original 
actors had on adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment. Soames can-
not make that argument, given the polysemy of equal, particularly in 
the context of the phrase “equal protection of the laws.” In that con-
text, it appears implausible to assert that equality has some crystalline 
precision that was understood to preclude separate provision of edu-
cation. Soames’s deferentialism is freighted with the understanding of 
the constitutional text at the time of its adoption. Thus, it would ap-
pear, Brown was mistakenly decided and reasoned under deferential-
ism.581 If that is right, deferentialism would appear to be a theory of 
interpretation with an extraordinarily short half-life.582 
There is nevertheless a lot in Soames’s theory that is important 
and original; three insights warrant highlighting. First, his focus on 
the performative dimension of the Constitution and the need to read 
 
 579.  See Michael W. McConnell, Originalism and The Desegregation Decisions, 81 VA. 
L. REV. 947 (1995) (stating a classic originalist defense of Brown); Michael J. Klarman, Brown, 
Originalism, and Constitutional Theory: A Response to Professor McConnell, 81 VA. L. REV. 
1881 (1995) (rejecting McConnell’s originalist defense of Brown). 
       580.   See RAOUL BERGER, GOVERNMENT BY JUDICIARY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT (1977; Alexander M. Bickel, The Original Understanding 
and the Segregation Decision, 69 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1955). 
 581.  See generally GREGORY BASSHAM, ORIGINAL INTENT: A PHILOSOPHICAL STUDY 
106 (1992) (characterizing Brown as the cliff over which originalism may be thrown). See also 
Posner, Bork, supra note 20, at 1374 (“No constitutional theory that implies that Brown v. 
Board of Education—which held that public school segregation violates the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment—was decided incorrectly will receive a fair hearing nowa-
days, though on a consistent application of originalism it was decided incorrectly.”) (footnote 
omitted). Moreover, even if, following McConnell, one could make an argument that Brown 
was correctly decided, it is hard to imagine such an argument reaching the decision striking 
down anti-miscegenation laws in Loving. That decision, under deferentialism, would therefore 
appear to be wrong, because it adopts an expansive reading and application of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause that was inconsistent with the understandings and expectations when the Four-
teenth Amendment was adopted. 
      582.   Whether Soames’s deferentialism is more successful as a theory of non-
constitutional legal interpretation is beyond my scope here. 
LEDUC.MACRO.FINAL_3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017  6:51 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
222 
the constitutional text in light of that performance is an important 
step forward. It is fully consistent with the arguments that I have 
been making. Soames is unduly cautious in recognizing the implica-
tions of the performative dimension of the constitutional text. He 
does not give the performative role primacy and so maintains the fo-
cus of his account of constitutional law on legal meaning. 
Second, Soames acknowledges that semantic meanings are too 
austere to capture the communicative content of legal texts. That 
recognition begins to move us beyond the dead end we have encoun-
tered in the debate over original semantic meanings—and captures 
the flaw in the public semantic meaning strategy of the New 
Originalism. Again, however, Soames believes that a more robust 
strategy to articulate the linguistic and legal content of the constitu-
tional text can generate an adequate account of our constitutional 
practice. 
Third, Soames’s careful attention to the description of legal ar-
gument is important, even as it does not go far enough. It acknowl-
edges why text and semantic meanings alone are inadequate as well as 
why any theory must face a threshold descriptive test.583 It does not 
go far enough, however, in recognizing the disparate sources of deci-
sion because the kinds of arguments that are accepted in our constitu-
tional decisional process go well beyond those permitted by deferen-
tialism. Deferentialism does not permit prudential or ethical 
argument and struggles with doctrinal or precedential argument. 
Soames acknowledges this feature of his account but views it as a 
badge of honor rather than a count in an indictment.584 But Soames 
never explains why political or other philosophical theory may trump 
the law. 
Soames’s theory is remarkable for its gaps and omissions. The 
most glaring gap arises in his move from interpretations to decisions. 
Soames simply assumes here that the project of constitutional adjudi-
cation begins—and effectively ends—with interpretation.585 That as-
sumption is inconsistent with his attention to the practice of constitu-
tional argument and decision and with his recognition of the 
performative, illocutionary, and perlocutionary force of constitutional 
 
 583.  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 212–13. 
 584.  Id. at 613–16 (criticizing the underlying rationale for non-deferentialist decisions). 
 585.  Scott Soames, Toward a Theory of Legal Interpretation, 6 N.Y.U. J.L. & LIBERTY 
231, 231 (2011) (“The constitutive task [in interpretation] is to render an authoritative judg-
ment that itself plays a role in determining what the content of the law is.”). 
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texts. It is inconsistent with his attention to those practices because 
constitutional argument and decision do not begin and end with in-
terpretation, although interpretations and arguments from interpre-
tations are an important, canonical mode of constitutional argument. 
It is inconsistent with the recognition of the performative, illocution-
ary force of constitutional texts (including opinions) because what 
constitutional cases do is to decide cases, first, and to provide guid-
ance as to the likely decision of future controversies, second. The de-
cision of those cases by stating a decision, is not, as Marmor acknowl-
edges, a matter of describing or representing the world.586 Soames 
likely attributes interpretation the central role in constitutional deci-
sion because he is committed to a classical, non-pragmatist philoso-
phy of language.587 He appears to be committed to an account of 
meaning that relies upon truth conditions.588 For Soames, it is a bold 
step to move beyond semantics to pragmatics. He is not comfortable 
with a philosophically pragmatic, functionalist account of the lan-
guage of law. By contrast, interpretation, employing semantic and 
syntactic analysis, is a recognized and comfortable concept. It is easy 
for him to exaggerate and misunderstand its place in constitutional 
adjudication. 
In conclusion, two criticisms challenge the accounts defended by 
Solum, Marmor, and Soames. First, all three employ philosophical 
argument at the core of their claims about constitutional originalism. 
Their theories are not defended as better descriptions of our consti-
tutional practice. Indeed, Scott Soames argues that his theory of def-
erentialism explains why Griswold and Roe are wrongly decided. 589 
But that argument appears to prove too much, because it also appears 
to explain why Brown and Loving were wrongly decided too, and 
that is not a viable constitutional theory in the 21st century. As with 
Solum’s use of philosophy to support originalism, none of these crit-
ics articulates their respective methodological defense for their re-
spective projects to employ foundational philosophical arguments in 
 
 586.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 61–62. 
 587.  See generally 1 SCOTT SOAMES, PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (2003); 2 SCOTT SOAMES, PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS IN THE TWENTIETH 
CENTURY (2003); SOAMES, PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, supra note 78. 
 588.  See Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 1, at 597, 599–600 (asserting, without ar-
gument, that the legal content of the law must have truth conditions); see generally SOAMES, 
PHILOSOPHY OF LANGUAGE, supra note 78, at 33–49 (describing the theoretical problems that 
have been encountered in building a theory of meaning on a theory of truth). 
 589.  Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2, at 609–10. 
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their account of constitutional theory and decision. Their ambitious 
claims are subject to the same metaphilosophical objections sketched 
above.590 Soames’s endorsement of philosophical arguments that 
would discredit Brown and Loving inadvertently provides a compel-
ling demonstration why constitutional argument is not subject to 
philosophical confirmation. 
As a philosopher, Soames might be inclined to reject the premise 
that a constitutional theory cannot reject Brown and Loving. In the 
philosophical context, a theory is not easily discredited simply be-
cause the consequences of inconsistent theories are inconsistent with 
it. In the context of constitutional law, most theorists, including most 
participants in the originalism debate, believe that there are fixed 
points and that Brown and Loving are among them. If Soames con-
cedes that constraint on constitutional theory, it is unclear how def-
erentialism could be defended or rehabilitated. Even if McConnell’s 
outlying analysis of the historical understanding of the Equal Protec-
tion Clause is endorsed, extending that analysis to Loving is          
impossible.591 
Second, a semantic account cannot account for the meaning of 
the Constitution as a doing. Indeed, a semantic account is also inade-
quate for judicial decisions, which are also performatives. Judicial de-
cisions carry consequences beyond the inferences that follow from 
what the associated judicial opinions say.592 Bush v. Gore593 stands as 
a classic example of just that role.594 The Supreme Court’s decision 
 
 590.  See the text accompanying notes 385–410, supra.  
 591.  See Walter Wadlington, The Loving Case: Virginia’s Anti-Miscegenation Statute in 
Historical Perspective, 52 VA. L. REV. 1189, 1189–90 (1966); see generally Alfred Avins, Anti-
Miscegenation Laws and the Fourteenth Amendment: The Original Intent, 52 VA. L. REV. 
1224 (1966) (arguing that the historical understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment permit-
ted anti-miscegenation laws). 
 592.  As verdictives, at the least, a final judicial decision will determine which of the par-
ties before the Court prevails and the remedy prescribed. Other decisions may simply order 
further proceedings, of course, and if verdictives, operate in this sense directly only on the low-
er courts, not upon the parties, although the parties must themselves comply with the rules and 
orders of the further proceedings. Philip Bobbitt has suggested that National League of Cities 
v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) played an expressive role in signaling to Congress the limits on 
the national government’s authority in the federal system. See BOBBITT, FATE, supra note 52, 
at 191–95 (describing a cueing function in judicial review). 
 593.  531 U.S. 98 (2000) (holding that the recount of ballots cast in Florida in the 2000 
United States presidential election ordered by the Florida Supreme Court violated the Equal 
Protection clause). 
 594.  See generally BUSH V. GORE: THE QUESTION OF LEGITIMACY (Bruce Ackerman 
ed., 2002) (generally expressing alarm as a matter of constitutional law at the role the Court 
played in the presidential election of 2000). The initial performative role of that case in ending 
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put in motion the determination of the result of the 2000 presidential 
election.595 But the equal protection analysis of that case has, at least 
in its first fifteen years, been ignored. Once we recognize that per-
formative role, and the critical importance of context, we can under-
stand why our account of the meaning and force of the Constitution 
cannot be confined to its semantic content. When we expand our ac-
count of our constitutional law and the argumentative and decisional 
processes of that law, the inadequacy of the originalism debate’s 
strategy of grounding the account of argument and decision on the 
interpretation or discovery of the meaning of the constitutional text 
becomes apparent. 
III. THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE PREMISES ABOUT 
SEMANTICS, TACIT AND EXPRESS 
The unstated premises and tacit assumptions underlying the clas-
sical debate over originalism account for important confusions. First, 
because originalism and many of its critics characterize constitutional 
disagreements as semantic, based on a particular semantic theory, the 
richness of the constitutional pragmatics—including, in particular, 
the performative character of the Constitution goes unrecognized. As 
a result, originalists and their critics have treated constitutional provi-
sions as if they were declarative texts that merely state something, ra-
ther than performative texts that do something. This mistaken stance 
toward the linguistic nature of the constitutional text (and the consti-
tutional precedents’ texts as well) has led to fruitless controversies in 
the debate about originalism. 
For example, by disregarding the performative character of the 
Constitution, both sides in the debate assume that our constitutional 
law is composed of the propositions stated by the constitutional text, 
or inferred from that text and that those propositions are true—are 
made true—by some fact in the world. If the constitutional provisions 
are recognized as performatives that are not true or false and that 
therefore have no non-trivial truth conditions, the exercise in consti-
tutional decision must be very different from that envisioned by the 
 
the contest in the courts over the outcome of the United States presidential election of 2000 has 
proved apparently more important than the conceptual content, as the case has never been cited 
by the Court. Moreover, the failure to cite the case has given the case a further performative 
role. The sound of its precedential silence, as Tribe might put it, reveals it as limited to its ear-
lier performative role—at least for now.  
 595.  Id. 
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protagonists in the debate over originalism. With respect to constitu-
tional texts, saying makes it so. In Brandom’s terms, they are taken as 
true by us rather than made true by the world.596 Thus, when the 
Court announces a holding, trying to explain the decision process it-
self as well as to assess the legitimacy of that process solely on the ba-
sis of whether the holding can be derived by valid inference from the 
original meaning of the constitutional text is a misguided mission. 
The clearest example of this performative feature of our constitu-
tional texts may be the doctrine of substantive due process. As ex-
plored above, that doctrine is to be understood for what it has done 
in our constitutional doctrine in the wake of the restrictive prece-
dents interpreting the Privileges and Immunities Clause. Even as so-
phisticated a theorist as John Hart Ely was flummoxed by the doc-
trine because he approached it looking for its semantic meaning.597 
But there are other examples as well. Much of the originalist criticism 
of Griswold and its progeny, including that leveled by Robert Bork, 
fails to understand that once the Court has announced its decision 
and its opinion, the law may be different from what it had been be-
fore the decision. Charles Fried appears to have recognized this di-
mension of doctrine even while he failed to articulate it expressly;598 
no originalist appears to have recognized the same dimension of our 
constitutional law. 
Originalism’s critics are generally in no stronger position with re-
spect to understanding the performative dimension of constitutional 
texts and its implications for accounts of constitutional meaning. For 
example, Marmor began by dismissing originalism (and the kinds of 
constitutional arguments it emphasizes). He apparently did so on the 
basis that it was mistaken as a matter of political and linguistic phi-
losophy. Marmor’s position is untenable because the historical and 
textual arguments made by the originalists are canonical arguments in 
our constitutional practice; they do not need an interpretive theory or 
a foundation. Those forms of argument cannot be excised from our 
constitutional decisional practice with a philosophical argument on 
the basis of a sophisticated account of linguistic meaning. There is no 
objective meaning of the Constitution that can be compared with the 
applications and associated meanings those arguments would yield. 
Originalism’s critics, like most originalists, have argued or as-
 
      596.   See Brandom, Articulating Reasons, supra note 88, at 83. 
      597.   See ELY, DEMOCRACY, supra note 17, at 18. 
      598.   See generally FRIED, SAYING, supra note 193. 
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sumed that identifying and articulating the meaning of the constitu-
tional text requires interpretation. Some, like Tribe, have expressly 
invoked an argument that there is an infinite regress in the constitu-
tional text absent extraconstitutional sources of law and interpreta-
tion. Others make that argument more directly. Marmor has claimed 
that while linguistic philosophy and a theory of meaning cannot re-
solve the choice among interpretive methodologies, including 
originalism, that choice can only be made with extraneous, extracon-
stitutional normative theory.599 Marmor is wrong to assert that extra-
constitutional theory can determine the resolution of constitutional 
controversies just as he was earlier mistaken to dismiss the force of 
originalism’s historical and textual arguments. Sunstein makes a 
comparable mistake when he asserts that normative choices must pre-
cede the selection of an interpretive methodology. While recognizing 
the limitations on the nature of interpretation, Sunstein appears to 
have assumed that there is something that constitutional meaning just 
is. There is not. Both Marmor and Sunstein err, as I have argued 
elsewhere, in assuming that the determination of the meaning of the 
constitutional text must be made through interpretation. They also 
err in the associated premise that such interpretation must precede 
constitutional decision.600 
An inferentialist account of constitutional meaning also under-
mines the classical originalism debate. The inferentialist account ex-
plains why we do not need a representational account of constitution-
al language to explain the meaning or truth of constitutional 
provisions or authoritative statements about those provisions. The 
classical debate has proceeded as if there were an objective Constitu-
tion whose meaning the constitutional interpretation reveals. The 
concept of the existing meaning of the Constitution’s provisions is 
the North Star of that entire project. If, instead, statements of consti-
tutional law derive their meaning from their inferential content, 
shaped by the practice of constitutional argument and decision, then 
that meaning is very different than the debate’s protagonists assume. 
The failure to understand the meaning of the constitutional texts 
inferentially has led both originalists and their critics astray. In the 
case of the originalists, a representational account of the meaning of 
 
 599.  MARMOR, LANGUAGE, supra note 2, at 149–50. 
 600.  See LeDuc, Interpretation and Constitutional Argument, supra note 17 (arguing 
that constitutional rules can be applied to decide cases without first settling on an interpretation 
of such rules). 
LEDUC.MACRO.FINAL_3.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 3/1/2017  6:51 PM 
BYU Journal of Public Law  [Vol. 31 
228 
the constitutional text underlies the associated confidence that there 
is a fact of the matter as to the accuracy of any particular account of 
such meaning. Whether that meaning is confined to semantic con-
cepts or understood somewhat more broadly with the New Original-
ists, both mistakenly think that there is a meaning that may be articu-
lated with interpretation. If we instead understand the meaning of 
our statements of constitutional law to consist in what we may do 
with those statements inferentially—and couple that understanding 
with our practice of practical constitutional inference—then we are 
more likely to appreciate that there is no benchmark of meaning that 
can adequately and independently constrain our constitutional deci-
sional practice apart from that practice itself. Originalism’s critics are 
more willing to acknowledge the limits of meaning but move imme-
diately to the conclusion that in the absence of a controlling linguistic 
meaning we must need exogenous moral or other normative judg-
ments to determine our constitutional interpretation. 
The tacit jurisprudential premises of classical originalism and its 
critics with respect to meaning thus have substantial implications for 
the debate. It is not clear that any hope of resolution is reasonable 
because while the premises about semantic meaning provide the 
foundation for the debate over originalism, a more sophisticated un-
derstanding of those premises does not resolve the competing aspira-
tions that support the theories of the originalists and their critics. 
The relevant constitutional meaning is more than semantics and the 
failure to look to those other sources of meaning has resulted in 
needless, fruitless argument and confusion. The performative role of 
the constitutional texts is more than a matter of semantic or linguistic 
communication. But even when we have a more complete account of 
the linguistic content of our constitutional texts, our constitutional 
arguments and constitutional practice cannot be adequately described 
as focused exclusively on identifying that content.601 
When we begin with the classical originalists and their critics we 
see that the debate over the question whether the original public un-
derstanding of the semantic or linguistic meaning of the Constitution 
is grounded on a commonsensical account of meaning that treats the 
meaning of words and sentences as derived from their correspond-
ence with objects and states of affairs in the world.602 But the litera-
 
 601.  See generally id. (arguing that interpretation is not prior to application of the Con-
stitution in constitutional adjudication). 
 602.  See generally LeDuc, Ontological Foundations, supra note 6. 
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ture of the debate exploring the nature of constitutional meaning is 
increasingly complex and arcane. We all learn to laugh at the paro-
dies of historical debates within Scholasticism (for example, debates 
about how many angels could dance on the head of a pin) but, even in 
a post-Kuhnian world, we never learn to consider what a modern 
scholastic debate would look like—or to recognize one when we see 
it.603 
The premises about the nature of meaning for constitutional texts 
offered by classical originalism and its critics have contributed to the 
confusion in the debate and to the stalemate therein. In particular, 
the assumption that semantic meanings have the definiteness and de-
terminacy that the protagonists generally assume has led those pro-
tagonists to a simplistic and misleading account of constitutional ar-
gument and decision. Those jurisprudential foundations are not the 
exclusive source of confusion and error in the debate, but they make a 
significant contribution. 
The New Originalists and their critics have offered a more com-
plex account of language and meaning. The New Originalists and 
their critics make their sophisticated linguistic analysis express and 
employ that analysis in defending their respective claims in the de-
bate. Substantively, they introduced the distinction between constitu-
tional interpretation and constitutional construction, but they also in-
troduced the concept of pragmatic import into their account of the 
meaning of constitutional provisions. But the New Originalists rec-
ognize limited pragmatic import. In their focus on constitutional se-
mantics, they treat the meaning of the performative text of the Con-
stitution as like that of declarative or, in Austin’s terms, constative 
sentences. That is a mistake because he misses the performative di-
mension of the Constitution. That performative dimension explains 
(and rehabilitates) apparent barbarisms like substantive due process. 
When we look beyond the semantic meaning of the constitution-
al text we find that its pragmatic import, performative role, and infer-
ential content are significant elements in an account of the meaning 
of the Constitution. But those performative dimensions of the consti-
tutional meaning are not accounted for adequately by either side in 
 
 603.  But see Tushnet, Heller, supra note 3, at 623 (“[C]riticizing [that] the new original-
ism, . . . is futile and, more importantly, uninteresting. We can examine originalism’s varia-
tions—in my view, Ptolemaic epicycles” and suggesting that the entire debate over originalism 
has become unproductive). Tushnet is clearly moving toward the reductive approach to the de-
bate that I defend here, but as a long-time participant in that debate he is unable to fully extract 
himself from engaging in the debate so as to be able to construct the path forward. 
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the originalism debate. Indeed, the missing elements of constitutional 
meaning call the very project of both sides of the debate into question 
because the assumed importance of linguistic meaning is exaggerated 
in the debate. When we have articles urging that the public under-
standing of the constitutional text was of synecdoches and hendia-
dyses and analyses of the meaning of those texts in terms of polysemy 
and super polysemy—as well as arguments that Brown, Loving, and 
Roe v. Wade should be understood as originalist decisions—we 
should begin to wonder if the originalism debate has become—or has 
been revealed as—scholastic and pathological. 
Once the underlying premises about meaning are identified and 
articulated, it might appear that the New Originalists and their critics 
will have put the debate on a firm foundation from which it can now 
proceed at a new, more sophisticated level.604 Originalism may now 
defend its semantic account of constitutional meaning, or choose to 
supplement that semantic account with other sources of linguistic or 
communicative content. Correspondingly, originalism’s critics may 
articulate and defend their account of the linguistic and communica-
tive content of the constitutional texts, and incorporate those express 
premises into their challenge to originalism. Such a development 
would reshape the respective stances in the debate, as the purported 
commonsensical stance sometimes assumed on each side would no 
longer be tenable. Nevertheless, when the debate over originalism is 
recast each side may believe that the debate may be finally won, alt-
hough the protagonists would disagree about which side would      
prevail. 
There is little or no potential for the protagonists to rehabilitate 
the debate over originalism in light of the concerns developed here. 
The debate over originalism relies upon the confusion about its un-
derlying premises. An originalism that acknowledges its philosophical 
commitments inherent in endorsing a constitutional theory that relies 
exclusively on the semantic meaning of the language of constitutional 
 
 604.  For fifty years or so the protagonists in the debate have tried unsuccessfully to bring 
the debate to a successful conclusion. See, e.g., Sachs, Legal Change, supra note 218 (offering a 
novel positivist argument for originalism on the basis that originalism’s critics cannot explain 
how the constitutional changes from its original content); SUNSTEIN, RADICALS, supra note 20; 
SCALIA, INTERPRETATION, supra note 19, at 149 (concluding, presciently, that the critics of 
originalism face future reverses in the courts); Posner, Bork, supra note 20 (concluding, mistak-
enly, that Bork’s Tempting will result in the demise of originalism); BORK, TEMPTING, supra 
note 18, at 251 (concluding, mistakenly, that non-originalist theories of constitutional interpre-
tation are impossible). 
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provisions, on the one hand, or an originalism that goes beyond those 
semantic meanings and acknowledges employing methods of implica-
ture which go well beyond that meaning, is very different from the 
naïve and purportedly commonsensical originalism defended by Rob-
ert Bork and Justice Scalia. Those originalisms are different not just 
in being more sophisticated and complex, and less a matter of com-
mon sense. They are also different in being less easily accessible to 
the political society bound by the Constitution as well as less intui-
tively compelling. That is because those modern originalisms can no 
longer style themselves as unphilosophical, common sense theories. 
They might be true, as Solum asserts, but they are no longer sim-
ple.605 As a result, the New Originalism cannot deliver the accessible 
and commonsensical alternative to the constitutional jurisprudence of 
the Warren Court that the originalism articulated by Robert Bork 
and Antonin Scalia promised. 
But there is little reason to believe that the philosophical and 
constitutional claims made by the New Originalists are true, either. 
The New Originalists’ account attributes too strong a role to philo-
sophical argument, too limited a role to the inferential account of the 
meaning of the Constitution, too exaggerated a role to the Constitu-
tion as communication, and too limited a role to the performative 
dimension of the Constitution. 
Originalism’s critics are generally no more sensitive to these ele-
ments of meaning in the Constitution.606 They do not recognize the 
performative and inferential elements in the Constitution. As a result, 
the critics generally employ more traditional, semantic accounts of 
constitutional meaning. Even when the critics acknowledge the rele-
vant meaning and import beyond the austere semantic meaning of 
the constitutional authority, their account of the language of authori-
tative constitutional texts and our decisional practice with respect to 
such language ignores important aspects of that language and prac-
 
 605.  Solum also claims that the sophisticated, philosophical account of semantic original-
ism that he defends is substantively consistent to or congruent with simpler, commonsensical 
understandings. Solum, Semantic Originalism, supra note 2, at 172–73. If that were so, the 
complexity would be a second order phenomenon affecting the theoretical explanation of our 
constitutional practice. It would therefore perhaps be less troubling to the claims of originalism 
expressed in commonsensical terms. 
 606.  Soames and to a lesser extent, Solum, are exceptions because they recognize the im-
portance of pragmatics for constitutional texts. See Soames, Deferentialism, supra note 2; So-
lum, Communicative Content, supra note 2. But both are committed to an account that reduces 
constitutional content to linguistic content; that account fails to recognize the full range of per-
formative roles of the Constitution and the other constitutional authorities. 
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tice.607 In doing so, the critics find support for a project of interpreta-
tion and a search for the semantic meaning of the Constitution that 
can support their competing interpretations. Thus, the powerful 
methods of linguistic analysis have proven of little practical help in 
determining which of the competing claims in the debate are    
stronger.608 
Attention to the tacit and express premises about the meaning of 
constitutional language in the debate over originalism ought to make 
us skeptical about the promise of a productive resolution of the de-
bate between the originalists and their critics.609 To the extent that 
critics like Marmor and Solum challenge the originalist theory on the 
basis of a more philosophically sophisticated account of constitutional 
meaning, the originalism debate is poised to continue. Yet the com-
peting theories cannot carry the burden their respective proponents 
would place on them. If the debate over originalism is to be ended or 
transcended, a deeper therapeutic strategy that builds on the work 
done here and articulates the other flawed premises grounding the 
debate is necessary. That is the mission of my Ontological Founda-




 607.  Compare Greenberg, supra note 2 (criticizing the communication theory of law). 
 608.  Philosophical methods are valuable in highlighting some of the assumptions that 
underlie some of the claims in the debate about the nature and methods of constitutional inter-
pretation. See LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpretation, supra note 6. The nature 
of constitutional rules and rule following and whether there is a problem of generality that must 
be resolved by extratextual interpretative methods are good examples of how philosophical ar-
gument may provide help in our constitutional theory making. 
 609.  Other unstated premises exacerbate these concerns. See generally LeDuc, Ontologi-
cal Foundations, supra note 6; LeDuc, Paradoxes of Positivism, supra note 14 (describing the 
role in the debate of the generally unstated commitment to positivism and the implications of 
the pragmatist commitments of many critics); LeDuc, Philosophy and Constitutional Interpre-
tation, supra note 6. 
